Rediscovering a Forgotten Past – State, Identities and Cohesion

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Credit Emilio Naranjo/European Pressphoto Agency

Politics in Europe are alive; Catalonia is the latest example. The financial crisis was the axiomatic moment in contemporary European politics fermenting domestic crises throughout and within the Union, occassionally bursting ever since. These crises have equally affected all EU Member States leading to the rise of nationalist forces (notably in France, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, the UK, Poland, Czech Republic and so forth) shaping the national political rhetorics and policy-agenda.

The latest crisis is undeniably Sunday’s referendum in Catalonia, which exposes an absolute dilemma and threatens the integrity of Spain, one of the largest EU Member States and Eurozone members. In a European Union composed of 28 sovereign states wherein domestic politics remain in the realm of the sovereign states (unless under a policy-area of a European competence), one core commonality remains binding democratic values and principles. Catalonia is one of these cases wherein state sovereignty and regional call for self-dertmination meet and clash.

The Catalan Nightmare

The crisis in Catalonia has changed gear, and potentially seen a shift in legitimacy from Madrid to Barcelona, with the reprehensible response by the Mariano Rajoy’s government on October 1 ensuing the unilateral Catalan referendum. Prime Minister Rajoy had the law on his side as the Spanish constitutional courts have ruled on several occasions on the illegality of a referendum on the independence of Catalonia. But “Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has transformed” argued Frederiga Bindi “what would have otherwise been a unilateral, unconstitutional, and useless referendum into a major victory for the separatists.”

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Cartoon: Chappatte

The legal baseline is Spain 1978’s constitution, which stipulates that Spain cannot be broken up as “the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation” and “the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards.” Only the Spanish Parliament can changed the constitution.

Catalonia is a critical piece of Spain, which is the 14th largest world economy and the 4th largest in the EU (post-Brexit). Catalonia counts about 16 percent of Spain overall population Catalonia is one of the richest regions of Spain contributing almost 20 percent of the Spanish economy. One of the arguments in favor of the independence is the lack of proportionality between Catalan contributions to the overall budget and the return. From the 20 percent of contribution, Catalan residents receive 14 percent back for public expenses. Economically, Spain may certainly face serious internal trouble if Catalonia were to secede.

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Emilio Morenatti/Associated Press

Without going back to 16th century Spanish history, Catalonia has always considered itself unique and separate from Spain with its own history, language, culture and therefore nation. In contemporary Spanish history, 90 percent of Catalonia supported the 1978 constitution. But the separatist movement and feeling have always remained underneath. The recent financial crisis, shifting into the Eurozone crisis, leading to the near collapse of the PIIGS country counted Spain in the mix contributed to exacerbate the tensions between Madrid and Catalonia. Adding to the financial crisis, Spain’s constitutional court struck down parts of the new statue of autonomy for Catalonia in 2010. Since then, Madrid did not reach several opportunities in order to continue talks with the region.

Prior Sunday’s violence, polls were always consistent in proving that only 40-45 percent of Catalans have been in favour of independence. 2013 was the year with a peak in the support level at 49 percent. Prior the announced referendum on October 1, a majority of Catalans were in a difficult position between Catalan authorities to hold the referendum on independence and the strong-hold position by Madrid.

Mariano Rajoy of Spain called on the separatist leaders, behind Carles Puigdemont, President of the Generalitat of Catalonia, to stop the “disobedience” and the “escalation of radicalism.” In a rare televised speech on the evening of October 3, the King Felipe VI of Spain condemned the actions by the separatists framing them as illegal and infringing the legal structure of Spain. “They have tried to break the unity of Spain and national sovereignty” he went on to claim. Ensuing the banned referendum, Catalonia has announced that it will move forward and declare independence from Spain in the near future (after a parliamentary session on Monday). Legally, if a declaration of independence were to be made, the central government of Spain could suspend Catalan autonomy under Article 155 of the 1978 Constitution. Such option would bring the country in a major constitutional and political crisis.

And, the European project?

Where does the European Union fit in this complex political puzzle? The EU is indirectly the cause and the remedy. But it is as well, rightfully so, a reluctant actor. In the case of the Catalan crisis, the EU and its set of institutions have remained as distant as possible from this domestic crisis. For the EU, this is not only bad news, but a sign of major internal forces at play within Member States. “Separation and secession within a member state is very bad news for a block” argued Stephen Beard of Marketplace “that is striving to hold itself together and is currently doing its utmost to punish Britain for daring to break away from the EU.”

The Treaties of the EU are clear regarding the competencies of States and the EU. For instance, Article 4.2 of the TEU stipulates that, It [the Union] shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.

Ensuing the use of force by Madrid on Sunday in Catalonia, the EU called out and condemned government violence against citizens. On October 2, the Commission released an official statement underlining the illegality of the referendum under Spanish law. Without directly targeting PM Rajoy, the Commission ended the statement by claiming that “Violence can never be an instrument in politics.” However, Spain may be one of the largest and Western EU Member State, the Commission must be as critical as it has been in Poland and Czech Republic. “It is the kind of violence the European Union” writes Steven Erlanger of the New York Times, “would ordinarily condemn in high moral terms and even consider punishing.”

