EUAM Ukraine – Responding to Geostrategic Realities?

Reuters
Reuters

During the G-20 meeting in Brisbane, Australia, Russian President, Vladimir Putin, received a rather cold welcoming from his world counterparts. It appeared that German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British Prime Minister David Cameron, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper among others to have had critical words toward Vladimir Putin. It was even reported that Canadian Prime Minister told Vladimir Putin, “Well, I guess I’ll shake your hand, but I have only one thing to say to you: ‘You need to get out of Ukraine’.” Russian President even left the meeting before the end as he explained, “We still have to get home and be ready for work on Monday. It would be nice to be able to sleep for 4 or 5 hours.” During the last Q&A with the press, Putin claimed that “Ukraine was not discussed in any official context during the G20 discussions. The issue did not come up at all and was not even mentioned.” The G-20 meeting confirmed that the relations between the West and Russia are at one of the lowest since the end of the Cold War.

Decisions by the FAC Meeting

After a rather difficult, or even ‘humiliating‘ G-20 meeting for Vladimir Putin, the Russian President is now waiting to see what the EU and its Member States are willing to do in order to tackle the Ukrainian crisis (see here a previous analysis on the topic). On November 17th, the EU-28 met during a Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) in order to discuss the Ukrainian situation among others. HR/VP Mogherini was presiding the FAC, for the first time as the HR, principally focusing on the situation in Ukraine. The conclusions reached by the FAC are once again minimal. The United Kingdom, Poland and the Baltic states were pushing for tougher rhetorics in order to denounce Russian violations in Ukraine. As explained by Mogherini ensuing the FAC meeting, “a major EU political role on the way to find effective means to have a political solution to the crisis, engaging in dialogue with Russia.” Four dimensions were discussed during the Council meeting:

  • first, reaffirming EU’s support for the Minsk Protocol and Memorandums (pushed by France, the Benelux countries, and Finland);
  • second, underscoring the importance of the formation of the new government following the national parliamentary elections of October 26th;
  • third, eventual sanctions targeting Ukrainian separatists, possibly agreed next month. But according to German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, stricter sanctions are not currently on the table;
  • fourth, the launch on December 1st of the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine).

EUAM Ukraine – The latest CSDP mission

Source: EEAS
Source: EEAS

The EUAM Ukraine, or the latest Common Security and Defense Policy mission, will be launched on December 1st, 2014. EUAM Ukraine is a civilian, or unarmed, non-executive civilian mission. EUAM was created on July 22nd, 2014 and is led by Kálmán Mizsei, appointed on the 24th of July. From its initial creation on July 22nd to November 30th, EUAM received a €2.68 million for the start-up of the mission. More recently, the Council has allocated a budget of € 13.1m for the first 12 months of the mission’s two-year mandate starting on the 1st of December. The mission of EUAM Ukraine consists in assisting “the Ukrainian authorities in the field of civilian security sector reform, including police and rule of law.” So far, there is no indication of the size of the EUAM.

In the aftermath of its establishment in July, former HR/VP Ashton declared:

“The Ukrainian Authorities have embarked on the critical path of civilian security sector reform and have requested the support of the European Union. The EU is deploying this mission to assist Ukraine in this reform, including police and the rule of law. It will provide strategic advice for the development of effective, sustainable and accountable security services that contribute to strengthening the rule of law in Ukraine, for the benefit of all Ukrainian citizens throughout the country.”
 

Several months later, newly appointed HR/VP Mogherini announced that

“Responding to a request from Ukraine, the EU advisory mission will assist in the reform of the Ukrainian civilian security sector, including police and civilian security services, public prosecution and the courts. EU experts will work for efficient, trusted civilian security institutions under democratic control. Like the Association Agreement, the Status of  Mission Agreement is a further sign of our joint efforts for a genuine reform process for Ukraine.”
 

The Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) has already been signed between the HR/VP Mogherini and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin, permitting an immediate launch of the operation on the 1st of December. Despite a small budget, the EUAM mandate and mission is enormous. EUAM is supposed to advise on a reform strategy over the civilian security sectors, including the police and the rule of law, and oversee its implementation. In a report produced by Bruxelles2, Nicolas Gros-Verheyde underscored the degree of challenges in creating and implementing the rule of law in Ukraine in a two-year period considering the level of corruption, the nature of the police forces – an historically politicized and militarized instrument -, and reaffirming the power of a centralized government – as some regions are under militia control -.

The implementation and deployment of EUAM Ukraine is a positive note for the EU as its represent a certain willingness to act in Ukraine aside the OSCE. Unfortunately, EUAM Ukraine does not address the root cause of the current tension in Ukraine, Russia. Even though, European leaders have talked tough in Australia, they are still not addressing the real problem represented by Russia. In her recent op-ed, Judy Dempsey underscored how Chancellor Merkel perceives Russia as the main threat to Europe’ security and her continuous interaction with her Russian counterpart as she does not trust him.

Following the G-20 meeting, Chancellor Merkel made some comments about the Ukrainian crisis, saying “suddenly we are confronted with a conflict which goes to the center of our values, so to speak. Now we can’t hold speeches at commemorations. Now we have to show what we have learned from all this.” Chancellor Merkel was clear on advancing the need for Europe to stop the talking and finally start behaving as a regional power. Additionally, Dempsey wrote that “The recent bout of Western sanctions against Russia have shown how the diplomatic path is not working. That is all the more reason for European leaders to accept the changing geostrategic realities.” Once again, EUAM illustrates the gap between between the rhetorics and the actions.

The Use of Economic Power to Asserting Europe’s Power?

To some degree EUAM Ukraine can be compared, in terms of strategic choice, to the failed EU mission in Afghanistan, EUPOL-A, trying to reform the Afghan National Police (ANP) in wartime. Despite, American and Western military presence, the EU was unable to perform such complex and lengthy process considering the security challenges in Afghanistan among other reasons. In Ukraine, wherein combats are taking place in the Eastern part of the country, wherein Russian presence and influence is undeniable, how can the EU be successful at reforming the civilian security sector in two years. Not significant reforms can be implemented until the borders are secure, the political situation of Eastern part of Ukraine is settled, and the central government of Ukraine is legitimate all around the country. EUAM Ukraine should be launched once the status of Ukraine is settled and Russian influence minimized, not before.

Right now, the EU ought to address the military threat represented by Russia on the European continent against Ukraine and some EU Member States. The EU and its Member States are not committed to use hard power, so they will need to increase the economic sanctions against Russia. EUAM does not respond to the geostrategic realities in Europe, deeper and stricter economic sanctions would finally demonstrate EU commitment to enforcing its influence and responding to Russian actions. The EU has demonstrated that it is not and does not want to become a military power in order to assert its influence and power, its economic engine and market may be the instrument to do so. “Merkel believes that German industry, and Europe as a whole,” argued Dempsey, “must be willing to pay the price for Putin’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.” History has demonstrated that there is always a cost to pay in order to assure one’s security. The EU feels that by adopting a ‘wait and see’ approach, the security threat embodied by Russia will eventually disappear. The battle over Ukraine may be a bigger fight about the future of geopolitics and peace on the European continent.

(Copyright 2014 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

Power Transition from Ashton to Mogherini

mogherini

On November 1st, 2014, the transfer of power from Catherine Ashton to Frederica Mogherini was finally official. Federica Mogherini is the third High Representative (HR), as well referred as EU foreign minister, in EU history. The first HR, Javier Solana of Spain, was appointed in 1999 and remained at the helm for two mandates (1999-2009), followed by Catherine Ashton of the UK for one mandate (2009-2014), to now Federica Mogherini of Italy (2014-).

