Little Big Power – France’ Strategic Objectives

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In a recent intervention before the press, Jean-Yves le Drian, French Minister of Defense, laid out the revised strategic and defense goals for France for 2015. This plan was supposed to be exposed early January, but the terrorist attacks against Charlie Hebdo changed the policy and ultimately the strategic agenda of France. In his introduction the Minister claimed that “never, in its recent history, France has known such a deep connection between the direct threats on its homeland and the ones multiplying outside of its borders.” Despite its economic difficulties, France has demonstrated this last decade its commitment to assuring the security of its territory and interests of the Nation, as well as projecting its military power in its perceived sphere of influence.

Threats and Challenges to France and Strategic Reactions

In his intervention, Jean-Yves le Drian underscored the threat represented by the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and Boko Haram. In the case of ISIL, it menace can be felt in Syria, Iraq and Libya and in Western homelands. Territories under control of terrorist networks form an ‘arc’ circling Europe. Their presence can be felt on the European continent considering their degree of attractivity for many European citizens as illustrated by the terrorist attacks conducted in France and Denmark.

In addition to the real menace of radical islamic terrorist networks, the war in Ukraine on463833570 the European continent completes the circle around Europe. War on the European continent has fostered serious fears in most European capitals. “War in Europe,” argued le Drian, “it is what everyone of us must fear when borders are being changed and when international law is being trampled.”

In order to address the challenges and threats confronting France and its interests, France has defined its national security and defense framework in the famous Livre Blanc. In the last decade, France saw the production of two Livres Blancs, one in 2008 under President Sarkozy and recently in 2013 under President Hollande. Historically, France has produced four Livres Blancs. The first one in 1972 looked at the strategic independence of France offered by the possession of its nuclear capabilities. The second one in 1994 sought to address the radical shifting regional and global order ensuing the collapse of the Soviet Union. The third one, in 2008, incorporates the lessons learned after 2001, the new world order, and the new threats facing the Nation.

The last one, produced in 2013, incorporates the new realities facing France such as the economic crisis and the financial constraints, the Arab Spring and the rising instabilities in European neighborhoods, the rise of new powers especially in Asia and cyberthreats. In this 160-page strategic document produced soon after the election of François Hollande, French defense experts laid out three strategic lines of conduct: protection, deterrence, and intervention.

French Foreign Hyper-Activity

Historically, France has always been an independent global actor. Its global rank ensuing World War two was boosted by General de Gaulle developing a maximalist and exceptionalist dimensions to France’s foreign and defense policies. France has been for several decades a second-rank superpower with its large standing army, nuclear weapons, and active military-industrial complex. France has been a reliable US partner even though it remained independent from NATO until 2009 when it rejoined NATO’s integrated military command structure.

In order to compete with NATO, France was favorable to the creation of an independent European military force. The most serious and effective decision took place in 1998 in Saint-Malo during a bilateral agreement with British Prime Minister Tony Blair. This agreement established the European Security and Defense Policy, becoming the Common Security and Defense Policy with the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon. France has been an active participant of CSDP missions, civilian and military combined, when it favored its national interests and usually when CSDP missions were deployed in its sphere of influence, Africa and the Middle East.

Since the turn of the century, France has stood against the US because of the 2003 war in Iraq and was vocal against the neo-conservative agenda of the Bush administration. The relations with the US changed with the arrival to power of President Obama in 2008, even though some warming up occurred in the last years of President Bush. In parallel of Obama’s arrival, the world and especially the European neighborhoods have developed new dynamics. Once elected in 2008, President Obama wanted to disengage the US from its Bushian wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and pivot to Asia. The US pivot was engaged leaving a certain power vacuum in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East. During the pivot, the Arab world faced a radical and quick transition caused by the Arab Spring, which no Western leaders saw coming and knew how to handle.

To some extent, France under the presidency of M. Sarkozy took the lead and initiated a period of hyper-activity starting with the 2011 mission against Libya sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) implementing a no-fly zone over Libya. This UNSCR was pushed to the limits by Western actors, France, Britain and the US, leading to the fall of the Gaddafi regime. Since the war in Libya, France is currently fighting battles on three exterior fronts and one interior front:

  • foreign theaters: in Central African Republic (CAR) with Operation Sangaris; in the Sahel region counting Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad under Operation Barkhane; in Mali with Operation Serval; and in Iraq with Operation Chammal fighting ISIL.
  • domestic theater: France has launched Operation Sentinelle in January 2015 until a scheduled review in June counting 10,000 soldiers to protect France’s homeland – public and religious sites – against possible attacks.
Operation Barkhane - Source: France24
Operation Barkhane – Source: France24

 Reactualization of the 2015 Objectives

In his speech, Jean-Yves le Drian announced five broad orientations for 2015. These orientations are made in accordance with the Military Programming Law (la loi de programmation militaire) from 2014-2019. Due to the terrorist attacks of January 2015, the Ministry of Defense is seeking to addressing some adjustments in the Military Programming Law (MPL), which holds two dispositions: first, material provisions such finance, equipments and budgets; second, normative provisions.

The new orientations for 2015 are as follow:

  1. review of the military effectives;
  2. reforming some of the priorities established in 2013 by developing special forces, a new cyber strategy, increasing the domain of intelligence (human and material capabilities);
  3. military-industrial complex, addressing some capabilities shortfalls of the French army (in drones, helicopters, arial transportation), while increasing the sale of French military equipments, namely the Rafale;
  4. financial resources for the MPL by guaranteeing the funding to the Ministry of Defense;
  5. a new relationship between the Army and the Nation.