On Wednesday, the Commission called for an open dialogue between the Catalan authorities and the Spanish government. Frans Timmermans, the Commission’s deputy head told before the European Parliament that “it’s time to talk.” Timmermans still maintained the official position of the Commission endorsing the legal position of Spanish Prime Minister Rajoy. During the European Parliament’s session, two leading MEPs, Bavarian Manfred Weber and Flemish Guy Verhofstadt emphasized on the fact “strong regional identity and autonomy did not mean breaking up existing nation states.” What is certain is that “if Catalonia were to leave Spain,” underlined Jonas Parello-Plesner of the Hudson Institute, “it would also leave the EU, only to start a cumbersome reentry process.”

EU Member States, all sovereign states, are not usually in favor of secessionist movements, especially within the Union. In the current context of the Brexit negotiation, the EU and the 27 Member States are quite reticent to see a region of a Member State calling for self-determination and seeking independence. “Throughout my life,” wrote Javier Solana, a former Spanish minister, former NATO Secretary General, and the first EU High Representative, prior the Sunday violence, “I have witnessed the fragmentation of many countries, and I cannot conceive of that happening in the European Union of today.” Despite the reprehensible past action and poor tactic by PM Rajoy, it is difficult at this time to foresee any support from the 27 European capitals for Catalonia’s independence.

Lastly, the Catalonia case brings home a reality, which seems to have been forgotten in 220px-2012_Catalan_independence_protest_1021.jpgone of the richest regions of the world: history tells us that states will use force to maintain their integrity and unity. In his address to the nation, King Felipe VI, “Today Catalan society is fractured and in conflict,” he said. “They (the Catalan leaders) have infringed the system of legally approved rules with their decisions, showing an unacceptable disloyalty towards the powers of the state.” The message is direct, the state shall remain and fight any types of fragmentation.

For decades, Europeans have watched separatist efforts in Iraq-Turkey (Kurdistan), Sudan (South and North), Serbia (Kosovo), Chechnya (Russia), Nepal (China) with a certain distance condemning state violence and believing in some sort of European exceptionalism, that it would not happen here inside the Union. Well Spain demonstrated a forgotten reality.

“As it forms the basis for an experience of freedom, the history of democracy,” Pierre Rosanvallon, Professor at the Collège de France noted, “is therefore not simply a history of frustrations or betrayed utopias: it has become a deeply intertwined history of disenchantment and indeterminacy.” The Catalan case opens the European Pandora box of a forgotten past forcing European citizens and leaders to reflect on the questions thought buried under the rumbles of World War two, but briefly emerging since with the reunification of Germany and the wars in the Balkans, of identity, democracy, power, oppression, nation-state, region-state and cohesion. The fraught between Madrid and Catalonia is serious and could have considerable ripple effects if a thoughtful and open dialogue is soon implemented.

(COPYRIGHT 2017 BY POLITIPOND. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. THIS MATERIAL MAY NOT BE PUBLISHED, BROADCAST, REWRITTEN OR REDISTRIBUTED WITHOUT PERMISSION).

 

European crises – The forgotten malaises

Daniel Stolle

Has populism disappeared from Europe? Is the European Union finally perceived as a constructive actor in Europe? Where are the reflections on regional crises affecting the unity of the EU and the security of the member states (MS)? All these questions seem to have disappeared from the national and European agendas since the election of Emmanuel Macron at the helm of France. Unfortunately, the malaise within each MS of the Union remains unchanged and ought to be analyzed.

On the question of the European Union, the debate about the role of the Commission will re-emerge with the next appointment of the President in 2019 and the next rounds of trade agreement with Japan. One core lesson that is often forgotten is the centrality of the MS in the decision-making process of the EU. The integration of the Union, either deepening or widening, cannot occur without the agreement and consent of the MS. If European technocrats and experts on the EU are aware of this fact, a wide majority of Europeans still tends to be unaware or even doubt this reality. Many cases in recent years, beginning with the Greek debt crisis leading to a referendum opposing the terms of the bailouts, which was then rejected by Prime Minister Tsipras, followed by the Austrian elections in May/November 2016, then the Brexit vote in June 2016, and the radicalization of new MS like Poland and Hungary, illustrate this popular opposition against the integration process and the EU at large.

The commonalities among all these cases are: regain of national sovereignty, protection of national identity, and quest to increase national power over European forces. The argument has usually been MS versus the EU. However, opening up the black-box of each MS, one can identify a much more nuance and complex picture. Within each MS, a division between cosmopolitanism (usually cities) versus nationalism (usually rural and post-industrial regions) is dividing countries politically and culturally speaking. The domestic split existed before 2016, but the financial crisis leading to an anemic economic growth across the Union exacerbated the split.

Pew Research Center

However, since the ‘positive’ outcomes of the Dutch and French elections, one could be fooled believing that the cultural-identity split dividing MS and the Union has disappeared. For many the election of Emmanuel Macron at the helm of French presidency stopped the populist wave. Such statement is certainly false considering the current domestic tensions in Poland with the push for constitutional reforms undermining the independence of the judiciary and in Hungary with the continuous anti-democratic efforts. The response of the Commission to potentially trigger Article 7 to sanction Poland is the proper approach enforcing the Copenhagen Criteria. However, the lack of clear support by Paris and Berlin to sanction Warsaw sends a mix message of unity and support of the rule of law in the EU.

