A Book Presentation – Debating the CSDP

Tobias Schwarz/Reuters
Tobias Schwarz/Reuters

A paradox is taking place in Europe. On the one hand, armed conflicts, traditional state invasions, revolutions, terrorist activities among others are taking place at the European Union’s doorstep. On the other hand, the EU is going through a process of risk-aversion and lack of strategic vision combined with progressive demilitarization as most EU Member States are barely investing in their national armies, in R&D, and even in their commitments to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). With the current types of threats and the global shift of power, one would expect the EU and its 28 Member States to maintain and/or at least increase their spending and investments in defense and security policies. The book, Debating European Security and Defense Policy. Understanding the Complexity, asks a simple question: “Why has the integration process of the EU security and defense policies been so unpredictable?” (p.4)

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This overarching research question has allowed the author to demonstrate throughout 12 chapters the multitude of dimensions and variables affecting the integration and/or demise of the CSDP from the 1950s to today. Debating European Security and Defense Policy is a journey into the European construction and broader narratives of a commitment among the initial six Member States to the current EU-28 to develop a common approach, policy and thinking to security and defense. Such project is directly intertwined to the story of European integration as the first attempt goes back to 1954 with the European Defense Cooperation (EDC) promoted and killed by the French, and supported by the US under President

Credit: Chancel ‘Get this idea well and truly into your head!’ This cartoon depicts the threat that would hang over France if it were to ratify the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC).
Credit: Chancel
‘Get this idea well and truly into your head!’ This cartoon depicts the threat that would hang over France if it were to ratify the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC).

Eisenhower. The evolution of European defense is closely linked to the integration process of the Union and saw several phases of integration. The problem of harmonization and integration in defense is similar to the one on fiscal policy. Both policies are causing headaches for Member States as they are at the crossroad between traditional state sovereignty and EU integration. Defense and fiscal policies are some of the most controversial to harmonized as they are forcing Member States to identify up to what point integration is necessary without affecting too much the sanctity of national sovereignty.

Purpose, Debate and Skepticism about the CSDP

The idea of this book fermented throughout my research for my Ph.D. dissertation seeking to look at the different degree of integration in EU defense and security. During a very insightful interview with a top expert in a highly renowned and respected Washington think tank, the interviewee told me: “your dissertation ought to start with the ESDP [this was before the 2009 Lisbon Treaty] and terminate with the ESDP.” For some reason, such comment/advise has stayed with me all these years and could be the words than fostered my desire to dig deeper into the topic of the CSDP.

The goal of this book was to decorticate the CSDP into manageable pieces centered on relevant debates. This work shall be seen and understood more as a reflection with diverging narratives and be read as such rather than a linear storyline. The manuscript is organized around three main parts: part one, the theoretical debates (positivist approaches) around the CSDP; part two, the historical and strategic evolutions of European Security and Defense Policy; and, part three, the Actors of the CSDP such as the Member States, the different institutions (Parliament, Commission, Council, EEAS) and agencies (European Defense Agency), the High Representative, and the CSDP (read here the table of contents).

This work distinguishes itself from the existing body of literature by the structure of the argument and chapters (access here to the introduction). Each chapter, answering an overarching research question, is divided into two sub-level research questions underscoring two-sides for each theme. Instead of evolving in the gray area as the entire literature on the topic, the book purposely answers each question through a yes and no answer. The reason behind such model is to demonstrate to the reader how successful or not the EU and the Member States have been in promoting and developing the CSDP. Such approach has demonstrated to be very effective in order to foster discussion and a debate.

Additionally, the book features a foreword written by Dr. Jolyon Howorth, undeniably one of the most accomplished researchers on the topic (read here his latest analysis on the 2011 Libyan military operation). His argument fits perfectly with the purpose of this book to underscore the existing debate on the CSDP. As he writes “Prior to 2009, the overall mood was upbeat, optimistic and constructive. Most scholars writing in the late 1990s and early 2000s were confident that the creation of a European defense capacity was an important new development, both for European integration and for European security. […] All this began to change around the time of the ratification of the Lisbon Treat. The mood among scholars switched to one of uncertainty, pessimism, skepticism” (p. xi).