A Call for More Europe

During the two-day informal Defense ministers meeting in Riga in February 2015, Jean-Yves le Drian underlined the importance for EU Member States to increase their commitments and support towards European security and defense. A month later, he continued his call for more European participation to the protection of Europe. In his march intervention, he said “we are 28 Member States in the EU, but how many are we to French-Security_reutersreally participate in the resolution of crises in our neighborhood?” He claimed that the distribution of labor is not evenly distributed, even though the threats directly threaten the EU and its 28 Member States as a whole. The attacks in Paris, Copenhagen and Tunis and the Russian expansionist war in Eastern Europe are a clear illustration.

The Defense Minister underlined the fact that European financial contributions to NATO (fixed at 2% of the GDP) are not met by most European members and in the case of the EU, the financial burden on common operations (under the CSDP, read here an article on the financing of CSDP missions) is not evenly distributed. “When France fight in the Sahel, Levant,” he said “she intervenes for the benefits of the security of all Europeans.”

Between the Le Drian’s comments, Juncker’s proposal for a EU army, and Solana’s call for a European Defense Union (EDU), the question of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is an important one of the many current European agendas. The global and regional realities with the ‘arc of fire’ all around the EU has caused great concerns to all EU-28. If Southern Members are more inclined to see the instabilities in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as a direct threat to their homelands, Eastern Members are feeling the heat from the war led by Russia on the Eastern front, and all Member States are seeing the rise of radical islamic terrorist activities domestically. The EU and the EU-28 are confronting serious external and internal threats requiring more cooperation and ultimately deeper integration. These threats are so diverse in their origins and nature that they cannot be solved independently. They require a united front.

The June Defense Summit will be an important moment in European security and defense cooperation. The French will be vocal and will want to increase European cooperation and burden-sharing in addressing the extremely volatile neighborhoods. Other EU Member States ought to join France in seriously addressing these threats.

(Copyright 2015 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

A European Army – Re-Visiting an Old Federalist Dream?

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The call for a European Army is back on the European table. In an interview with German newspaper Die Welt over the weekend, Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, discussed on a wide array of topics from the Eurocrisis, to Grexit, to the Monetary Union, and called for the creation of a European army. The discussions around the topic of a European army have been cyclical inside European political circles for decades. With the European Council Summit on Defense of June approaching, President Juncker may want to prepare the ground before hand for a productive meeting.

Juncker’s Proposal for a European Army

The lingering crisis in Ukraine is reminding the Europeans how dependent they are on NATO and the US for the enforcement of regional security and how irrelevant/inefficient are the EU and its Member States in shaping desired outcomes in high politics. Despite the attempts by Berlin and Paris to solve the Ukrainian crisis diplomatically, Moscow has not budged and is continuing its territorial expansion in Eastern Ukraine. In some ways, Ukraine is another Kosovo for the Europeans, as in both cases the EU cannot respond independently with force and end the crisis. Such statement is certainly confirmed by Juncker’s comments when arguing that “With its own Army, Europe could react credibly to a threat

Photo: European People's Party/Flickr
Photo: European People’s Party/Flickr

to peace in a Member State or in a neighboring country of the European Union.”

Die Welt continued its interview by asking Mr. Juncker if he thinks that Russia would have thought twice before annexing Crimea if the EU had had a European army. Juncker responded by arguing that military response should not be the initial strategy and only complement diplomacy and politics. However, Juncker went on claiming that “a joint army of Europeans would give the clear impression [to Russia] that we are serious about defending the European values.” Juncker denied the fact that a European army would compete with NATO. As per Juncker, the European army would permit to demonstrate the seriousness of the EU in foreign policy; and contribute to the deepening process of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

On Monday, March 9th, the Commission tried to narrow and justify some of the comments made by President Juncker. Chief Commission Spokesman, Margaritas Schinas, underlined that the pooling and sharing (P&S) in defense capabilities make financial sense for the EU-28 (watch his response here). Mr. Schinas called for going beyond the interview and work on the substance of the question of a European army.

Such comment is not surprising coming from Mr. Juncker, as even before becoming President of the Commission, Mr. Juncker was in favor of the creation of a European army. As a Prime-Minister of Luxembourg, a small EU Member State in terms of military power, Mr. Juncker has long been in favor of a common EU force. During his candidacy to the presidency of the Commission, Mr. Juncker reiterated the call for a European army.

The Cyclical Desire for a European Army

The question of European defense is directly intertwined with the story of European integration. As developed in his latest analysis on the Juncker’s proposal, Jan Techau of the Carnegie Endowment wrote that:

The oldest item on the European list of utopian integration topics is a federal superstate. The second oldest is the creation of an EU army. Despite the obvious hopelessness of getting such a thing started and of making it work, this latter idea has been remarkably resilient.