Before drawing some expectations on what the EU under HR Mogherini may look like, one should reflect on the transition of power from one High Representative to another: Solana to Ashton to Mogherini. Out of the three High Representatives, Mogherini seats comfortably behind Solana in terms of promising situations, meaning EU Member States’ willingness to commit to EU foreign affairs, economic position of the EU, and global forces. Catherine Ashton received the worst situation possible once appointed as HR in 2009. Considering the domestic, regional and international situations, it would have been very difficult for any appointee to make it into a successful tenure.

The Position and Role of the High Representative

The position of High Representative was established at the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 Solana-fermeture-014and the first High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy was appointed in 1999 after the European Council meeting of Cologne (for more in depth analysis on the position of the HR refer to these books, here and here). The article J.8.3 of the Amsterdam Treaty mentions the position of HR and states that the Presidency will be assisted by the HR. The description of the job requirements was very broad, as the HR ought to contribute with assistance of the Council to the “formulation, preparation, and implementation of policy decisions” on foreign and security policy matters (Official Journal of the European Union 2007: Article J.16). The HR was supposed to increase the cooperation between the various actors in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), bring coherence in the rotating processes of the six-month presidencies, and to make the EU a more visible international actor.

Until the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), the position of the HR did not evolve institutionally speaking. Javier Solana made his marks all over the position during his tenure. With Lisbon, the new position became the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission. The Lisbon Treaty made the position of HR more complex and as well cross-institutional, as the HR sits now at the Commission and at the Council, whereas before the Treaty of Lisbon, the HR was only sitting at the Secretariat of the Council. The position of the HR is now the bridge between a supranational institution, the Commission, the Member States, the Council, and the institution at the HR’s disposition, the European External Action Service (EEAS). The most important change in the position of the HR is its double-role, supranational and intergovernmental all at the same time. As opposed to her predecessor, HR Mogherini has announced her moving from the EEAS building to the Commission’s building, wherein she will be residing. The Treaty of Lisbon made the position of the HR one of the most powerful and visible figure in the Union.

From Ashton to Mogherini

A vast literature, mostly from media and think tanks, have demonstrated, since her appointment, how Catherine Ashton has been a weak HR and certainly not very savvy in dealing with foreign affairs. Cathy Ashton even describes herself as the “accidental diplomat” (O’Connor 2010). HR Ashton certainly scored some late successes with the agreement in Kosovo (despite the recent scandal over the EU mission in Kosovo) and Iran. For the rest, HR Ashton has been invisible and quiet.  As compared to Federica Mogherini, Catherine Ashton took the helm of European foreign policy at a very difficult time. One should recognize that Ashton faced three fundamental difficulties when appointed HR/VP in 2009.

First, the world markets were at their lowest after the collapse of the global financial markets in 2007. The Eurozone was already feeling the tension and several EU Member States were already showing serious signs of weakness such asPortugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain, formerly known as the PIIGS. The future of the Union looked very bleak at that point and many thought that neither the EU nor the Euro would survive the crisis. The financial crisis, and its consequences on the eurozone, was the first real challenge ever faced by the EU. Many realized the degree of incoherence, unpreparedness in the design of the Union and its monetary union. Ultimately, the CSDP was not the priority for neither the EU nor the Member States. The Union turned into crisis-mode and let the CSDP on the side. The CSDP was after ten years of existence considered a luxury good that Member States could easily dispense themselves from, especially the European powerhouses with effective diplomatic and defense instruments. During the Solana era, Member States were committed to the CSDP experiment and were willing to spend money and contribute in terms of capabilities and humans. This was not the same under Ashton, whom had to deal with less money, less political will, and an messy world order.

Second, Ashton was being appointed right after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009. The Treaty of Lisbon changed a lot the EU in terms of foreign and security policy. First, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – or foreign policy – and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) – or European defense – were merged into the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Second, the Treaty of Lisbon established the European External Action Service (EEAS). Cathy Ashton had one year to design a new institution and make it operational. Third, the position of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy was transformed into a double-hatted position, the High Representative of European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). Prior to Ashton, the HR was simply part of the Secretary of the Council of the EU, now the HR is not only leading a new body, the EEAS, and chairing at the Commission. The double-hatted position merges two contradictory institutional forces, inter-governmentalism and supranationalism.