One of the most interesting chapters to write and research on was about the impacts of the 2008 financial crisis on the CSDP (Chapter 7). Theoretically (as informed by neoliberalism), the financial crisis should have been a vector contributing to the fostering of integration in security and defense policies; but the EU has seen another evolving trend: mini-clusters or sub-EU defense integration. Member States have instead increased spending on sub-regional defense cooperation initiatives with their closest neighboring states sharing similar national security problems like the Visegrad Group (as well known as the V4 composed of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), Weimar Triangle (Poland, Germany and France), Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO composed of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) among others. A debate among EU experts exist as some claim that these sub-regional initiatives will ultimately spill-over at the regional level – meaning the CSDP –, while others (myself included) see a trend lowering the deepening process of defense and security integration at the EU. This could lead to a multi-speed Europe in the realm of defense and security.

The CSDP, A Priority in the Future of the EU?

Once again, the CSDP does not appear to be on the list of priorities of the EU-28 for the coming year or even decade. Almost a year ago, the 27 heads of states and governments (Croatia was not part of the EU yet) met at the December defense summit (read analyses on the summit here, here and there), wherein they all committed to deepening European defense, and famously agreed that “defense matters.” One major way to empower the CSDP since the 2008 financial crisis has been through an increase in the pooling and sharing (P&S) of military capabilities among the Member States in order to decrease the levels of duplication at national levels.

From “defense matters” to “what defense?” the EU-28 has not expressed a great interest in empowering the CSDP. The usual argument of Pooling & Sharing (P&S) has been a way for Member States to avoid to develop and commit behind a clear strategic vision requiring credible European forces and strategic thinking. Additionally, the pillars of the CSDP, the Big 3, have been shifting away their interests from the CSDP to more national policies. Historically, European defense has evolved thanks to Franco-British initiatives. With the current distance between Paris and London for political and ideological divergences, the CSDP is slowing declining. Additionally, France has increasingly gone alone since the Libya mission in order to advance its interests and influence in Africa; Britain is fighting against the EU and trying to identify its future outside of the Union; and Germany is struggling in maintaining a standing national army and values its influence over other EU

Source: Getty
Source: Getty

policies (nevertheless, Falk Tettweiler argues that the CSDP fits in German mindset for its contribution to crisis management and prevention, civilian missions, and its multilateral nature).

Debating European Security and Defense Policy comes at the time where the CSDP is not a priority for European capitals and remains a mystery to most European citizens. This manuscript seeks to identify the important problems facing the EU and many themes of debate challenging European experts. The new EU leadership, President Tusk, President Juncker and HR Mogherini, seems to have brought a new wind into their respective positions (even though President Van Rompuy has done an excellent job). It may be that this new group of EU leaders could reinvigorate the CSDP and EU foreign policy, at least at the European level.

The book is available for purchase here on Ashgate’s website and here on Amazon.

(Copyright 2014 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

The Berlin Wall – The Centerpiece of European Integration?

Photograph: Rex Features
Photograph: Rex Features

The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9th, 1989 is one of the most important geopolitical events of the late 20th century. It marks the onset of the fall of the Soviet Union, symbolizes the end of the Cold War, and launches a new round in the construction of the European Union. Germany, and especially Berlin, were celebrating on Sunday the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall.

On the one hand, the fall is a direct celebration of the freedom and liberty of the people from state-oppression. On the other, the fall of the Wall created a series of fears and concerns in Western Europe and the US wondering about: What would a reunified Germany look like? Can a reunified Germany be left unchecked? How can the West maintain strong ties with Germany? The answer was: incorporation of the reunified Germany into the Western institutional networks, meaning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). In the case of NATO, a reunified Germany did neither affect its institutional design nor its principles, but it permitted Western powers to ‘control’ Germany on questions of defense and security. However, in the case of the EU, the reunification was an axiomatic moment leading to an unprecedented effort towards greater and deeper integration.

Even though the reunification of Germany triggered a new round in the integration process of the Union, at first Western EU Member States were extremely concerned of this geopolitical shift. Soon after the reunification of Germany, a year later, France and Britain understood the need to incorporate the unified Germany inside the European Communities (EC). But the period from November 9th, 1989 to the signature of the

Source: Madame Le Figaro
Source: Madame Le Figaro

Two-Plus Four Treaty (between the US, the Soviet Union, UK and France) on September 12, 1990, granting full sovereignty to Germany,  was very tense. At first, London and Paris were opposed to the reunification as they feared that it would upset the balance of power on the European chessboard. For instance, during a meeting on December 8th, 1989, Margaret Thatcher expressed her fears to her French counterpart, François Mitterrand, about the resurgence of a ‘Grand Reich.’ Additionally, France did not want to see its deep ties with West Germany being upset by a new Germany; while, the UK aspired to maintain its special relationship with the US.

Ultimately, the integration process of the EC was closely linked to the desire to ‘anchor’ the reunified Germany inside a European network of institutions, rules, principles and procedures. In parallel, Paris and London were disagreeing on the degree of European integration required. The 1986 Single European Act (SEA) laying out the foundation of the future European Monetary Union (EMU) and a 1990 intergovernmental meeting pushed the trend towards deeper political, economic and even security integration. The SEA established the common market, the heart and soul of the EU. London was not ready to accept deeper integration as it saw it as a threat to its national sovereignty (seems familiar?). Nevertheless, the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, incorporating all these dimensions, was a solution to the ‘German dilemma.’ Following the fall of the Wall, “the Treaty of Maastricht became a priority in order to solidify the Union and integrate a reunified Germany inside Europe” (refer to Chapter 5 of Debating European Security and Defense Policy).

The construction of the European experiment took a sharp turn moving from the European Communities (EC) to the European Union (EU). In a matter of three years, the Maastricht Treaty strengthened and deepened the integration process of the European construction. Maastricht laid out the EU under a three-pillars system (see illustration below):

  • the first pillar, the European Communities, dealt with the Common Market and the four freedoms linked to it (under supranational decision-making process)
  • the second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), offered the Union and its Member States an institutionalized external policy (under intergovernmental decision-making process)
  • the third pillar, the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), dealt with the policies of the sector of justice and police (under intergovernmental decision-making process)
Source: Institute for Language and Speech Processing (ILSP)
Source: Institute for Language and Speech Processing (ILSP)

Undeniably, the European Communities was a passive geopolitical entity, principally focusing on trade and economics, throughout the Cold War. Such risk-aversion was possible for several reasons: NATO offering a security umbrella over the continent; and active Member States like France and the United Kingdom provided security and did not want to see the EC overshadowing their national sovereignty. As well, the European Communities was not design to be an active security and defense actor. With the end of the Cold War and the reunification of the Germany, the EU understood the importance to increase its role in geopolitics and foreign affairs. Despite the creation of the CFSP, it took almost a decade for the creation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The 1990s demonstrated, once again, the European inabilities to secure its neighborhood. Additionally, the integration of a reunified Germany as a full NATO member soon after the fall of the Wall was an important moment in order to lower some of the transatlantic concerns about the future of Germany as a regional actor.

Lastly, the fall of the Berlin Wall symbolizes the end of an era for Western power, the victory of liberal democracy over communism (remember Fukuyama’s “End of History”) and underlines the power of individual freedoms in Germany and Europe. The fall of the Wall illustrates the end of the Cold War, which has appeared to be dearly missed in the BRITAIN-G8-SUMMITWest, especially in America. The Cold War was a period of relative stability, offered by the bipolarity of the world order (as theorized and advanced by neorealism), between two blocs, two models. 25 years later, American leadership, especially its most conservative/hawkish branch, is looking back at the Cold War with a certain degree of nostalgia. Today’s world does not hold such clear cut enemy and strategic approach to containing and/or confronting the enemy. All these narratives and actions are all intertwined inside this axiomatic moment of the Fall of the Berlin Wall.

(Copyright 2014 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).