The current Brexit negotiations are as well an important matter for the future of the EU and the relationship with the UK. Even though the departure of the UK from the Union is a disappointing event, it is an important historical lesson for Europeans. At this point, it would be a mistake for the EU to appear weak in the negotiations by not reaching a complete departure of the UK from the Union; Brexit ought to occur. In the UK, there are already surges of unhappiness towards the ruling class with the recent domestic talks of a potential remaining of the UK in the Union. It would play against the EU to keep the UK at this point of time. Despite a close majority of pro-Brexit votes winning the non-binding referendum, the EU needs to move along and finalize the exit of the UK. In addition, the EU needs to remain strong in enforcing rule of law and global norms. If the rumors of ongoing US-UK negotiations, as advanced by the American president, regarding a comprehensive trade agreement between the UK-US to kick in as soon the exit is completed, were to be true, the EU needs to escalate the matter. It is in the interest of the EU to enforce its global standing as the trade negotiator for the 28 Member States. The credibility of the EU as global actor is at play and should not be undermined by neither the UK nor the US. The 27 remaining MS need to support such action in case ongoing trade talks between London and Washington were to be accurate.

The domestic political tensions have distracted from the broader question of furthering the integration of the EU. The Eurozone crisis has highlighted the limitation of an integration à la carte and incomplete integration process in fiscal and economic matters. President Macron was in recent time the most pro-European candidate centering his agenda around the need to foster EU integration. Now in power, President Macron may back down from its EU centric agenda. But the EU needs to maintain the momentum in pushing for deepening the integration process in fiscal and economic issues as well as in defense policies.

(COPYRIGHT 2017 BY POLITIPOND. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. THIS MATERIAL MAY NOT BE PUBLISHED, BROADCAST, REWRITTEN OR REDISTRIBUTED WITHOUT PERMISSION).

Once upon a time, the EU was a Nobel Peace Prize Laureate

 

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Three years ago I wrote a piece beginning by: “It all started in the aftermath of World War II and in the emotional and material rumbles of Europe. The visionary great men of Europe — Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer —understood that peace in Europe would only be possible through deep economic integration, strengthening an irreversible degree of cooperation between Western European powers.” This was in mid-October of 2012, when the Norwegian Nobel Committee gave the Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union (EU). The rationale behind the prize was that the EU was a process permitting to make war unthinkable and allow for economic growth. This was a proud moment for Europeans, even though most of them did not pay much attention, and for Europeanists.

Radicalization of Domestic Politics

Today it is with real sadness to realize that in less than three years the survival of the EU appears in direct jeopardy and on the brink of implosion. Domestically, nationalism is ramping through either the rise of extreme-right wing parties, like the Front National in France, UKIP in Britain, Golden Dawn in Greece, or more recently through the

Image: AFP/Getty Image
Image: AFP/Getty Image

reemergence of extreme leftist parties like Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, and the newly elected Jeremy Corbyn in Britain. In addition, the narratives and actions demonstrated by the Obrán government in Hungary talking of a Christian Europe is affecting the overall normative message of EU (read a previous analysis here). These movements demonstrate a radicalization of the political debate directly informed by a highly emotional and confused electorate witnessing a continuous and unstoppable decline of their socio-economic condition.

Directly related to the rise of European nationalism is the financial crisis, which has spilled over to the Eurozone. The euro crisis has left the 17 Eurozone economies, at the exception of Germany, into a state of economic lethargy. In the case of Greece, the country has been on the brink of default for years and its future does not look promising based on the reports produced by the International Monetary Fund, a member of the Troika. In the case of France, still an economic pillar of the Eurozone, the succession from right to left has demonstrated the inabilities of traditional political parties to build confidence, implement meaningful structural reform, and lower inequalities. Part of the problem is the divide between a common currency and national fiscal policies.

Regional Inefficiencies

Regionally, the lingering war in Ukraine is a direct illustration that war on the European continent continues to live on. A last minute cancelation by Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych of a bilateral agreement between Ukraine and the EU in November 2013 sent off Ukraine into one of its darkest periods. Two years later, Ukraine lost a piece of its territory, Crimea, which was annexed by Russia in spring 2014 after a quickly organized referendum (read here an analysis on Russian influence over Europe). Since the annexation of Crimea, not only as Ukraine lost the peninsula, which is never mentioned by

Photo: Kremlin.ru [CC BY 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons
Photo: Kremlin.ru [CC BY 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0)%5D, via Wikimedia Commons

the 28 EU Member States, but the war in the Eastern border of Ukraine has severely affected the political, economic and stability of Ukraine. The only instrument implemented by the EU, which has been very successful, is a series of sanctions against Russia. But unity among the 28 on keeping and deepening the sanctions is slowly disappearing in favor of national gains.