Las but not least, Cathy Ashton took over European foreign policy after its first and very successful HR Javier Solana. Javier Solana, a savvy Spanish politician, was prior hisCatherine_Ashton_and_solana appointment at the helm of European foreign affairs in 1999, Secretary General of NATO from 1995 to 1999. During his leadership at the head of the Alliance, he oversaw the massive air campaign over Kosovo in 1998 and demonstrated on the international stage his savviness in working with Europe and the US. During his time at the head of European foreign policy, he was the person that pushed the ESDP from its paper-status into a civilian-military instruments seeing its first action in 2003. He has as well axiomatic during the nuclear negotiation with Iran in 2002-03, known as the EU3+1. The +1 being HR Solana, which rose the question of knowing if Solana was speaking in the name of Europe, or simply being an intermediary between the EU3 and the rest of the Union. Last, Solana finally was important in answering Kissinger’s question, “what is the phone number of Europe?”

Yes, Cathy Ashton was not the best HR/VP that European experts were dreaming about. But she embodied what the powerful EU Member States wanted, a leaderless HR/VP shifting the EU from a risk-taking EU into a risk-averse EU. EU Member States, especially France, Germany and the UK, wanted in 2009 to avoid another Solana and settled on the appointment of Ashton. For her defense, as demonstrated above, her set of cards could not really allow her to do anything positive. During her mandate, she illustrated herself more as an administrator than a strategic leader. Her clear achievement, though, is the EEAS, that she was able to create and implement in one year.

A Welcome’s Note

hq_hp_mogherini_enAs opposed to Ashton, Mogherini’ situation is much more promising and could allow her to be an effective HR/VP. She embodies a new generation of European leaders and is from Italy, a founding Member State, that wants to redeem itself after the years of crisis. Mogherini’s experience in foreign affairs is certainly greater than Ashton’s, but lesser than Solana. It will be interesting to see what Mogherini decides to focus on: foreign policy and/or defense. Will she help in strengthening the CSDP – civilian-military instrument -? Or, would she facilitate the transition to a more NATO integrated instrument? In terms of foreign policy issues, she has several important ones in her hands (see the excellent memo by Daniel Keohane, Stefan Lehne, Ulrich Speck, Jan Techau about the challenges facing HR Mogherini):

  • short-term, ebola, the direct threat of the Islamic State (IS), and Eastern violences in Ukraine. They all represent direct threats to the security of the Union.
  • mid-term, stabilizing the neighborhoods (Eastern and Southern) through economic and development assistances. Countries in Northern-Africa and Central Africa are facing serious domestic challenges that could completely destabilize the region. For the Union, it means rise of ethnic violence in Africa, illegal trafficking, rise of mass-migrations, and eventually rise of radical islamism, all these directly threatening the stability of the Union. The CSDP was created for exactly this purpose to stabilize the neighborhoods. Would it become the primary instrument for stabilization, peace-keeping, and institutional solidification?
  • long-term (well beyond her tenure), the survival of European influence in global affairs and the maintenance of its strategic role side by side with new powers like China and Brazil. Ashton did not have a long-term vision, will Mogherini have one? The EU still holds a favorable position in the current global order. Its Member States are key actors in international organizations, with France and Britain at the UN Security Council, with NATO, the WTO, the IMF – Christine Lagarde of France is leading it -, the World Bank and so forth. Multilateralism has always been a core component of European global strategy, now EU Member States have to solidify and empower these international organizations in order to keep them relevant in a more multipolar system. The EU has a role to play in the 21st century, but if it does not secure a seat in this new multipolar global order, it will simply become a second/third rank power.