The fight between the Gaullist vision – independent EU army – and the Altanticist – Europe9781472409959.PPC_PPC Template under the US nuclear umbrella – has remained ever since. But one should distinguish six important periods in explaining the tentatives of development/integration in high politics at the EU level (for an in-depth look at the question of the European Defense, refer to the following book Debating European Security and Defense Policy. Understanding the Complexity):

  • 1954 – European Defense Cooperation (EDC) was initiated by the French and killed by the French. The EDC was supposed to create a standing European army.
  • Cold War – Europe under the NATO umbrella. For over 30 years the baseline of European security and defense was enforced by the transatlantic alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The US provided the bulk of the military protection with its military bases around Europe. NATO offered a security blanket to the European Communities, allowing its Member States to focus on economic integration.
  • 1992 – The Treaty of Maastricht and the CFSP. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany, powerful EC Member States, France and the UK, felt that deepening the integration process with a new treaty would permit to absorb a reunified Germany. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht created the European Union and its pillar system. The new institutional design based on a three-pillar structure established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) permitting the creation of a common EU foreign policy.
  • 1998 – The Declaration of Saint Malo. Over a two-day bilateral meeting in the French town of Saint Malo, French President Chirac and British Prime Minister Blair agreed on bilateral basis to create a common European defense system permitting the EU to respond to regional crisis threatening the security of the Union and the continent. The Saint Malo Declaration was a response to European inabilities in acting and responding to the war in the Balkans and the 1998 war in Kosovo. Both regional crises highlighted the lack of hard power and unity from the Europeans and their dependence on NATO.
  • 1999-2007 – From summits to deployments. From 1999 to 2007, under the leadership of the first High Representative Javier Solana, the EU institutionalized the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) permitting the Union to deploy national forces under the EU flag for civilian and military missions. Many ESDP missions were deployed in Africa, Europe, and Asia (see the map below).
Source: EU ISS. 2014. "#CSDPbasics leaflet." September 26: 5.
Source: EU ISS. 2014. “#CSDPbasics leaflet.” September 26: 5.
  • 2007 to today – Financial crisis and CSDP. Since the 2007 collapse of the financial markets, the global balance of power has been shifting. The US and European economies were on the brink of collapse, and in the specialized literature, the declinist argument, looking at the end of the liberal world order, has illustrated the decline of American hegemony and the rise of new powers. In parallel, a series of crises surrounding Europe initiated by the Arab Spring have caused grave concerns in European capitals and Washington. Europe has been circled by a ‘ring of fire’ from all sides, Ukraine, Syria, Libya, MENA and Central Africa. Inside this ‘ring of fire’ many threats have directly challenged Europeans such as terrorism, mass-migration, war, trafficking, and failed-states. In this environment, the EU has tried to increase its defense harmonization through the Pooling & Sharing (P&S) in order to avoid duplication at the European level as well as responding to the declining of share of national GDP committed to military expenditures. Because of lack of national commitment, the P&S and CSDP have not received the attention required. In such environment, the argument of a European Defense Union (EDU), as raised by Solana and Blockmans, should permit greater strategic, institutional, capabilities, and resources cooperation between the EU-28.

A Hopeless Call?

The call for an EU army is only part of the revival of an old federalist dream. The gap between Juncker’s proposal and the European realities is extremely wide. For instance, the United Kingdom under Prime Minister Cameron has fought all European initiatives towards the furthering of European integration. During the selection and appointment process of Mr. Juncker, the UK opposed his nomination fearing that he would continuously call for deeper integration as he had done in the past. With Juncker at the helm of the Commission for a little less than a year, he has certainly launched a series of initiatives inCAMERON-UK-EU order to re-boost the EU. From the Juncker Plan to launch the European economies (read two previous analyses here and here), to the EU Energy Union to now the call for a EU army, Juncker’ strategy is to demonstrate that ‘more Europe’ is necessary in order to solving Europe’s problems.

Even though the United Kingdom was a pioneer with France in December 1998 when agreeing to the creation of the ESDP, the UK has since changed its position on greater defense integration. Ensuing the Juncker interview, London’s reaction was “Our position is crystal clear that defense is a national, not an EU responsibility and that there is no prospect of that position changing and no prospect of a European army.” The reactions by British politicians have been along the same line, a clear opposition to the Juncker’s proposal of a European army. That does not mean that the UK is opposed to a more integrated CSDP, but the country is in election-mode and being pro-European seems to be a no-go in this election.

If the UK finds Juncker’s call outraging, Germany welcomed it. For instance, German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen told German radio that “Our [German] future as Europeans will at some point be with a European army.” France has not been very vocal on Juncker’s comments. So far, France has been very active in his perceived sphere of influence and has been deploying his national troops in Libya, Mali, CAR and throughout the Sahel region at the expense of the CSDP.

The question of a EU army is always of actuality and will remain in the federalist arsenal. President Juncker is correct in his analysis of the state of the world in 2015 and the challenges/threats facing the Union and its 28 Member States. In this ever-changing world and increasing degree of

Photo: Vadim Braydov/Associated Press
Photo: Vadim Braydov/Associated Press

complexity of the challenges, the EU-28 ought to understand that increasing the Pooling & Sharing falls under an improvement of their national security and interest. The regional instabilities equally threaten all EU Member States from Sofia to London, Rome to Copenhagen, Warsaw to Paris. An EU army may not be the appropriate option, but a common strategic thinking and common foreign policy and military vision ought to be addressed and adopted.

