In November 2014, Ashgate published my first single author book reflecting on the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the European Union (here is the link to the page). This book is addressed to an audience in search of understanding the reasons behind the periods of breakthroughs and declines, construction and demise of European defense (review a review here). Debating ESDP is an attempt to breakdown a complex project directly intertwined with the integration evolution of the European Union. The CSDP embodies the complexity of the European Union illustrating the perpetual tensions between European and national interests and between federalism and intergovernmentalism (here is a review on federalism).
The current geopolitical realities facing the Union – domestic, regional, international – are serious and demonstrate to a certain extent why a meaningful, coherent and active CSDP is necessary either as a civilian and/or military instrument. The lingering violence and civil war in Syria are at the roots of one of the largest migration crisis since the end of the World War two. The Syrian crisis requires sound diplomatic, foreign policy and defense policy strategies. Each EU Member State has a different reading of the situation and willingness to participate in direct actions on the ground. But the EU and its Member States may simply be waiting on a clear US position by the Obama administration on addressing the issue in Syria. Will it go through a US-Russian pro-Assad alliance? Or will it be a series of highly disorganized international interventions? Debating ESDP offers the instruments in order to understand the lack of unity of the EU on all the different pressing crises, from the Syrian crisis, to the one in Ukraine.
In the latest issue of the excellent Italian journal The International Spectator, a review of Debating European Security and Defense Policy was published and is copied below.
Debating European security and defense policy : understanding the complexity / Maxime H.A. Larivé. – Aldershot ; Burlington : Ashgate, c2014. – xviii, 262 p. – (Global interdisciplinary studies series). – ISBN 978-1-4724-0995-9 ; 978-1-4724-0996-6 (ebk) ; 978-1-4724-0997-3 (ePUB)
With this book, Maxime H.A. Larivé seeks to clarify the debate on the evolution and probable outcomes of the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In order to provide a comprehensive overview of the subject, the author sets out the different positions, both optimistic and sceptical, that characterise the issue, one of the most controversial of the EU integration process.
The book is broken down into chapters that constitute an articulated answer to ten different questions, in the form of a debate. The debate structure allows the author to provide two different answers to each question: one more optimistic and the other less conﬁdent in the progress and outcomes of CSDP. Yet, the work also has a central question to which each single query relates. The author proposes a reﬂection on why European integration in the ﬁeld of security and defence always seems to have come up against major hurdles to its deﬁnitive completion. The book is structured in a functional way that guides the reader in discovering and examining this crucial subject in depth.
The chapters are organized into three different sections, each bringing together questions on the theoretic background, the historical evolution of CSDP, and the actors, structures and processes engaged in its implementation. The result is an overarching analysis that delves into the most crucial aspects of the subject, including the role of the United States and NATO in the promotion (or obstruction) of CSDP over the decades and the implications of the recent ﬁnancial crisis on the engagement of EU member states in this ﬁeld.
Despite its dichotomous structure, the general impression that the book gives of CSDP is of a complex mechanism that is still far from functioning in a proper and effective way. The shortfalls of CSDP become apparent in its practical implementation and the reluctance of member states to move ahead, obstructing the attainment of its objectives.
The argumentation in the various chapters is generally supported by the most relevant IR theories (namely neorealism, neoliberalism and social constructivism) and empirical data on CSDP missions and their legal/institutional instruments (such as the European Security Strategy of 2003). The information thus gathered reveals a shift in the evolution of CSDP towards an ever more bureaucratic body unable to act as a coherent political subject in the most crucial IR matters, for example the upheaval in the MENA region caused by the Arab Spring.
One of the book’s most important contributions to the discussion of CSDP and the debate over European Union foreign policy management is the analysis and comparison of the two High Representatives that were in charge of the Union’s foreign affairs and security policy from 1999 to 2013. The ﬁgures and policies of Javier Solana and Catherine Ashton are subjected to a detailed analysis that seeks to highlight their respective strengths and weaknesses in the making and implementation of CSDP.
The author does not present the book as an essay on the history and evolution of CSDP (for that purpose Larivé refers to the work of Jolyon Howorth – who also authored the Foreword), but rather as a contribution and tool for all those who want to form a personal opinion on the issue. Moreover, the plain language and schematic structure make the book suitable for students aiming to acquire a critical awareness of the subject. Larivé succeeds in putting readers in an active position, challenging their opinions and knowledge of the subject. (Laura De Marchi)
Politipond wants to thank The International Spectator for authorizing to copy the review, which figures on the Volume 50, Issue 3, p. 135-6 (here is the link to the latest issue and the link to the book review)
(Copyright 2014 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).