In any case, Politipond wishes the best of luck to Federica Mogherini. She published on the EEAS website a simple message marking her commencement and calling for a new beginning:

Today we start a new story. The next five years will be challenging, we are all well aware of the difficulties that lie ahead of us. Our part of the world is facing one of the most complex periods of our recent history, still I believe we have all the tools and the capacity to overcome these times of tensions and crisis, and build peace, stability and prosperity all around Europe.
 
It’s up to us and we have great opportunities too. Vision, political will and teamwork can make us shape a much better future. Not only for Europe, but for the rest of the world. Today I start my mandate knowing that I can build on the good lessons we can learn from the past and counting on an excellent team: in the EEAS, in the Commission, in the Council and with all Member States. We know the next five years will be a turning point: we feel the responsibility to make the European dream come true.
 
Generations of Europeans expect from us a new beginning. So, ready to start!
 
Federica Mogherini
 
(Copyright 2014 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

Mogherini’s Choices

Hearing of Commissioners-designate at the European Parliament

On the 6th of October, Federica Mogherini was facing the European Parliament for her confirmation hearing as the next High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP). In an hearing of over 3 hours, she described and presented her vision of the job and the role of the EU on the international stage.

In her opening statement, Mogherini framed quite well the main questions that are oftentimes sidelined and unfortunately left continuously unanswered by national and European leaders: “In this difficult world, in these difficult times, what does the European Union do? Where do we stand? How do we make sure that we play our role in these difficult times?” She presented her plan in order to make the EU more relevant on the global stage. She laid out three driving forces: first, to shape ‘a real common policy;’ second, to deepen the degree of cooperation between the EU institutions, Parliament, Council, Commission and EEAS; third, to increase coordination and communication among the agents involved on similar policies.

In terms of area of actions, Mogherini wants to narrow down the area of European interests. She wants to “taking care of our part of the world,” which entails the direct and broader neighborhoods: East (Russia, Caucasus and Turkey), South (Middle East and North Africa). A clear area of actions for the EU and the CSDP is long due as it will allow Member States and European institutions to clearly identify the pressing issues and the strategy to adopt and implement.

Mogherini’s Challenges

However, Mogherini is facing several core challenges: first, an inside one – Member States & institutional; second, an outside one – Europe declining global position in the world; third, a series of unstable regional and global crises. Her opening statement before the Parliament illustrates clearly that she is well aware of the challenges ahead of her.

First, the institutional tensions between EU institutions, Member States and from the Member States are real. They can seriously affect the efficiency of the European foreign policy machine as it was the case under Ashton. Mogherini was appointed at one of the most difficult position. Her title says it all: High Representative and Vice President of the Commission. She has a double-hatted position half intergovernmental – Member States – and half supranational – Commission -. As argued by Jan Techau, Mogherini’s role and tasks are very complex as “[European] institutions are strong on trade and development but have almost zero executive power in classic diplomacy and crisis management.”

Ashton has demonstrated the degree of challenge entailed in the HR/VP position. For instance, she had been criticized for not assisting at many meeting at the Commission, when in fact she was traveling for the EEAS (at least this is the official argument). In order to avoid a similar scenario, Mogherini has been proactive and has announced that she will be moving with her Cabinet to the Berlaymont Building (the Commission’s building). Her rationale is that “I [Mogherini] cannot ask structures to work together if I do not work with all of them myself.” She is planning to assist at the College of European commissioners’ meetings. Techau frames quite well the reality and dilemma of the HR/VP job and all decision-making in foreign policy at the EU level. Techau calls it the dilemma between the internal realities – Brussels bubble – (what is possible), and the external realities (what is needed). Mogherini, as her predecessor, will have to try to narrow this expectation-reality gap as much as possible.

Undeniably, Mogherini is taking over a broken foreign and defense policy machine. The last five years under the helm of Catherine Ashton, the EEAS and CSDP have been under serious tensions and attacks from the Member States. The Big Three, especially France and the UK, see the EEAS as a direct threat to their national foreign ministries; while the CSDP has simply been relegated to a second grade defense instrument stabilizing context after French or international interventions. This has been the case in Mali, Central Africa and Libya. Mogherini will have to deal with the powerful European foreign policy leaders, and re-affirm the credibility and contribution of the EEAS in Europe. She will have to sell the EU foreign policy to Europeans.

Second, the declining position of the EU on the global stage is undeniable. The rise of new powers, especially China, and the continuous affirmation of American powers, despite a broad literature demonstrating American decline, are clear challenges. Mogherini holds one dimension of the global relevance of the EU. She needs to remain committed and avoid the “rapid erosion of European power and influence in the world.” At this rate of decline and inaction, the EU will become a second-grade power. In the current global dis-order, the EU can maintain a premier role if it wants to. The HR/VP can play a role in it.

Third, Mogherini will have a lot on her plate once HR/VP. The list of security issues from public health (with the Ebola), to energy security (Russia and Ukraine), to territorial tensions (Russia and the Palestinian files), to homeland and international terrorism (ISIS and homeland radicalization of the European youth) are all awaiting clear common European strategies. Each of these issues has to be coordinated at the European level as all of them are transnational problems. Additionally, Mogherini will have to empower the CSDP or simply shift the CSDP into NATO. The CSDP under Ashton has been in decline in terms of objectives, role and influence. The 2013 Defense summit (read here, here, and here in depth analysis on the summit) led to a re-commitment by the EU-28 towards European defense and the CSDP, but the words have yet to be translated into actions.

Food for Thoughts

On a positive note, Mogherini embodies a new class of European leaders. She is young and understands foreign policy. Her past experience, despite being short and limited, nevertheless was directly connected with foreign affairs. This was not the case of Catherine Ashton when she got appointed in 2009. Mogherini embodies a younger Italian political class that wants to reaffirm the serious commitment of Italy to the European project.

“We need a long-term vision to prevent crises and to manage post-crises. We need to think big,” underscored Mogherini during her opening statement “with a far-reaching look at the global landscape, and we have to realise that this is in our own interest.” Such statement Catherine_Ashton_and_solanadeserves credit and attention as leaders with a strategic vision have become rare. Javier Solana, the first HR, was this kind of politician with a broad strategic vision. He understood that a clear narrative and strategic vision was necessary in order to have an active EU on the global stage; and he understood which fights to pick. Again, the political, social and economic realities of the EU are to some degree similar and arguably worst that the ones under HR Ashton. The economic slump of the Eurozone and the EU is continuing; anti-Europe sentiments are growing all around the EU and are even becoming core components of domestic policies like in Britain; and the national desire to spend money on foreign policy and defense is not present. Mogherini will have to convince the EU-28 that the EEAS and CSDP are not a redundancy in costs and are in fact complementary to national commitment to foreign policy and defense. Mogherini certainly has a positive aspect going in her favor as a large majority of Europeans are in favor a EU leadership in world affairs as demonstrated below. Europeans at 73% consider that the EU ought to contribute to the making and shaping of world affairs.

Source:  German Marshall Fund. 2014. Transatlantic Trends. Key Finding 2014. p.16
Source: German Marshall Fund. 2014. Transatlantic Trends. Key Finding 2014. p.16

Last but not least, Mogherini’s hearing before the Parliament underlined her ease in expressing herself – and in several languages -. She seems to understand – and we will see if she will ‘enjoy’ it – the highly political dimension of her position, which was apparently not shared by her predecessor. As underscored by Nick Witney of the ECFR, “To succeed, she will also need luck, determination, and more support – from the member states, from the President of the European Commission and from the other Brussels institutions – than her predecessor ever enjoyed.” Based on her performance before the European Parliament, Mogherini wants to appear as the person in charge in order to reform the EU strategic approach to foreign policy.

(Copyright 2014 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).