(Copyright 2015 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

A Book Presentation – Debating the CSDP

Tobias Schwarz/Reuters
Tobias Schwarz/Reuters

A paradox is taking place in Europe. On the one hand, armed conflicts, traditional state invasions, revolutions, terrorist activities among others are taking place at the European Union’s doorstep. On the other hand, the EU is going through a process of risk-aversion and lack of strategic vision combined with progressive demilitarization as most EU Member States are barely investing in their national armies, in R&D, and even in their commitments to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). With the current types of threats and the global shift of power, one would expect the EU and its 28 Member States to maintain and/or at least increase their spending and investments in defense and security policies. The book, Debating European Security and Defense Policy. Understanding the Complexity, asks a simple question: “Why has the integration process of the EU security and defense policies been so unpredictable?” (p.4)

9781472409959.PPC_PPC Template

This overarching research question has allowed the author to demonstrate throughout 12 chapters the multitude of dimensions and variables affecting the integration and/or demise of the CSDP from the 1950s to today. Debating European Security and Defense Policy is a journey into the European construction and broader narratives of a commitment among the initial six Member States to the current EU-28 to develop a common approach, policy and thinking to security and defense. Such project is directly intertwined to the story of European integration as the first attempt goes back to 1954 with the European Defense Cooperation (EDC) promoted and killed by the French, and supported by the US under President

Credit: Chancel ‘Get this idea well and truly into your head!’ This cartoon depicts the threat that would hang over France if it were to ratify the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC).
Credit: Chancel
‘Get this idea well and truly into your head!’ This cartoon depicts the threat that would hang over France if it were to ratify the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC).

Eisenhower. The evolution of European defense is closely linked to the integration process of the Union and saw several phases of integration. The problem of harmonization and integration in defense is similar to the one on fiscal policy. Both policies are causing headaches for Member States as they are at the crossroad between traditional state sovereignty and EU integration. Defense and fiscal policies are some of the most controversial to harmonized as they are forcing Member States to identify up to what point integration is necessary without affecting too much the sanctity of national sovereignty.

Purpose, Debate and Skepticism about the CSDP

The idea of this book fermented throughout my research for my Ph.D. dissertation seeking to look at the different degree of integration in EU defense and security. During a very insightful interview with a top expert in a highly renowned and respected Washington think tank, the interviewee told me: “your dissertation ought to start with the ESDP [this was before the 2009 Lisbon Treaty] and terminate with the ESDP.” For some reason, such comment/advise has stayed with me all these years and could be the words than fostered my desire to dig deeper into the topic of the CSDP.

The goal of this book was to decorticate the CSDP into manageable pieces centered on relevant debates. This work shall be seen and understood more as a reflection with diverging narratives and be read as such rather than a linear storyline. The manuscript is organized around three main parts: part one, the theoretical debates (positivist approaches) around the CSDP; part two, the historical and strategic evolutions of European Security and Defense Policy; and, part three, the Actors of the CSDP such as the Member States, the different institutions (Parliament, Commission, Council, EEAS) and agencies (European Defense Agency), the High Representative, and the CSDP (read here the table of contents).

This work distinguishes itself from the existing body of literature by the structure of the argument and chapters (access here to the introduction). Each chapter, answering an overarching research question, is divided into two sub-level research questions underscoring two-sides for each theme. Instead of evolving in the gray area as the entire literature on the topic, the book purposely answers each question through a yes and no answer. The reason behind such model is to demonstrate to the reader how successful or not the EU and the Member States have been in promoting and developing the CSDP. Such approach has demonstrated to be very effective in order to foster discussion and a debate.

Additionally, the book features a foreword written by Dr. Jolyon Howorth, undeniably one of the most accomplished researchers on the topic (read here his latest analysis on the 2011 Libyan military operation). His argument fits perfectly with the purpose of this book to underscore the existing debate on the CSDP. As he writes “Prior to 2009, the overall mood was upbeat, optimistic and constructive. Most scholars writing in the late 1990s and early 2000s were confident that the creation of a European defense capacity was an important new development, both for European integration and for European security. […] All this began to change around the time of the ratification of the Lisbon Treat. The mood among scholars switched to one of uncertainty, pessimism, skepticism” (p. xi).

One of the most interesting chapters to write and research on was about the impacts of the 2008 financial crisis on the CSDP (Chapter 7). Theoretically (as informed by neoliberalism), the financial crisis should have been a vector contributing to the fostering of integration in security and defense policies; but the EU has seen another evolving trend: mini-clusters or sub-EU defense integration. Member States have instead increased spending on sub-regional defense cooperation initiatives with their closest neighboring states sharing similar national security problems like the Visegrad Group (as well known as the V4 composed of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), Weimar Triangle (Poland, Germany and France), Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO composed of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) among others. A debate among EU experts exist as some claim that these sub-regional initiatives will ultimately spill-over at the regional level – meaning the CSDP –, while others (myself included) see a trend lowering the deepening process of defense and security integration at the EU. This could lead to a multi-speed Europe in the realm of defense and security.

The CSDP, A Priority in the Future of the EU?

Once again, the CSDP does not appear to be on the list of priorities of the EU-28 for the coming year or even decade. Almost a year ago, the 27 heads of states and governments (Croatia was not part of the EU yet) met at the December defense summit (read analyses on the summit here, here and there), wherein they all committed to deepening European defense, and famously agreed that “defense matters.” One major way to empower the CSDP since the 2008 financial crisis has been through an increase in the pooling and sharing (P&S) of military capabilities among the Member States in order to decrease the levels of duplication at national levels.