The second serious regional crisis is the current migration crisis. After the 2007 Arab Spring, many in the West and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) were hopeful for a democratic transition of many countries under long-term dictatorships like in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and Libya. The time of euphoria quickly turned sour for Arabs and Westerners, witnessing either the reemergence of authoritarian regimes (Egypt), their survival (Syria) or simply collapse of the state (Libya). Since then, the EU, which has not done enough with its American counterparts in assisting in the transition of these states, is seeing an unprecedented number of refugees fleeing their homes, which have become war zones like in Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia and so forth. The mass of refugees seeking for asylum in the richest EU countries is not new, but the current mass of refugees is unprecedented and is underlining the weaknesses of the EU (institutional) and dismantling European solidarity.

A Crisis for Ages – The Migration Nightmare

If the Eurozone crisis, or at least a Greek default, were framed as the event that could kill the Euro and ultimately the Union as whole, these were the good old days. The migration crisis is directly threatening the future of the Union. If Germany and Sweden have been the good Samaritans in welcoming refugees (in 2015, it is estimated that Germany could welcome between 800,000 and 1,000,000 asylum seekers), Chancellor Merkel with her Minister of Interior, Thomas de Maizière, have reinstalled border control at the frontier with Austria. This move by Germany has started a snowball effects with other EU Member States implementing similar measures. The closing of borders to control the movement of people is a direct violation of the Treaties. The border-free Schengen agreement is one of the most successful and visible symbols of the European Union. It is too some extent a sacrosanct dimension of the EU.

European Integration in Danger?

The European integration process is a complex story of crises and adequate responses through policy changes and bargaining power. The period of the empty chair, the end of european_crisisthe Cold War and the reunification of Germany, the war in Kosovo, the divide between old and new Europe around the Iraq crisis, the no to the 2007 Constitutional Treaty and the Eurozone crisis have all been serious crises, but yet manageable for the European leaders. It appeared that European actors understood the need to solidify the Union and put aside differences in order to solve a crisis. The migration crisis is showing the worst of Europeans and their leaders, and European solidarity remains to be seen. Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the Commission, called for courage in remaining altogether and implementing meaningful measures like quotas. With a weakening Euro, as the Eurozone crisis has yet to be solved, the Schengen agreement under attack, a possible Brexit in 2016/17, the EU appears to move towards an ‘ever-lesser Europe.’ Yes, once upon a time, the EU was a Nobel Peace Prize laureate.

(Copyright 2014 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

 

Grexit, Zombies and Back to the Future

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With the looming Greek deadline, it is interesting to revisit an interview conduced back in 2011 about the future of Greece as a member of the Eurozone. Not surprisingly, not much as changed since then aside from the perpetual rotation of Prime Ministers unable to balance the debt, european and international pressures, and domestic forces.

In almost five years, the EU, the Eurozone and Greece are in the same situation that they initially were. Today Greece is on the verge of defaulting on its debt of €1.5 billion to the IMF on June 30th. Since the election of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, the fight between Greece and the Troika+Germany has been tense with no real solution (read a previous analysis on Syriza here). The bargaining process has brought the EU and Greece in front of a wall. The only difference between 2011 and 2015 is the acceptance of the concept of Grexit. In 2011, Grexit was only a word to express the unthinkable. In 2015, Grexit is an option.

Here is the interview of Dr. Lorca-Susino taken place in Miami in 2011:

“What makes a currency unique? The symbols, monuments, leaders figuring on the paper money, are exemplifications of the collective identity and shared culture. In the case of the Euro, as underlined by Gideon Rachman, the symbols on Euro’s coins and bills are fictitious.

Last week [September 15th, 2011], I ask one of my close friends, Dr. Maria Lorca-Susino, and also co-worker at the EU Center of Excellence at the University of Miami to grant me a little of her time for an interview on the future of the Euro and its impacts on the EU as whole. The fraternity among Europeans living abroad is such that she could not refuse. Dr. Lorca-Susino has emerged as one of the top thinkers on the Euro and recently published an outstanding book, The Euro in the 21st century, from the ashes of her dissertation. I had in mind to do the interview à la Financial Times, unfortunately neither lunch nor coffee were part of it.

Zombies have become a very trendy concept to use in International Relations and mass culture [it was the case in 2011 with all the movies, tv-shows and Drezner’s book Theories of International Politics and Zombies], and I could not resist on using it for this piece. Is Greece a zombie? Can a bite from Greece lead to contagion to the other members of the Eurozone? and ultimately to the European Union as a whole? Could it lead to the comeback of national currencies? Would a default of Greece be like a heat shot to a zombie? These were my general questions throughout our discussion.

I started straight with a large, contentious and complex question, “How do you see the future of the Euro?” As a true academic, she replied by “it depends,” and then claimed that it will be “without Greece.” Greece has been at the heart of a massive political storm in Europe for several reasons: first, Greece is seen by the Troika – EU, IMF, ECB – as not doing enough; second, Greece could be considered as a failed-state. The problem with Greece is that the Greek government is unable to raise money [this changed in 2014 in Greece], as opposed to be unwilling to. Furthermore, from an economic standpoint, the case of Greece is a problem of solvency – no more assets – as opposed to have a problem of liquidity, which is the case of the Italy.

Dr. Lorca-Susino underlined that the Eurozone without Greece is not a “big problem” as the Treaties have been already breached many times. The no bailout rule has been breached, so why would it be a problem to remove Greece for the Eurozone? At that time, I should have raised the fact that one of the problems is perhaps not political, but instead unethical. But even the notion of ethics on the Greek fiasco lost its value a long time ago, when the Greek government cooked the books. The fact is that Greece lied and did not report the “real” data concerning its deficit and debt. The expulsion of Greece from the Eurozone is not a question of economic weakness, as argued by Dr. Lorca-Susino, but instead a consequence of its dishonesty to the other Member States. The cover-up by the Greek government did put the entire system in jeopardy, as she recalled, but also limited the time for action or reaction of the other Member States in dealing with such crisis.

I, then, wondered about the need to restructure, redesign the architecture of the Eurozone. She replied very simply that, “the Eurozone has all the requirements. But the only problem is that they have not been respected.” Originally and “in good faith” – as underlined several times throughout our discussion – Member States were allowed to maintain their fiscal autonomy. She went on and argued that the “unwritten rule for this fiscal independence” was because of a shared belief that Member States were part of a so-called “gentlemen club.” In other words, Member States’ words were the only guarantee needed for a stable and safe economic climax within the Eurozone. Short-term breaching was permitted, as it was the case with France and Germany, as long as Member States readjusted their deficits.

What about a common EU fiscal system? “Fiscal unity is complicated,” argued Dr. Lorca-Susino, “because it would send the entire European political class to unemployment.” Her vision of the role of politicians is reduced to their abilities to make the budget in accordance with the country’s needs. Fiscal unity is not a fiscal question, but instead a political one. However, another problem would be to design a common European taxation system with all its complexity around the question of redistribution in accordance with national taxation and European needs. Fiscal unity would ultimately lead toward a federal state along the lines of the United States.

But, what is the role of the European public in all that? Have European citizens been removed from the equation? Since the beginning of the crisis in 2008, the European public, all across the Union, has been extremely critical and vocal of all the austerity measures undertaken, especially the ones implemented in Greece, Spain, Italy, Britain, and to some extent France. A large segment of Europeans see the European Union as the supra-entity forcing national governments to cut their budgets and ultimately weakening the power of the welfare state. Her answer, once more, was sharp and clear, “the Euro is like Bush! Everybody blames it!” Her argument is that European citizens truly believe that life post-Euro was better. To some extent, the economic rationale is valid, monetary autonomy. Furthermore, national governments have used the Euro as a shield in order to push unpopular national economic policies without affecting the electability of its political class.

On the international stage, the Euro has been used as an instrument from diversion especially in the US. On the money market, the Euro is not seen anymore as a strong, stable currency leading investors in buying massive amount of Swiss Franc with all the consequences it entails for the Swiss authorities.

To conclude this piece, I would emphasize two points: first, the Euro is far from being perfect, however, it has become an European scapegoat. At least, Member States can agree on something; second, as argued by Dr. Lorca-Susino, “Greece is not buyable as a country, as an economy.” Greece looks like a zombie. One of the problems with zombies is the difficulty to find a vaccine. “

0,,18530052_303,00Putting this interview in perspective and as a concluding remark, one should mention the call by Prime Minister Tsipras to put the decision in the hands of the Greeks by holding a referendum on July 5th. This fascinating political move by Tsipras put the Greeks in the driver seat. Tsipras and his finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, are opposed to the terms of the new bailout. For instance, in his public address on June 26th, PM Tsipras said “After five months of tough negotiations, our partners ended up with a proposal in the form of an ultimatum,” with “new, unbearable measures,” which would force for additional cuts to pensions, salaries and tax increases. He added that “the goal of some of Greece’s partners is the humiliation of an entire nation.” It is the first time since the beginning of the eurozone crisis that a government is asking directly its citizenry to make a choice on their future.

In order to do so Tsipras had asked to his creditors and the Eurogroup to give a 5 days extension. The next day, June 27th, the finance ministers of the Eurogroup rejected Tsipras’ demand. Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the leader of the Eurogroup of eurozone finance ministers, told a news conference that “The Greek government has broken off the process. However regrettable, the program will expire on Tuesday night.” Ultimately, Greece seems on the verge to leave the Euro. A Grexit is now a reality.

This piece was initially published on Foreign Policy Association’s Blog on September 23rd, 2011 under the title of “Euro, Zombies, and Greece: A Discussion with Dr. Lorca-Susino”
(Copyright 2015 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

Mogherini’s Choices

Hearing of Commissioners-designate at the European Parliament

On the 6th of October, Federica Mogherini was facing the European Parliament for her confirmation hearing as the next High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP). In an hearing of over 3 hours, she described and presented her vision of the job and the role of the EU on the international stage.

In her opening statement, Mogherini framed quite well the main questions that are oftentimes sidelined and unfortunately left continuously unanswered by national and European leaders: “In this difficult world, in these difficult times, what does the European Union do? Where do we stand? How do we make sure that we play our role in these difficult times?” She presented her plan in order to make the EU more relevant on the global stage. She laid out three driving forces: first, to shape ‘a real common policy;’ second, to deepen the degree of cooperation between the EU institutions, Parliament, Council, Commission and EEAS; third, to increase coordination and communication among the agents involved on similar policies.

In terms of area of actions, Mogherini wants to narrow down the area of European interests. She wants to “taking care of our part of the world,” which entails the direct and broader neighborhoods: East (Russia, Caucasus and Turkey), South (Middle East and North Africa). A clear area of actions for the EU and the CSDP is long due as it will allow Member States and European institutions to clearly identify the pressing issues and the strategy to adopt and implement.

Mogherini’s Challenges

However, Mogherini is facing several core challenges: first, an inside one – Member States & institutional; second, an outside one – Europe declining global position in the world; third, a series of unstable regional and global crises. Her opening statement before the Parliament illustrates clearly that she is well aware of the challenges ahead of her.

First, the institutional tensions between EU institutions, Member States and from the Member States are real. They can seriously affect the efficiency of the European foreign policy machine as it was the case under Ashton. Mogherini was appointed at one of the most difficult position. Her title says it all: High Representative and Vice President of the Commission. She has a double-hatted position half intergovernmental – Member States – and half supranational – Commission -. As argued by Jan Techau, Mogherini’s role and tasks are very complex as “[European] institutions are strong on trade and development but have almost zero executive power in classic diplomacy and crisis management.”

Ashton has demonstrated the degree of challenge entailed in the HR/VP position. For instance, she had been criticized for not assisting at many meeting at the Commission, when in fact she was traveling for the EEAS (at least this is the official argument). In order to avoid a similar scenario, Mogherini has been proactive and has announced that she will be moving with her Cabinet to the Berlaymont Building (the Commission’s building). Her rationale is that “I [Mogherini] cannot ask structures to work together if I do not work with all of them myself.” She is planning to assist at the College of European commissioners’ meetings. Techau frames quite well the reality and dilemma of the HR/VP job and all decision-making in foreign policy at the EU level. Techau calls it the dilemma between the internal realities – Brussels bubble – (what is possible), and the external realities (what is needed). Mogherini, as her predecessor, will have to try to narrow this expectation-reality gap as much as possible.

Undeniably, Mogherini is taking over a broken foreign and defense policy machine. The last five years under the helm of Catherine Ashton, the EEAS and CSDP have been under serious tensions and attacks from the Member States. The Big Three, especially France and the UK, see the EEAS as a direct threat to their national foreign ministries; while the CSDP has simply been relegated to a second grade defense instrument stabilizing context after French or international interventions. This has been the case in Mali, Central Africa and Libya. Mogherini will have to deal with the powerful European foreign policy leaders, and re-affirm the credibility and contribution of the EEAS in Europe. She will have to sell the EU foreign policy to Europeans.

Second, the declining position of the EU on the global stage is undeniable. The rise of new powers, especially China, and the continuous affirmation of American powers, despite a broad literature demonstrating American decline, are clear challenges. Mogherini holds one dimension of the global relevance of the EU. She needs to remain committed and avoid the “rapid erosion of European power and influence in the world.” At this rate of decline and inaction, the EU will become a second-grade power. In the current global dis-order, the EU can maintain a premier role if it wants to. The HR/VP can play a role in it.

Third, Mogherini will have a lot on her plate once HR/VP. The list of security issues from public health (with the Ebola), to energy security (Russia and Ukraine), to territorial tensions (Russia and the Palestinian files), to homeland and international terrorism (ISIS and homeland radicalization of the European youth) are all awaiting clear common European strategies. Each of these issues has to be coordinated at the European level as all of them are transnational problems. Additionally, Mogherini will have to empower the CSDP or simply shift the CSDP into NATO. The CSDP under Ashton has been in decline in terms of objectives, role and influence. The 2013 Defense summit (read here, here, and here in depth analysis on the summit) led to a re-commitment by the EU-28 towards European defense and the CSDP, but the words have yet to be translated into actions.

Food for Thoughts

On a positive note, Mogherini embodies a new class of European leaders. She is young and understands foreign policy. Her past experience, despite being short and limited, nevertheless was directly connected with foreign affairs. This was not the case of Catherine Ashton when she got appointed in 2009. Mogherini embodies a younger Italian political class that wants to reaffirm the serious commitment of Italy to the European project.

“We need a long-term vision to prevent crises and to manage post-crises. We need to think big,” underscored Mogherini during her opening statement “with a far-reaching look at the global landscape, and we have to realise that this is in our own interest.” Such statement Catherine_Ashton_and_solanadeserves credit and attention as leaders with a strategic vision have become rare. Javier Solana, the first HR, was this kind of politician with a broad strategic vision. He understood that a clear narrative and strategic vision was necessary in order to have an active EU on the global stage; and he understood which fights to pick. Again, the political, social and economic realities of the EU are to some degree similar and arguably worst that the ones under HR Ashton. The economic slump of the Eurozone and the EU is continuing; anti-Europe sentiments are growing all around the EU and are even becoming core components of domestic policies like in Britain; and the national desire to spend money on foreign policy and defense is not present. Mogherini will have to convince the EU-28 that the EEAS and CSDP are not a redundancy in costs and are in fact complementary to national commitment to foreign policy and defense. Mogherini certainly has a positive aspect going in her favor as a large majority of Europeans are in favor a EU leadership in world affairs as demonstrated below. Europeans at 73% consider that the EU ought to contribute to the making and shaping of world affairs.