Is the United Kingdom, especially Britain, sick? For years, the media has called France the sick man of Europe, it appears that Britain has caught a similar cold. If France is facing dire economic conditions and is unable to implement real reforms launching the economic engine once and for all, Britain has for its part disappeared from the European and international stage. Britain is on election mode and these elections are serious for the future of Britain and its future within the European Union. Because Britain has fallen from the table of relevance, the general European public is unaware of them. May 7th will be a big day for Britain, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.
The election is being disputed between seven candidates. The two main candidates belong to the two big parties: conservative led by Prime Minister David Cameron; and the Labor led by Ed Miliband. The others are from smaller parties, which have nevertheless shaped the debate, like the Scottish and Welsh nationalists, the Democratic Unionists in Northern Ireland, the Greens, and UK Independence Party (UKIP). These smaller parties may not produce the next Prime Minister, but “could hold the balance of power in the next Parliament, making government policy subject to negotiation.” The expectation is to see either Miliband or Cameron winning the popular vote. So far, the campaign has revolved around the following three issues: the economy, health care, and immigration.
Risk-Aversion or Pessimistic Isolationism?
Since the election of Prime Minister David Cameron in 2010 Britain has lost some of its grandeur and relevance. Just on foreign and defense policy, Britain has disappeared from
the international arena. From a mid-size power to a small power, Britain lost its appetite for international relevance and action. The turning point was the no vote by the Parliament for a military intervention in Syria against President Bashar al-Assad in August 2013. Since then, Prime Minister Cameron has just looked inward and tried to clean up the house letting foreign affairs aside. Ed Miliband, Labor Party Leader, has described Cameron’s foreign policy of “pessimistic isolationism,” and for electoral purposes argued that Cameron has “weakened Britain.”
In terms of foreign policy, Britain has been a no-show on really important issues like Ukraine (France and Germany signed the Minsk agreement with Russia), on sanctions against Russia, on Libya, on the migration crisis, on Africa, on fighting ISIS in Syria and Libya and so forth. Britain is only assisting the US on bombing ISIS in Iraq. In Africa, Britain is barely assisting the French in the mission in Mali and has expressed very limited interests in fighting Boko Haram. The absence of Britain and Cameron on dealing with Putin and Russia over the question of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine has been damaging to the credibility of the country and the EU on trying to solve serious regional crises.
One reason for such risk-aversion by Britain is the Iraq and Afghan campaigns. The costs on going to war in Iraq with the Americans in 2003 are still being felt. Then the mission in Afghanistan lasted over a decade and Britain does not want anymore to get drag down in another foreign campaign with no success at the end, which Syria and Libya could very much be. In Iraq and Afghanistan, Britain has not been able to justify the size and length of both missions and the population has grown opposed to another foreign intervention.
Letting your Allies down
The US is now extremely worried about the future of the ‘special relationship.’ Britain may tend to believe that the ‘special relationship’ is set in stone, but like any relationship, without discussion and connection they tend to dry out and die. Britain cannot expect the US to be its closest ally when Britain does not reciprocate. Maybe the British leadership believes that all GOP candidates ought to pass by London in order to be presidential, but so far none of them has been successful at it – recall McCain and Romney – and a talk in London by a non-elected and/or elected official in his personal capacity does not make up for the core of the ‘special relationship.’ Additionally, the US saw the move by the Foreign Office to decide to make Britain a founding member of Beijing’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a competitor of the World Bank, as some sort of backstabbing. France, Italy, and Germany have followed the UK on this policy-choice.
For France and Europe, an inward looking Britain is a real concern as well. France and Britain have certainly a long past fighting one another, but there is one core dimension wherein Paris and London see eye to eye: defense and foreign policies. European defense was created, functioned and has deepened thanks to the Franco-British couple. The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) was established ensuing the 1998 bilateral Saint-Malo meeting. Since the disappearance of Britain on common defense questions, France has become anxious. For instance, top French expert, Camille Grand of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique argued in the New York Times that “We in Paris understand that Germany is a complicated partner on defense, but the assumption is that Britain is a like-minded country ready to intervene, would spend enough on defense and remain a nuclear weapons state. All this is being challenged, and it makes Paris feel lonely.” Despite some historical and cultural divergences, Paris and London have always shared a common acute sense of foreign affairs and valued their cooperation in foreign, security and defense policies.
So Long Britain?
Britain is an interesting European case for two reasons: first, the raison d’être of its political class has become so anti-European that it goes against its national interest; second, there is no long-term vision for Britain in interacting with Europe and the world.