From “defense matters” to “what defense?” the EU-28 has not expressed a great interest in empowering the CSDP. The usual argument of Pooling & Sharing (P&S) has been a way for Member States to avoid to develop and commit behind a clear strategic vision requiring credible European forces and strategic thinking. Additionally, the pillars of the CSDP, the Big 3, have been shifting away their interests from the CSDP to more national policies. Historically, European defense has evolved thanks to Franco-British initiatives. With the current distance between Paris and London for political and ideological divergences, the CSDP is slowing declining. Additionally, France has increasingly gone alone since the Libya mission in order to advance its interests and influence in Africa; Britain is fighting against the EU and trying to identify its future outside of the Union; and Germany is struggling in maintaining a standing national army and values its influence over other EU

Source: Getty
Source: Getty

policies (nevertheless, Falk Tettweiler argues that the CSDP fits in German mindset for its contribution to crisis management and prevention, civilian missions, and its multilateral nature).

Debating European Security and Defense Policy comes at the time where the CSDP is not a priority for European capitals and remains a mystery to most European citizens. This manuscript seeks to identify the important problems facing the EU and many themes of debate challenging European experts. The new EU leadership, President Tusk, President Juncker and HR Mogherini, seems to have brought a new wind into their respective positions (even though President Van Rompuy has done an excellent job). It may be that this new group of EU leaders could reinvigorate the CSDP and EU foreign policy, at least at the European level.

The book is available for purchase here on Ashgate’s website and here on Amazon.

(Copyright 2014 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

The Berlin Wall – The Centerpiece of European Integration?

Photograph: Rex Features
Photograph: Rex Features

The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9th, 1989 is one of the most important geopolitical events of the late 20th century. It marks the onset of the fall of the Soviet Union, symbolizes the end of the Cold War, and launches a new round in the construction of the European Union. Germany, and especially Berlin, were celebrating on Sunday the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall.

On the one hand, the fall is a direct celebration of the freedom and liberty of the people from state-oppression. On the other, the fall of the Wall created a series of fears and concerns in Western Europe and the US wondering about: What would a reunified Germany look like? Can a reunified Germany be left unchecked? How can the West maintain strong ties with Germany? The answer was: incorporation of the reunified Germany into the Western institutional networks, meaning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). In the case of NATO, a reunified Germany did neither affect its institutional design nor its principles, but it permitted Western powers to ‘control’ Germany on questions of defense and security. However, in the case of the EU, the reunification was an axiomatic moment leading to an unprecedented effort towards greater and deeper integration.

Even though the reunification of Germany triggered a new round in the integration process of the Union, at first Western EU Member States were extremely concerned of this geopolitical shift. Soon after the reunification of Germany, a year later, France and Britain understood the need to incorporate the unified Germany inside the European Communities (EC). But the period from November 9th, 1989 to the signature of the

Source: Madame Le Figaro
Source: Madame Le Figaro

Two-Plus Four Treaty (between the US, the Soviet Union, UK and France) on September 12, 1990, granting full sovereignty to Germany,  was very tense. At first, London and Paris were opposed to the reunification as they feared that it would upset the balance of power on the European chessboard. For instance, during a meeting on December 8th, 1989, Margaret Thatcher expressed her fears to her French counterpart, François Mitterrand, about the resurgence of a ‘Grand Reich.’ Additionally, France did not want to see its deep ties with West Germany being upset by a new Germany; while, the UK aspired to maintain its special relationship with the US.

Ultimately, the integration process of the EC was closely linked to the desire to ‘anchor’ the reunified Germany inside a European network of institutions, rules, principles and procedures. In parallel, Paris and London were disagreeing on the degree of European integration required. The 1986 Single European Act (SEA) laying out the foundation of the future European Monetary Union (EMU) and a 1990 intergovernmental meeting pushed the trend towards deeper political, economic and even security integration. The SEA established the common market, the heart and soul of the EU. London was not ready to accept deeper integration as it saw it as a threat to its national sovereignty (seems familiar?). Nevertheless, the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, incorporating all these dimensions, was a solution to the ‘German dilemma.’ Following the fall of the Wall, “the Treaty of Maastricht became a priority in order to solidify the Union and integrate a reunified Germany inside Europe” (refer to Chapter 5 of Debating European Security and Defense Policy).

The construction of the European experiment took a sharp turn moving from the European Communities (EC) to the European Union (EU). In a matter of three years, the Maastricht Treaty strengthened and deepened the integration process of the European construction. Maastricht laid out the EU under a three-pillars system (see illustration below):

  • the first pillar, the European Communities, dealt with the Common Market and the four freedoms linked to it (under supranational decision-making process)
  • the second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), offered the Union and its Member States an institutionalized external policy (under intergovernmental decision-making process)
  • the third pillar, the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), dealt with the policies of the sector of justice and police (under intergovernmental decision-making process)
Source: Institute for Language and Speech Processing (ILSP)
Source: Institute for Language and Speech Processing (ILSP)

Undeniably, the European Communities was a passive geopolitical entity, principally focusing on trade and economics, throughout the Cold War. Such risk-aversion was possible for several reasons: NATO offering a security umbrella over the continent; and active Member States like France and the United Kingdom provided security and did not want to see the EC overshadowing their national sovereignty. As well, the European Communities was not design to be an active security and defense actor. With the end of the Cold War and the reunification of the Germany, the EU understood the importance to increase its role in geopolitics and foreign affairs. Despite the creation of the CFSP, it took almost a decade for the creation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The 1990s demonstrated, once again, the European inabilities to secure its neighborhood. Additionally, the integration of a reunified Germany as a full NATO member soon after the fall of the Wall was an important moment in order to lower some of the transatlantic concerns about the future of Germany as a regional actor.