Source:  German Marshall Fund. 2014. Transatlantic Trends. Key Finding 2014. p.16
Source: German Marshall Fund. 2014. Transatlantic Trends. Key Finding 2014. p.16

Last but not least, Mogherini’s hearing before the Parliament underlined her ease in expressing herself – and in several languages -. She seems to understand – and we will see if she will ‘enjoy’ it – the highly political dimension of her position, which was apparently not shared by her predecessor. As underscored by Nick Witney of the ECFR, “To succeed, she will also need luck, determination, and more support – from the member states, from the President of the European Commission and from the other Brussels institutions – than her predecessor ever enjoyed.” Based on her performance before the European Parliament, Mogherini wants to appear as the person in charge in order to reform the EU strategic approach to foreign policy.

(Copyright 2014 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

Europe’s Dilemma – A Confused Power?

Credit: EPA
Credit: EPA
 
Europe is of little help. Internal European divisions mean that no European government, not even the one led by Angela Merkel in economic powerhouse Germany, can provide a clear definition of and support for a European consensus on dealing with the currently troubled world (Stanley R. Sloan 2014).

Since the collapse of the financial markets leading to a deep economic and financial crisis in Europe, the European Union’s aspirations to contribute to global security have slowly disappeared. With its array of foreign policy tools and its defense and security policy – the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) – the EU seemed like a well-versed regional and global actor at least on paper at the start of the millennium.

The recent crises – Russia’s annexion of Crimea, continuous war in Eastern Ukraine, rise of ISIS in Iraq, destruction of a civilian airliner by pro-russian militiamen over Ukraine, instabilities in Sahel and Middle East & North Africa (MENA), war in Gaza, among others – have clearly demonstrated the inaptitude of the EU and its Member States in their willingness to tackle these challenges and be actually able to play the game of world politics. It has appeared that the EU seems unable to operate in 21st century world politics and incapable to formulate a unified response to pressing crisis.

As most Western powers, but especially for the EU which does not have a standing army and a clear national interest, Europe’s dilemma has always been in balancing values with interests. For a long time, values and interests tended to be closely intertwined (remember Kagan’s argument of a 21st century power, or Cooper’s argument of Europe as a post-modern state). Europe’s foreign policy tools shaped by soft power – EU’s behaviors based on international law, institutions and multilateralism – seem to be an effective road for all European agents. The EU had soft power, while the Member States had hard power. It seems to be a good balance as the EU was not overshadowing active foreign policy Member States, like France or Britain. However, the academic literature has for some times wondered about the sole influence of soft power in order to shape world events and stabilize regions. It seems that soft power may very well function in times of prosperity, peace and most importantly international stability provided by a hegemon. For instance, hard power was required and necessary in order to stop the vicious wars in the Balkans during the 1990s. After the use of military power, Europe’ soft power has been a successful instrument in order to stabilize the region. But, since the 2007 financial crisis, the international order has been progressively shifting leading to a rebalancing of world powers and their roles onto the international arena.

china-u-s-europe-trade-economy5Back to the original theme, Europe’s dilemma is dealing with the balancing act between the EU and its 28 Member States in shaping world events. The perpetual question in European domestic circles has always been: what has the EU done for us? When studying the CSDP, the real question should be what have European powerhouses done for the CSDP? At first, France and Britain were the initiators behind its creation in 1998. Paris and London were strong supporters – even though they have had some divergence in terms of the role of CSDP and its interactions with NATO – and the first decade of the CSDP was to some degree successful with a broad range of civilian and military CSDP missions and a charismatic High Representative in Javier Solana. Then, the financial crisis, causing clear domestic shifts, has contributed to the demise of the CSDP. European powerhouses have since tried to lower their commitments to the CSDP and lessen their desires to foster a common voice when tackling new challenges. This has been the challenge for the EU these last 7 years, saving the CSDP and EU aspirations to shaping world events.

Britain – all about leaving the EU?

Since the election of David Cameron as Prime Minister, Britain has been more concerned CAMERON-UK-EUabout promoting and defending its interests within the Union. Most EU Member States do so, but Britain has been principally concerned in bringing-back its perceived lost powers from Brussels to London. Britain has been in the business to defend British interests at the expense of European way of doing business, compromise. Additionally, Britain is facing a tense period of its history with the looming Scottish referendum of September 18th, 2014. The financial crisis has severely hurt the British economy and to some degree Britain’s global aspirations. It has translated to a lesser active Britain in promoting the CSDP.