Britain must for once and for all accept its role and place within the European Union. If it wants to leave, the referendum ought to be implemented and the country will adjust accordingly towards a Brexit or not (see the short video above). But having Britain being so anti-European and
blocking any initiatives (against the CAP, against a large common budget, against police and judiciary cooperation, against the Schengen agreement, and so on) in Brussels is counter-productive for Britain, the EU, and the 28 EU Member States. For instance, having London fighting for the increase of the budget of Operation Triton is counterproductive. The perpetual fear of lost of sovereignty and stripping away British independence cannot last any longer. A balance ought to be found between anti-EU and constructive bargaining.
Second, the British political class, as its French counterpart, is composed of visionless politicians. There is no long-term vision for their respective countries with serious political, economic, social and financial agendas. There are only bureaucrats seeking for perpetual reelection at great cost for the country. Hopefully, the May 7th elections will allow British citizens and politicians to reflect on the role of Britain in Europe and the world. This is only wishful thinking, as in reality the general election appears to be another wasted opportunity for a clear national reflection on Britain’s future.
(Copyright 2015 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).
The Mediterranean sea is the most dangerous migrating route in the world. In 2014, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) concluded that 75% of the total migrant-related deaths in the world lost their lives in the Mediterranean sea. Unfortunately, many experts predict that 2015 could be one of the deadliest years in modern history. This prediction was confirmed with the tragic event in mid-April with the death of an estimated 900 migrants with only 28 survivors.
“unless Europe acts to reform its failed policy on migration” writes the editorialist of the New York Times of April 21st, “this could be the deadliest year yet for the thousands of people who fled to Libya from conflict-torn regions across the Middle East and Africa, only to find themselves in a deadly pincer.” After years of inactivity and avoidance of this problem, the Member States are now facing human and political crises requiring rapid and substantial solutions. Blaming the EU for such failed policy would be an error, as according the Treaties, the Member States are the ones in charged of the security of their borders. The protection of the territory depends on the Member States, not on the EU. In this current crisis, the Member States have three options: first, to patch a problem with a short-term policy; second, to do nothing; third, to empower the EU. In any case, the Europeans are now facing a dilemma.
How can the EU identify itself as a normative power with that many people trying to reach its coasts for a better life? And, how can the EU bring a serious solution on the table when so many EU Member States are dealing with the rise of extreme-right wing parties – for many xenophobist and racist – domestically?
The Central Route to Europe
The crisis in Libya is serious for two reasons. Since the fall of the Qaddafi regime in 2011, led by an Euro-Atlantic coalition, the country has spiraled into a civil war. The civil war has created a power vacuum in the middle of North Africa offering the exit point for many Northern and Central Africans leaving their home countries because of political violence, war, dire economic conditions, terrorism with the hope to reach the European continent for a better life. Libya has become the transit country for most of illegal migration. In addition to unchecked migration, the civil war and lack of government have offered a new ground to the Islamic State (IS). IS has emerged in the country directly threatening neighboring countries, which includes Europe.
The migrants leaving their countries have changed over the years. They were once the
poorest and the most desperate. Today’s migrants are composed of individuals belonging to the middle class with a predominance of women and children. Some come from Middle East countries devastated by war like in Syria, Iraq and others from further South such as Mali, Gambia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Eritrea and Somalia. The price of the trip has increased and cost between €2,000 and 6,000 per person. Migrants can ask for asylum in a European country unless they set foot on European ground. Such law empowers the smugglers. Once in Europe, their lives remain extremely difficult.
If Libya is the exit point of Africa, Italy is one of the entry points of Europe. Since the Arab Spring, Italy has been on the front line of illegal mass-migration from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). For years the numbers of migrants seeking asylum in Europe has considerably increased. The Central Mediterranean Route, from Libya to Italy, has seen a serious increase of illegal migrants from 40,000 in 2008 to 170,000 in 2014 (see here the different routes to Europe).
As reported in the New York Times by Jim Yardley, “after a year in which more than 3,200 people died and more than 130,000 were rescued by Italian naval and coast guard ships. Humanitarian groups estimate that nearly 500 people have already died at sea this year, compared with about 50 in the same period last year.” The Mediterranean has become a large cemetery at the doorstep of Europe. The number of death at sea is increasing. So far this year, it has been estimated that more than 500 migrants have died as opposed to 47 in the same period of 2014. Additional Lampedusas may very well become routine considering the recent numbers.