Lastly, the fall of the Berlin Wall symbolizes the end of an era for Western power, the victory of liberal democracy over communism (remember Fukuyama’s “End of History”) and underlines the power of individual freedoms in Germany and Europe. The fall of the Wall illustrates the end of the Cold War, which has appeared to be dearly missed in the BRITAIN-G8-SUMMITWest, especially in America. The Cold War was a period of relative stability, offered by the bipolarity of the world order (as theorized and advanced by neorealism), between two blocs, two models. 25 years later, American leadership, especially its most conservative/hawkish branch, is looking back at the Cold War with a certain degree of nostalgia. Today’s world does not hold such clear cut enemy and strategic approach to containing and/or confronting the enemy. All these narratives and actions are all intertwined inside this axiomatic moment of the Fall of the Berlin Wall.

(Copyright 2014 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

Power Transition from Ashton to Mogherini

mogherini

On November 1st, 2014, the transfer of power from Catherine Ashton to Frederica Mogherini was finally official. Federica Mogherini is the third High Representative (HR), as well referred as EU foreign minister, in EU history. The first HR, Javier Solana of Spain, was appointed in 1999 and remained at the helm for two mandates (1999-2009), followed by Catherine Ashton of the UK for one mandate (2009-2014), to now Federica Mogherini of Italy (2014-).

Before drawing some expectations on what the EU under HR Mogherini may look like, one should reflect on the transition of power from one High Representative to another: Solana to Ashton to Mogherini. Out of the three High Representatives, Mogherini seats comfortably behind Solana in terms of promising situations, meaning EU Member States’ willingness to commit to EU foreign affairs, economic position of the EU, and global forces. Catherine Ashton received the worst situation possible once appointed as HR in 2009. Considering the domestic, regional and international situations, it would have been very difficult for any appointee to make it into a successful tenure.

The Position and Role of the High Representative

The position of High Representative was established at the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 Solana-fermeture-014and the first High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy was appointed in 1999 after the European Council meeting of Cologne (for more in depth analysis on the position of the HR refer to these books, here and here). The article J.8.3 of the Amsterdam Treaty mentions the position of HR and states that the Presidency will be assisted by the HR. The description of the job requirements was very broad, as the HR ought to contribute with assistance of the Council to the “formulation, preparation, and implementation of policy decisions” on foreign and security policy matters (Official Journal of the European Union 2007: Article J.16). The HR was supposed to increase the cooperation between the various actors in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), bring coherence in the rotating processes of the six-month presidencies, and to make the EU a more visible international actor.

Until the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), the position of the HR did not evolve institutionally speaking. Javier Solana made his marks all over the position during his tenure. With Lisbon, the new position became the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission. The Lisbon Treaty made the position of HR more complex and as well cross-institutional, as the HR sits now at the Commission and at the Council, whereas before the Treaty of Lisbon, the HR was only sitting at the Secretariat of the Council. The position of the HR is now the bridge between a supranational institution, the Commission, the Member States, the Council, and the institution at the HR’s disposition, the European External Action Service (EEAS). The most important change in the position of the HR is its double-role, supranational and intergovernmental all at the same time. As opposed to her predecessor, HR Mogherini has announced her moving from the EEAS building to the Commission’s building, wherein she will be residing. The Treaty of Lisbon made the position of the HR one of the most powerful and visible figure in the Union.

From Ashton to Mogherini

A vast literature, mostly from media and think tanks, have demonstrated, since her appointment, how Catherine Ashton has been a weak HR and certainly not very savvy in dealing with foreign affairs. Cathy Ashton even describes herself as the “accidental diplomat” (O’Connor 2010). HR Ashton certainly scored some late successes with the agreement in Kosovo (despite the recent scandal over the EU mission in Kosovo) and Iran. For the rest, HR Ashton has been invisible and quiet.  As compared to Federica Mogherini, Catherine Ashton took the helm of European foreign policy at a very difficult time. One should recognize that Ashton faced three fundamental difficulties when appointed HR/VP in 2009.

First, the world markets were at their lowest after the collapse of the global financial markets in 2007. The Eurozone was already feeling the tension and several EU Member States were already showing serious signs of weakness such asPortugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain, formerly known as the PIIGS. The future of the Union looked very bleak at that point and many thought that neither the EU nor the Euro would survive the crisis. The financial crisis, and its consequences on the eurozone, was the first real challenge ever faced by the EU. Many realized the degree of incoherence, unpreparedness in the design of the Union and its monetary union. Ultimately, the CSDP was not the priority for neither the EU nor the Member States. The Union turned into crisis-mode and let the CSDP on the side. The CSDP was after ten years of existence considered a luxury good that Member States could easily dispense themselves from, especially the European powerhouses with effective diplomatic and defense instruments. During the Solana era, Member States were committed to the CSDP experiment and were willing to spend money and contribute in terms of capabilities and humans. This was not the same under Ashton, whom had to deal with less money, less political will, and an messy world order.

Second, Ashton was being appointed right after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009. The Treaty of Lisbon changed a lot the EU in terms of foreign and security policy. First, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – or foreign policy – and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) – or European defense – were merged into the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Second, the Treaty of Lisbon established the European External Action Service (EEAS). Cathy Ashton had one year to design a new institution and make it operational. Third, the position of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy was transformed into a double-hatted position, the High Representative of European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). Prior to Ashton, the HR was simply part of the Secretary of the Council of the EU, now the HR is not only leading a new body, the EEAS, and chairing at the Commission. The double-hatted position merges two contradictory institutional forces, inter-governmentalism and supranationalism.