In the case of the tension with Russia over Ukraine, Britain has long defended its interests by avoiding meaningful sanctions against Russia. Britain sought to protect Russian investments in the City and massive Russian influx in its country. Nevertheless, the recent EU sanctions, adopted mid-July, demonstrates the commitment by London to challenge Moscow and take Russian leadership accountable. The destruction of the Malaysian airplane was a turning point for Cameron and his European colleagues.

France – all about promoting French interests?

French security and defense policy is moving into an opposite direction than the common one. On one side, France has been extremely active on the international stage leading the multilateral military intervention in Libya, and then going alone in Mali (Operation Serval starting in 2012), Central African Republic (started in 2014) and now throughout the Sahel (Operation Barkhane). Each time the EU and the CSDP were sidelined and left with small missions that it can difficulty undertake due to limited support back in Europe. In the case of Libya, Mali and CAR it was difficult to materialize EU Member States’ words with actions and materials.

Second, France is seeking for a solution to its dire financial and economic climate. France stands behind the fact that it will sell its Mistral-class amphibious assault ships to Russia so Paris can protect

Credit: Newscom
Credit: Newscom

domestic jobs and economic growth. But, recently France has claimed that the delivery of the second mistral ship will depend on Russia’s attitude. Moscow’s response was that it will not be paying until the two ships have been delivered. Even former Defense Secretary Gates has expressed during an interview his incomprehensions concerning the French sale of military equipment to Russia. Such move by Paris illustrates the large margin of action offered by Europeans to Putin. Despite annexing Crimea, arming al-Assad and the pro-russian militiamen in Eastern Ukraine, using hydrocarbons as a weapons, France still perceives that it is in French national interest to provide high level military equipment to a regional power in search for greatness and perpetual challenge of Western interests. Such move by Paris is incomprehensible.

Germany – still a reluctant foreign policy actor?

Germany and Italy are naturally protecting the influx of Russian hydrocarbons. Germany has remained a quiet actor within the EU in matter of defense and security policy. Aside from its contribution to NATO mission in Afghanistan, that ended in 2007, Berlin has not be a major European foreign actor. Germany has been called a reluctant foreign policy actor especially after its abstention to contribute to the NATO-led mission in Libya in 2011.

Germany’s priority has been about stabilizing the Eurozone crisis and re-launching growth in Europe. Germany has been choosing its foreign policy battles. For instance Germany has increased its foreign policy game in recent months through its diplomatic rift with the US on the spying scandals and finally agreeing on tougher sanctions against Russia. However, on the recent crisis in Iraq, Germany was one of the obstacle at the recent EU meeting in order to coordinate a unified EU response. If France and Britain are willing to send weapons and assist the Kurds in their fight against ISIS, Germany has expressed its reluctance “to test the limits of its policy prohibiting the export of weapons to conflict zones.”

So much for a 21st century power!

The EU, which has identified and promoted itself as a soft power, is even unable to behave as one. Member States are too concerned about their short-term interests over their owns and EU’s actual long-term interests. The unwillingness to sanction Russia, at first, for its behavior in direct violation of international law – Syria, Crimea, Ukraine, Chechnya, among others – exemplifies Europeans’ perpetual defense of their national interests. As demonstrated in Dempsey’s excellent piece, European powerhouses are continuing ‘business as usual’ with Russia. It took months for the Union to finally agree on a set of sanctions against Russia that actually could have a real effect on the Russian economy. However, the EU and the US changed their position early August with the adoption of stronger sanctions (watch here a good video on the topic) against Russia leading to a Russian response to import bans on select EU foods (an extraordinary meeting of the Agriculture and Fisheries Council will take place early September to assess the impact of these measures and the appropriate response). The sanctions are targeting Russian financial, energy and military sectors. Russia may be a tough case to crack for the Union, but it plays within a broader spectrum of regional stability. The EU is not in position to assert its influence and power. Since the financial crisis, the Union has been catching up with world events in its neighborhoods rather than influencing them.

Back to the original question, what have European powerhouses done for the CSDP? Since the 2007 financial crisis, not much. National interests have ruled over the any types of

The Economist
The Economist

common interests. The CSDP was created back in 1998, at the bilateral meeting in Saint Malo between French president Chirac and British Prime Minister Blair, to finally provide the Union with a civilian-military instrument to solving pressing regional crises. The wars in the Balkans – Bosnia and Kosovo – were clear illustrating of European inabilities to assure security in its neighborhood. Over a decade later, the lessons have been already forgotten. Member States are more committed to their national interests. The example of the selection process of the next EU diplomatic chief, which should be understood as a clear fiasco, demonstrates that Member States rather have a mediocre diplomatic chief not overshadowing their interests and influences – for what there are worth – than a clear diplomatic leader with a vision for the EU and the CSDP on the global stage. It seems obvious that the Ashton mandate did not overstep over national interests, but what was the real costs to Europe’s influence and credibility on the international stage? And was the Solana’s mandates so damaging to French and British interests? The selection of the next HR does matter and could affect the future of the CSDP (read here the excellent article by Ian Bond, Denis Corboy, William Courtney, Craig Dunkerley). A top diplomat at the helm of European diplomacy and foreign affairs may simply be what Europe needs in order to find a new direction and get a second wind.

(Copyright 2014 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).