From Mare Nostrum to Triton
In order to control this illegal migration, but mostly in reaction to the Lampedusa catastrophe costing the lives to 232 migrants in October 2013, the Italian launched a program in October 2013, Operation Mare Nostrum, in which the Italian navy was used in order to stop boats transporting illegal migrants. Because of the continuous rise of migrants and an increase in the cost of the operation (around $9.7 million per month), the Italians have been calling for support from their European counterparts in sharing the burden on costs and materials as all European nations are directly or indirectly confronting the problems of illegal migrations. Ultimately the Italian cancelled Mare Nostrum because of financial constrains considered too costly within the dire Italian economic context.
In November 2014 Mare Nostrum ended and let the spotlight to a small European program, Triton, under the supervision of Frontex, the European immigration agency. Triton is much smaller in scope, in geographical coverage (operates only within 30 nautical miles of European shores), and in financial terms (represents 1/3 of Mare Nostrum’s budget). Additionally, Frontex depends on the supports and contributions of Member States in order to receive material and human capabilities. Last but not least Triton’s mission is not to replace Italy’s work on protection of its territory but assists it when needed. As per the European Commission’s memo of October 2014 “Triton is intended to support the Italian efforts, and does not replace or substitute Italian obligations in monitoring and surveying the Schengen external borders and in guaranteeing full respect of EU and international obligations, in particular when it comes to search and rescue at sea.” Frontex coordinates, Italy leads.
Table: Comparative Analysis of the Mare Nostrum with Triton
The table clearly demonstrates the fundamental distinction between Mare Nostrum and Triton in terms of mandate. Triton’s mandate does not make the operation a search and rescue mission, but simply a border management operation. Additionally, the capabilities provided to Frontex are based on the contribution of the willing Member States. Frontex facilities the work of the Italian navy. Frontex’s hands are clearly tied.
European Union’s Responses and Actions
European reactions and responses will depend on the complex paradigm: balancing humanitarian responsibilities against budget constraints and widespread public sentiment against immigration. Ensuing the catastrophe, most European officials and heads of state and government expressed their emotions. In addition, President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, called an emergency European summit meeting for Thursday, April 23rd to address the issue. The problem of illegal migration and lack of EU unity was addressed in a report eight years ago wherein the EU acknowledged a “disunity within the E.U. over which obligations arise from E.U. fundamental rights, international human rights and refugee law, and how these obligations relate to the law of the sea.”
Matteo Renzi of Italy and his counterpart Joseph Muscat of Malta declared during a joint conference after the weekend that “What happened on Sunday was a game changer. There is a new realization that if Europe doesn’t act as a team, history will judge it very harshly, as it did when it closed its eyes to stories of genocide — horrible stories — not long ago.” The President of European Parliament, Martin Schulz, made a similar argument when raising two questions: “How many more people will have to drown until we finally act in Europe?” “How many times more do we want to express our dismay, only to then move on to our daily routine?”
Frederica Mogherini, Chief of EU Foreign Affairs, declared once again ‘‘We have said too many times ‘Never again.’ Now is time for the EuropeanUnion as such to tackle these tragedies without delay.’’ French President François Hollande called for more material capabilities “more boats, more aerial surveillance and a much tougher fight against traffickers.”
Prior the extraordinary European summit meeting, the President of the European Council highlighted a list of overarching questions: How to stop the human traffickers, whom put the migrants’ lives at risk? How to step up European combined efforts for rescuing people in need? How to better help the EU Member States most affected? and, how to step up European cooperation with countries of origins and transits?
Days before the summit, during a joint meeting of Foreign and Interior Ministers with HR Mogherini, Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship Commissioner Avramopoulos presented a 10 point plan of the immediate actions in the Mediterranean region. During the emergency meeting of Thursday, the European heads of government agreed on a list of points:
First, the High Representative (HR) is now charged of the mission to “propose actions in order to capture and destroy the smugglers’ vessels before they can be used.”
Second, Triton’s budget has been tripled and is now at the same level than Mare Nostrum and Member States have committed more material resources (no numbers though).
Third, increase cooperation with origin and transit countries, especially Libya.
These agreements seem quite shallow considering the complexity of the problem. The Commission is scheduled to deliver its Europe Agenda on Migration due on May 13, which in Juncker’s words “We will be ambitious. We will be bold.” The destruction of boats and an increase of budget are only a quick fix to a regional problem requiring state-building, economic and trade cooperations, security sector reforms, additional humanitarian and aid assistance, and even military interventions.
Solidarity, Responsibility and Norms
“With no coherent policy and woefully insufficient financing,” writes the New York Times “lives are needlessly being put at risk, and the European Union’s humanitarian values are exposed as meaningless.” The continuous dying of migrants at the doorstep of fortress
Europe is forcing the EU and its Member States to reflect on three dimensions: solidarity; responsibility; and normative action. Solidarity is the core component of a social contract and an Union like the EU. Unfortunately with the financial crisis and the rise of populist movements throughout the Union, this core value has been lost in translation.
“The E.U. has been struggling to respond to the crisis because governments think it is too expensive,” Mr. Pascouau said, and “the debate on immigration has become toxic because of the rise of the far right.” Sweden, Poland, Austria need to be as concerned as mediterranean Member States about the rise of illegal migrants and their deaths in vein. Most migrants do not stay in Spain, Italy or Greece, they are trying to reach France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden. In this case, solidarity can be represented under two dimensions: material, human and financial aspects; and a reform of the European immigration policy.
Solidarity does not only imply European solidarity, but global solidarity. During an interview with NPR with François Crepeau, the U.N. special rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, argued in having the Global North (North America and the EU) absorbing immigrants. He argues that the best solution in resolving the massive illegal influx of migrants is through the integration of these migrants in each country of the Global North over a 5-10 years period by giving them visas in order to build a life. Crepeau claims that by offering them a legal solution/exit they would wait in their home countries for a way out rather than risking their lives and burning all their savings. The EU-28, especially European citizens, needs to accept such option and implement it and then find a common agreement with the US and Canada. Unfortunately this option seems off the table as Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the Commission, declared after the extraordinary summit that his “proposal for legal immigration was not supported” in order to secure resettlement across Europe for 10,000 refugees.
Responsibility, Member States ought to demonstrate their commitment to the Treaties and accept their own responsibility in the deaths. So many Member States are blaming the EU for these catastrophes, when in fact the Member States are to be blamed. Even though the blame game is counter productive, Member States and domestic political parties ought to have serious national discussion about the rise of illegal migrants from Africa. The arguments of closing the borders, ending the Schengen agreement and passing the buck to neighbors are unacceptable. Member States have to increase spending and cooperation either at the European level or even on bilateral basis.
Normative action seems to have died in the Mediterranean sea. The EU and the EU-28 need to materialize the self-proclamation of soft power through actions. Even if one cannot expect the EU to solve the migration problems coming from Africa, the EU and its Member States have to demonstrate a willingness to work with African partners. During an interview with a French expert on European defense in 2010, he argued that the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) was developed in order to solve the most pressing
crises in Africa. He claimed that if the Europeans were not doing as much as possible in order to solve political cronyism in Africa, terrorism, and contribute on stabilizing the region with substantial economic incentives, the European continent would be flooded by massive waves of migrants. This expert was 100% correct.
Five years ago the EU and its Member States could have implemented preventive measures. Today the EU and its Member States are confronting a serious crisis requiring massive human, capabilities and financial contributions, a European reform of the immigration policy and a serious commitment to cooperation at the European level all this under dire economic situation and unfriendly domestic electorate. The EU ought to liberalize immigration policy and open up legal routes for migrants. The EU and its Member States have quite a challenge in front them.
Last but not least, the most shocking line was made President Tusk right after the Council meeting, “Let me be clear. Europe did not cause this tragedy. But that does not mean we can be indifferent.” Was the summit about finger-pointing or about solving one of most pressing issues facing Europe? Such comment clearly illustrates Europe’s mindset in addressing this crisis.
(Copyright 2015 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).
In a recent intervention before the press, Jean-Yves le Drian, French Minister of Defense, laid out the revised strategic and defense goals for France for 2015. This plan was supposed to be exposed early January, but the terrorist attacks against Charlie Hebdo changed the policy and ultimately the strategic agenda of France. In his introduction the Minister claimed that “never, in its recent history, France has known such a deep connection between the direct threats on its homeland and the ones multiplying outside of its borders.” Despite its economic difficulties, France has demonstrated this last decade its commitment to assuring the security of its territory and interests of the Nation, as well as projecting its military power in its perceived sphere of influence.
Threats and Challenges to France and Strategic Reactions
In his intervention, Jean-Yves le Drian underscored the threat represented by the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and Boko Haram. In the case of ISIL, it menace can be felt in Syria, Iraq and Libya and in Western homelands. Territories under control of terrorist networks form an ‘arc’ circling Europe. Their presence can be felt on the European continent considering their degree of attractivity for many European citizens as illustrated by the terrorist attacks conducted in France and Denmark.
In addition to the real menace of radical islamic terrorist networks, the war in Ukraine on the European continent completes the circle around Europe. War on the European continent has fostered serious fears in most European capitals. “War in Europe,” argued le Drian, “it is what everyone of us must fear when borders are being changed and when international law is being trampled.”
In order to address the challenges and threats confronting France and its interests, France has defined its national security and defense framework in the famous Livre Blanc. In the last decade, France saw the production of two Livres Blancs, one in 2008 under President Sarkozy and recently in 2013 under President Hollande. Historically, France has produced four Livres Blancs. The first one in 1972 looked at the strategic independence of France offered by the possession of its nuclear capabilities. The second one in 1994 sought to address the radical shifting regional and global order ensuing the collapse of the Soviet Union. The third one, in 2008, incorporates the lessons learned after 2001, the new world order, and the new threats facing the Nation.
The last one, produced in 2013, incorporates the new realities facing France such as the economic crisis and the financial constraints, the Arab Spring and the rising instabilities in European neighborhoods, the rise of new powers especially in Asia and cyberthreats. In this 160-page strategic document produced soon after the election of François Hollande, French defense experts laid out three strategic lines of conduct: protection, deterrence, and intervention.
French Foreign Hyper-Activity
Historically, France has always been an independent global actor. Its global rank ensuing World War two was boosted by General de Gaulle developing a maximalist and exceptionalist dimensions to France’s foreign and defense policies. France has been for several decades a second-rank superpower with its large standing army, nuclear weapons, and active military-industrial complex. France has been a reliable US partner even though it remained independent from NATO until 2009 when it rejoined NATO’s integrated military command structure.
In order to compete with NATO, France was favorable to the creation of an independent European military force. The most serious and effective decision took place in 1998 in Saint-Malo during a bilateral agreement with British Prime Minister Tony Blair. This agreement established the European Security and Defense Policy, becoming the Common Security and Defense Policy with the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon. France has been an active participant of CSDP missions, civilian and military combined, when it favored its national interests and usually when CSDP missions were deployed in its sphere of influence, Africa and the Middle East.
Since the turn of the century, France has stood against the US because of the 2003 war in Iraq and was vocal against the neo-conservative agenda of the Bush administration. The relations with the US changed with the arrival to power of President Obama in 2008, even though some warming up occurred in the last years of President Bush. In parallel of Obama’s arrival, the world and especially the European neighborhoods have developed new dynamics. Once elected in 2008, President Obama wanted to disengage the US from its Bushian wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and pivot to Asia. The US pivot was engaged leaving a certain power vacuum in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East. During the pivot, the Arab world faced a radical and quick transition caused by the Arab Spring, which no Western leaders saw coming and knew how to handle.
To some extent, France under the presidency of M. Sarkozy took the lead and initiated a period of hyper-activity starting with the 2011 mission against Libya sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) implementing a no-fly zone over Libya. This UNSCR was pushed to the limits by Western actors, France, Britain and the US, leading to the fall of the Gaddafi regime. Since the war in Libya, France is currently fighting battles on three exterior fronts and one interior front:
domestic theater: France has launched Operation Sentinelle in January 2015 until a scheduled review in June counting 10,000 soldiers to protect France’s homeland – public and religious sites – against possible attacks.
Reactualization of the 2015 Objectives
In his speech, Jean-Yves le Drian announced five broad orientations for 2015. These orientations are made in accordance with the Military Programming Law (la loi de programmation militaire) from 2014-2019. Due to the terrorist attacks of January 2015, the Ministry of Defense is seeking to addressing some adjustments in the Military Programming Law (MPL), which holds two dispositions: first, material provisions such finance, equipments and budgets; second, normative provisions.
The new orientations for 2015 are as follow:
review of the military effectives;
reforming some of the priorities established in 2013 by developing special forces, a new cyber strategy, increasing the domain of intelligence (human and material capabilities);
military-industrial complex, addressing some capabilities shortfalls of the French army (in drones, helicopters, arial transportation), while increasing the sale of French military equipments, namely the Rafale;
financial resources for the MPL by guaranteeing the funding to the Ministry of Defense;
a new relationship between the Army and the Nation.
A Call for More Europe
During the two-day informal Defense ministers meeting in Riga in February 2015, Jean-Yves le Drian underlined the importance for EU Member States to increase their commitments and support towards European security and defense. A month later, he continued his call for more European participation to the protection of Europe. In his march intervention, he said “we are 28 Member States in the EU, but how many are we to really participate in the resolution of crises in our neighborhood?” He claimed that the distribution of labor is not evenly distributed, even though the threats directly threaten the EU and its 28 Member States as a whole. The attacks in Paris, Copenhagen and Tunis and the Russian expansionist war in Eastern Europe are a clear illustration.
The Defense Minister underlined the fact that European financial contributions to NATO (fixed at 2% of the GDP) are not met by most European members and in the case of the EU, the financial burden on common operations (under the CSDP, read here an article on the financing of CSDP missions) is not evenly distributed. “When France fight in the Sahel, Levant,” he said “she intervenes for the benefits of the security of all Europeans.”
Between the Le Drian’s comments, Juncker’s proposal for a EU army, and Solana’s call for a European Defense Union (EDU), the question of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is an important one of the many current European agendas. The global and regional realities with the ‘arc of fire’ all around the EU has caused great concerns to all EU-28. If Southern Members are more inclined to see the instabilities in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as a direct threat to their homelands, Eastern Members are feeling the heat from the war led by Russia on the Eastern front, and all Member States are seeing the rise of radical islamic terrorist activities domestically. The EU and the EU-28 are confronting serious external and internal threats requiring more cooperation and ultimately deeper integration. These threats are so diverse in their origins and nature that they cannot be solved independently. They require a united front.
The June Defense Summit will be an important moment in European security and defense cooperation. The French will be vocal and will want to increase European cooperation and burden-sharing in addressing the extremely volatile neighborhoods. Other EU Member States ought to join France in seriously addressing these threats.
(Copyright 2015 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).
The call for a European Army is back on the European table. In an interview with German newspaper Die Welt over the weekend, Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, discussed on a wide array of topics from the Eurocrisis, to Grexit, to the Monetary Union, and called for the creation of a European army. The discussions around the topic of a European army have been cyclical inside European political circles for decades. With the European Council Summit on Defense of June approaching, President Juncker may want to prepare the ground before hand for a productive meeting.
Juncker’s Proposal for a European Army
The lingering crisis in Ukraine is reminding the Europeans how dependent they are on NATO and the US for the enforcement of regional security and how irrelevant/inefficient are the EU and its Member States in shaping desired outcomes in high politics. Despite the attempts by Berlin and Paris to solve the Ukrainian crisis diplomatically, Moscow has not budged and is continuing its territorial expansion in Eastern Ukraine. In some ways, Ukraine is another Kosovo for the Europeans, as in both cases the EU cannot respond independently with force and end the crisis. Such statement is certainly confirmed by Juncker’s comments when arguing that “With its own Army, Europe could react credibly to a threat
to peace in a Member State or in a neighboring country of the European Union.”
Die Welt continued its interview by asking Mr. Juncker if he thinks that Russia would have thought twice before annexing Crimea if the EU had had a European army. Juncker responded by arguing that military response should not be the initial strategy and only complement diplomacy and politics. However, Juncker went on claiming that “a joint army of Europeans would give the clear impression [to Russia] that we are serious about defending the European values.” Juncker denied the fact that a European army would compete with NATO. As per Juncker, the European army would permit to demonstrate the seriousness of the EU in foreign policy; and contribute to the deepening process of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).
On Monday, March 9th, the Commission tried to narrow and justify some of the comments made by President Juncker. Chief Commission Spokesman, Margaritas Schinas, underlined that the pooling and sharing (P&S) in defense capabilities make financial sense for the EU-28 (watch his response here). Mr. Schinas called for going beyond the interview and work on the substance of the question of a European army.
Such comment is not surprising coming from Mr. Juncker, as even before becoming President of the Commission, Mr. Juncker was in favor of the creation of a European army. As a Prime-Minister of Luxembourg, a small EU Member State in terms of military power, Mr. Juncker has long been in favor of a common EU force. During his candidacy to the presidency of the Commission, Mr. Juncker reiterated the call for a European army.
The Cyclical Desire for a European Army
The question of European defense is directly intertwined with the story of European integration. As developed in his latest analysis on the Juncker’s proposal, Jan Techau of the Carnegie Endowment wrote that:
The oldest item on the European list of utopian integration topics is a federal superstate. The second oldest is the creation of an EU army. Despite the obvious hopelessness of getting such a thing started and of making it work, this latter idea has been remarkably resilient.
The fight between the Gaullist vision – independent EU army – and the Altanticist – Europe under the US nuclear umbrella – has remained ever since. But one should distinguish six important periods in explaining the tentatives of development/integration in high politics at the EU level (for an in-depth look at the question of the European Defense, refer to the following bookDebating European Security and Defense Policy. Understanding the Complexity):
1954 – European Defense Cooperation (EDC) was initiated by the French and killed by the French. The EDC was supposed to create a standing European army.
Cold War – Europe under the NATO umbrella. For over 30 years the baseline of European security and defense was enforced by the transatlantic alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The US provided the bulk of the military protection with its military bases around Europe. NATO offered a security blanket to the European Communities, allowing its Member States to focus on economic integration.
1992 – The Treaty of Maastricht and the CFSP. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany, powerful EC Member States, France and the UK, felt that deepening the integration process with a new treaty would permit to absorb a reunified Germany. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht created the European Union and its pillar system. The new institutional design based on a three-pillar structure established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) permitting the creation of a common EU foreign policy.
1998 – The Declaration of Saint Malo. Over a two-day bilateral meeting in the French town of Saint Malo, French President Chirac and British Prime Minister Blair agreed on bilateral basis to create a common European defense system permitting the EU to respond to regional crisis threatening the security of the Union and the continent. The Saint Malo Declaration was a response to European inabilities in acting and responding to the war in the Balkans and the 1998 war in Kosovo. Both regional crises highlighted the lack of hard power and unity from the Europeans and their dependence on NATO.
1999-2007 – From summits to deployments. From 1999 to 2007, under the leadership of the first High Representative Javier Solana, the EU institutionalized the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) permitting the Union to deploy national forces under the EU flag for civilian and military missions. Many ESDP missions were deployed in Africa, Europe, and Asia (see the map below).
2007 to today – Financial crisis and CSDP. Since the 2007 collapse of the financial markets, the global balance of power has been shifting. The US and European economies were on the brink of collapse, and in the specialized literature, the declinist argument, looking at the end of the liberal world order, has illustrated the decline of American hegemony and the rise of new powers. In parallel, a series of crises surrounding Europe initiated by the Arab Spring have caused grave concerns in European capitals and Washington. Europe has been circled by a ‘ring of fire’ from all sides, Ukraine, Syria, Libya, MENA and Central Africa. Inside this ‘ring of fire’ many threats have directly challenged Europeans such as terrorism, mass-migration, war, trafficking, and failed-states. In this environment, the EU has tried to increase its defense harmonization through the Pooling & Sharing (P&S) in order to avoid duplication at the European level as well as responding to the declining of share of national GDP committed to military expenditures. Because of lack of national commitment, the P&S and CSDP have not received the attention required. In such environment, the argument of a European Defense Union (EDU), as raised by Solana and Blockmans, should permit greater strategic, institutional, capabilities, and resources cooperation between the EU-28.
A Hopeless Call?
The call for an EU army is only part of the revival of an old federalist dream. The gap between Juncker’s proposal and the European realities is extremely wide. For instance, the United Kingdom under Prime Minister Cameron has fought all European initiatives towards the furthering of European integration. During the selection and appointment process of Mr. Juncker, the UK opposed his nomination fearing that he would continuously call for deeper integration as he had done in the past. With Juncker at the helm of the Commission for a little less than a year, he has certainly launched a series of initiatives in order to re-boost the EU. From the Juncker Plan to launch the European economies (read two previous analyses here and here), to the EU Energy Union to now the call for a EU army, Juncker’ strategy is to demonstrate that ‘more Europe’ is necessary in order to solving Europe’s problems.
Even though the United Kingdom was a pioneer with France in December 1998 when agreeing to the creation of the ESDP, the UK has since changed its position on greater defense integration. Ensuing the Juncker interview, London’s reaction was “Our position is crystal clear that defense is a national, not an EU responsibility and that there is no prospect of that position changing and no prospect of a European army.” The reactions by British politicians have been along the same line, a clear opposition to the Juncker’s proposal of a European army. That does not mean that the UK is opposed to a more integrated CSDP, but the country is in election-mode and being pro-European seems to be a no-go in this election.
If the UK finds Juncker’s call outraging, Germany welcomed it. For instance, German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen told German radio that “Our [German] future as Europeans will at some point be with a European army.” France has not been very vocal on Juncker’s comments. So far, France has been very active in his perceived sphere of influence and has been deploying his national troops in Libya, Mali, CAR and throughout the Sahel region at the expense of the CSDP.
The question of a EU army is always of actuality and will remain in the federalist arsenal. President Juncker is correct in his analysis of the state of the world in 2015 and the challenges/threats facing the Union and its 28 Member States. In this ever-changing world and increasing degree of
complexity of the challenges, the EU-28 ought to understand that increasing the Pooling & Sharing falls under an improvement of their national security and interest. The regional instabilities equally threaten all EU Member States from Sofia to London, Rome to Copenhagen, Warsaw to Paris. An EU army may not be the appropriate option, but a common strategic thinking and common foreign policy and military vision ought to be addressed and adopted.
(Copyright 2015 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).