Las but not least, Cathy Ashton took over European foreign policy after its first and very successful HR Javier Solana. Javier Solana, a savvy Spanish politician, was prior hisCatherine_Ashton_and_solana appointment at the helm of European foreign affairs in 1999, Secretary General of NATO from 1995 to 1999. During his leadership at the head of the Alliance, he oversaw the massive air campaign over Kosovo in 1998 and demonstrated on the international stage his savviness in working with Europe and the US. During his time at the head of European foreign policy, he was the person that pushed the ESDP from its paper-status into a civilian-military instruments seeing its first action in 2003. He has as well axiomatic during the nuclear negotiation with Iran in 2002-03, known as the EU3+1. The +1 being HR Solana, which rose the question of knowing if Solana was speaking in the name of Europe, or simply being an intermediary between the EU3 and the rest of the Union. Last, Solana finally was important in answering Kissinger’s question, “what is the phone number of Europe?”

Yes, Cathy Ashton was not the best HR/VP that European experts were dreaming about. But she embodied what the powerful EU Member States wanted, a leaderless HR/VP shifting the EU from a risk-taking EU into a risk-averse EU. EU Member States, especially France, Germany and the UK, wanted in 2009 to avoid another Solana and settled on the appointment of Ashton. For her defense, as demonstrated above, her set of cards could not really allow her to do anything positive. During her mandate, she illustrated herself more as an administrator than a strategic leader. Her clear achievement, though, is the EEAS, that she was able to create and implement in one year.

A Welcome’s Note

hq_hp_mogherini_enAs opposed to Ashton, Mogherini’ situation is much more promising and could allow her to be an effective HR/VP. She embodies a new generation of European leaders and is from Italy, a founding Member State, that wants to redeem itself after the years of crisis. Mogherini’s experience in foreign affairs is certainly greater than Ashton’s, but lesser than Solana. It will be interesting to see what Mogherini decides to focus on: foreign policy and/or defense. Will she help in strengthening the CSDP – civilian-military instrument -? Or, would she facilitate the transition to a more NATO integrated instrument? In terms of foreign policy issues, she has several important ones in her hands (see the excellent memo by Daniel Keohane, Stefan Lehne, Ulrich Speck, Jan Techau about the challenges facing HR Mogherini):

  • short-term, ebola, the direct threat of the Islamic State (IS), and Eastern violences in Ukraine. They all represent direct threats to the security of the Union.
  • mid-term, stabilizing the neighborhoods (Eastern and Southern) through economic and development assistances. Countries in Northern-Africa and Central Africa are facing serious domestic challenges that could completely destabilize the region. For the Union, it means rise of ethnic violence in Africa, illegal trafficking, rise of mass-migrations, and eventually rise of radical islamism, all these directly threatening the stability of the Union. The CSDP was created for exactly this purpose to stabilize the neighborhoods. Would it become the primary instrument for stabilization, peace-keeping, and institutional solidification?
  • long-term (well beyond her tenure), the survival of European influence in global affairs and the maintenance of its strategic role side by side with new powers like China and Brazil. Ashton did not have a long-term vision, will Mogherini have one? The EU still holds a favorable position in the current global order. Its Member States are key actors in international organizations, with France and Britain at the UN Security Council, with NATO, the WTO, the IMF – Christine Lagarde of France is leading it -, the World Bank and so forth. Multilateralism has always been a core component of European global strategy, now EU Member States have to solidify and empower these international organizations in order to keep them relevant in a more multipolar system. The EU has a role to play in the 21st century, but if it does not secure a seat in this new multipolar global order, it will simply become a second/third rank power.

In any case, Politipond wishes the best of luck to Federica Mogherini. She published on the EEAS website a simple message marking her commencement and calling for a new beginning:

Today we start a new story. The next five years will be challenging, we are all well aware of the difficulties that lie ahead of us. Our part of the world is facing one of the most complex periods of our recent history, still I believe we have all the tools and the capacity to overcome these times of tensions and crisis, and build peace, stability and prosperity all around Europe.
 
It’s up to us and we have great opportunities too. Vision, political will and teamwork can make us shape a much better future. Not only for Europe, but for the rest of the world. Today I start my mandate knowing that I can build on the good lessons we can learn from the past and counting on an excellent team: in the EEAS, in the Commission, in the Council and with all Member States. We know the next five years will be a turning point: we feel the responsibility to make the European dream come true.
 
Generations of Europeans expect from us a new beginning. So, ready to start!
 
Federica Mogherini
 
(Copyright 2014 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

2003, When the CSDP still mattered…

Tobias Schwarz/Reuters
Tobias Schwarz/Reuters

Once upon a time, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) used to matter. Ten years ago in an essay written by Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas (read here my review of Habermas’ book on the Euro crisis) in the french newspaper Libération, both thinkers called for the deepening of a common European foreign policy. It was at the time when the US, under the Bush administration, had already flexed its muscles against the will of the international community and unleashed its military power against Iraq. It was a time when the US, under a conservative administration influenced by neoconservative ideas and values, was behaving as an imperial power.

Source: Libération, 31 mai 2003
Source: Libération, 31 mai 2003

A decade later, the 2003 war in Iraq still matters for several reasons: first, Iraq is after over a decade of war and state-building a new heaven to a terrorist network, ISIS; second, the 2003 war announced the beginning of global shift of power and the decline of the liberal world order; third, it discredited the power and relevance of international institutions, especially the United Nations.

Additionally, the war created a serious transatlantic and European split. Two months after the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the Euro-Atlantic community was deeply divided. Former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, (read here the review of the documentary starring Rumsfeld) made a distinction between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe in order to distinguish on one side, France and Germany – strongly opposed to the war and the neoconservative agenda -, with the new EU Member States on the other supporting the US in its military endeavor. In Europe, the United Kingdom, under Tony Blair, was the keenly expressing its alliance to the US marking an even deeper degree of alliance in the special relationship.

In some way the 2003 war in Iraq was a wake-up call for Europe and its Member States. The EU ought to be more autonomous in foreign affairs. The question of EU foreign policy is not new as one can go back to the failed European Defense Community tentative of 1954. After several failures (EDC and EPC), it was finally addressed, materialized and institutionalized in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty with the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP), composing the second pillar. Six years, later, during the December bilateral meeting in Saint-Malo between French President Jacques Chirac and

Photo: AFP
Photo: AFP

British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), called since the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon as the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), was born. The reason for the two European military powerhouses to seek for a civilian-military instrument, autonomous from NATO, was to assert European security in its region and neighborhoods. The CSDP was born in the ramble of the Balkans – war in Bosnia and Kosovo -, when the EU was unable to stabilize its neighborhood without the intervention of the US/NATO forces.

2003 marked the beginning of the lengthy Iraq war, but as well the use for the first time the CSDP. Three CSDP missions were launched in 2003:

  • EUPM BiH mission, the first CSDP mission, a Police Mission in Bosnia & Herzegovina (2003-2012)
  • ARTEMIS DRC mission, a military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2003)
  • CONCORDIA Fyrom mission, a military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2003)
Source: EEAS
Source: EEAS, 2014

For the first time of its history the European Union (EU) had some sort of civilian-military instrument, the CSDP, in order to project power and stabilize the near and broad neighborhoods. Despite the deep division between ‘venus’ and ‘mars’ (remember Kagan?), 2003 was a year of reflection and action for the EU and its Member States. Not only the CSDP was deployed, but at the end of the year, the EU adopted its first European Security Strategy (ESS) titled A Secure Europe in a Better World. The ESS served several objectives:

  • first, to re-unite the EU Member States;
  • second, to give a strategic direction to the Union now active a civilian-military actor;
  • third, to respond to the 2002 US National Security Strategy (NSS). It was really an ideological fight between preventive action and unilateralism (US) versus ‘effective multilateralism’ (EU).

As argued by Derrida and Habermas, the “war [in Iraq] made Europeans conscious of the progressive and announced decline of the common foreign policy” (in french, “la guerre a fait prendre conscience aux Européens du naufrage depuis longtemps annoncé de leur politique extérieure commune”). 2003 was the beginning of a new era in European actions on the global stage ending abruptly with the collapse of global markets ensued by the Eurozone crisis in 2007. In some ways, the short period, 2003-2007, was the golden years of EU foreign and security policy.

Aside from the global financial crisis, has the CSDP been one of the victims of President Obama? During the Bush years, the EU had in some degree found an ‘enemy,’ a person that it could materialize an opposition. It was unilateralism versus multilateralism, international law versus impunity. With the election of President Obama, US foreign policy in regard to Europe has been very different. The message once was ‘do not overshadow and duplicate NATO’ (see the 3Ds of Madeleine Albright, refer p.10) and let the US take care of European security. Sloan even called US foreign policy towards the CSDP the ‘yes, but’ policy; ‘yes’ Europe can develop its CSDP, ‘but’ NATO is the predominant actor in European security. With President Obama, the American strategy shifted to a ‘yes, please’ strategy. Since the US (remember former Defense Secretary Gates) has called on the EU to share the burden, the EU has been unable, or even unwilling, to answer the call.

An important component in the EU defense and foreign policy engine has been the Franco-British couple. Aside from the 2010 Defense agreement, both countries have not been aligned politically, economically and strategically in recent years. Britain, under David Cameron, has been more consumed about bringing back powers to European capitals than seeking for contributing to the integration process. Britain’s big European policy is directly embedded on the eventual referendum on the future of Britain’s EU membership. Cameron certainly won’t seek for deeper integration in defense and foreign policy matters. The latest appointment of Michael Fallon as Defense Secretary, a conservative and euroskeptic favorable to Britain independence, may contribute to widening the gap between continental Europe and the island. In the case of France, Paris has been over-active in launching a military operation almost every year (Libya in 2011, Mali in 2013, and Central African Republic in 2014). Each time, the CSDP was sidelined.

imagesDerrida and Habermas in their 2003 essay underscored the importance of a common foreign policy as part of the European construction. They argued on the importance of a european citizenry and identity. Without it, it is difficult to foresee any sustainable European Union or common foreign policy striving in the coming decades. Ten years ago the CSDP seemed possible even though the Union faced a serious political and strategic crisis caused by the Iraq crisis. Today, the idea of a CSDP seem improbable considering the powerful domestic forces, the economic slowdown and rise of populism. At the end of the day the Bush years may have been the greatest thing for the CSDP.

(Copyright 2014 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission)