Book Review in The International Spectator

9781472409959.PPC_PPC TemplateIn November 2014, Ashgate published my first single author book reflecting on the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the European Union (here is the link to the page). This book is addressed to an audience in search of understanding the reasons behind the periods of breakthroughs and declines, construction and demise of European defense (review a review here). Debating ESDP is an attempt to breakdown a complex project directly intertwined with the integration evolution of the European Union. The CSDP embodies the complexity of the European Union illustrating the perpetual tensions between European and national interests and between federalism and intergovernmentalism (here is a review on federalism).

The current geopolitical realities facing the Union – domestic, regional, international – are serious and demonstrate to a certain extent why a meaningful, coherent and active CSDP is necessary either as a civilian and/or military instrument. The lingering violence and civil war in Syria are at the roots of one of the largest migration crisis since the end of the World War two. The Syrian crisis requires sound diplomatic, foreign policy and defense policy strategies. Each EU Member State has a different reading of the situation and willingness to participate in direct actions on the ground. But the EU and its Member States may simply be waiting on a clear US position by the Obama administration on addressing the issue in Syria. Will it go through a US-Russian pro-Assad alliance? Or will it be a series of highly disorganized international interventions? Debating ESDP offers the instruments in order to understand the lack of unity of the EU on all the different pressing crises, from the Syrian crisis, to the one in Ukraine.

In the latest issue of the excellent Italian journal The International Spectator, a review of Debating European Security and Defense Policy was published and is copied below.

Debating European security and defense policy : understanding the complexity / Maxime H.A. Larivé. – Aldershot ; Burlington : Ashgate, c2014. – xviii, 262 p. – (Global interdisciplinary studies series). – ISBN 978-1-4724-0995-9 ; 978-1-4724-0996-6 (ebk) ; 978-1-4724-0997-3 (ePUB)

With this book, Maxime H.A. Larivé seeks to clarify the debate on the evolution and probable outcomes of the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In order to provide a comprehensive overview of the subject, the author sets out the different positions, both optimistic and sceptical, that characterise the issue, one of the most controversial of the EU integration process.

The book is broken down into chapters that constitute an articulated answer to ten different questions, in the form of a debate. The debate structure allows the author to provide two different answers to each question: one more optimistic and the other less confident in the progress and outcomes of CSDP. Yet, the work also has a central question to which each single query relates. The author proposes a reflection on why European integration in the field of security and defence always seems to have come up against major hurdles to its definitive completion. The book is structured in a functional way that guides the reader in discovering and examining this crucial subject in depth.

The chapters are organized into three different sections, each bringing together questions on the theoretic background, the historical evolution of CSDP, and the actors, structures and processes engaged in its implementation. The result is an overarching analysis that delves into the most crucial aspects of the subject, including the role of the United States and NATO in the promotion (or obstruction) of CSDP over the decades and the implications of the recent financial crisis on the engagement of EU member states in this field.

Despite its dichotomous structure, the general impression that the book gives of CSDP is of a complex mechanism that is still far from functioning in a proper and effective way. The shortfalls of CSDP become apparent in its practical implementation and the reluctance of member states to move ahead, obstructing the attainment of its objectives.

The argumentation in the various chapters is generally supported by the most relevant IR theories (namely neorealism, neoliberalism and social constructivism) and empirical data on CSDP missions and their legal/institutional instruments (such as the European Security Strategy of 2003). The information thus gathered reveals a shift in the evolution of CSDP towards an ever more bureaucratic body unable to act as a coherent political subject in the most crucial IR matters, for example the upheaval in the MENA region caused by the Arab Spring.

One of the book’s most important contributions to the discussion of CSDP and the debate over European Union foreign policy management is the analysis and comparison of the two High Representatives that were in charge of the Union’s foreign affairs and security policy from 1999 to 2013. The figures and policies of Javier Solana and Catherine Ashton are subjected to a detailed analysis that seeks to highlight their respective strengths and weaknesses in the making and implementation of CSDP.

The author does not present the book as an essay on the history and evolution of CSDP (for that purpose Larivé refers to the work of Jolyon Howorth – who also authored the Foreword), but rather as a contribution and tool for all those who want to form a personal opinion on the issue. Moreover, the plain language and schematic structure make the book suitable for students aiming to acquire a critical awareness of the subject. Larivé succeeds in putting readers in an active position, challenging their opinions and knowledge of the subject. (Laura De Marchi)

Politipond wants to thank The International Spectator for authorizing to copy the review, which figures on the Volume 50, Issue 3, p. 135-6 (here is the link to the latest issue and the link to the book review)

(Copyright 2014 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

Greece – Failure of Leadership with Global Consequences

Photo: EPA
Photo: EPA

“Le drame grec n’est pas et ne sera pas seulement national : il a et il aura des effets sur l’ensemble de l’Europe, dont la Grèce fait partie intégrante par son histoire et sa géographie” – Jacques Delors, Pascal Lamy et Antonio Vitorino in Le Monde of July 4th.

Greece and the European Union have their backs against the wall. Greece faces two deadlines, June 30th repayment of €1.6bn to the International Monetary Fund (which remains unpaid until the results of the referendum), and the July 20th of €3.5bn to the European Central Bank (ECB). Even if Greece were to repay the first bill, it would be unable to do so on July 20th.

So far, Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and his finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, feel that the terms of the new bailouts are too destructive and would require more cuts on Greek social programs that they have asked Greek citizens to vote on their futures (the referendum is currently taking place in Greece). Without an extension of his first debt, Greece has no chance of receiving the remaining of the credit of €7.2 billion and would ultimately default. So, how has a crisis starting in October 2009 been so poorly managed and is putting at risk the stability of Europe and global markets?

A Call for Democracy?

On the night of Saturday  27th, Prime Minister Tsipras announced on television, at the great surprise of his European counterparts, that he would be holding a referendum on July 5th asking the Greek citizens to decide on the future of Greece, either by accepting the deal and the ensuing austerity measures, or by rejecting the deal and ultimately having to default. In order to hold the referendum, Tsipras asked his creditors to postpone the June 30th deadline by five days, which has been rejected. For instance, the leader of the Eurogroup of Eurozone finance ministers, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, said at a news conference that “The Greek government has broken off the process. However regrettable, the program will expire on Tuesday night.”

International public opinions have been deeply divided when reflecting on Tsipras’ call. On the one hand, some have argued that Tsipras is gambling with the future of Greece and ultimately the Eurozone and the stability of global market. While others have talked of a smart political move by Tsipras. On the question of the referendum, Prime Minister Tsipras has already expressed that he will be campaigning for a ‘no’ vote (read here Varoufakis’ recommendation for a no vote). Two of the top American economists, Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman, announced in separate editorials that they would vote ‘No’ at the referendum. Joseph Stiglitz said clearly in his op-ed that the tension between Greece and its creditors (troika) is about power and democracy rather than economics. Yet, many media outlets have been very critical towards Tsipras as one can see the recent cartoon published by the Economist:

The Economist - July 4th
The Economist – July 4th

Merkel & Hollande, European Leaders? Think again…

The current crisis is more of a political failure than an economic/monetary one. It is the failure of Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and François Hollande of France to recognize that saving Greece is more important than letting a Eurozone member

Photo: EPA/WOLFGANG KUMM
Photo: EPA/WOLFGANG KUMM

defaulting on its payments and obligations. Chancellor Merkel has been portrayed as the leader of Europe, which seems to be a wrong assessment in retrospective. A leader is not an individual working on protecting solely the interest of his/her country, but in the interest of the system as whole. In addition, one needs to recognize that Merkel rejected a last minute call by Tsipras to redefine the terms of the agreement. She reiterated that there was no point in holding talks with Greece before the July 5th referendum. Her finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, was more critical, saying, “Greece is in a difficult situation, but purely because of the behaviour of the Greek government … Seeking the blame outside Greece might be helpful in Greece, but it has nothing to do with reality.” As hard it may be to justify another rescue of Greece to her electorate, Angela Merkel needs to recognize that a Greek default would endanger Germany, the Eurozone, the EU and global financial markets as a whole.

In the case of François Hollande, he has been too quiet and distant on the question of the Greek default. François Hollande, a socialist by political affiliation, missed a strategic moment in establishing himself as the axiom between the members of the South with the ones of the North. François Hollande’s gamble has been to bandwagon with Germany rather than positioning himself with a clear strategy and eventually offering alternative options in favor of Southern members. Hollande’s gamble is not only failing, but he has become irrelevant on the Greek dossier (not what French finance minister, Michel Sapin, would claim). Such strategic absence by France is regrettable, as the country economic base is so fragile that a Greek default would certainly put a halt to the more than timid recovery if one considers the degree of involvement of French banks in the Greek economy. It is difficult to imagine France striving through another Eurozone crisis with GDP growth rate of 0.6% and an unemployment level at 10.5%.

Global Earthquake, and American Powerlessness

A Greek default would have serious global consequences causing contagion throughout the world. Since Monday morning, global stock markets have been declining and are waiting on the eventual repercussions of a Greek default as many unpredictable consequences could occur considering the complex interconnection of world financial system.

The United States has been following the European drama very closely and powerlessly from the other side of the pond. Even though the US economy is slowly picking up, it has remained very timid with strong quarters and weaker ones. President Obama has been in directly contact (and through his Jack Lew, his Secretary of Treasury) with his European counterparts, Ms. Merkel and M. Hollande, expressing his concerns about the eventual consequences on the global finance and calling for a resolution. Speaking at a news conference, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Janet Yellen, said that “To the extent that there are impacts on the euro-area economy or on global financial markets, there would undoubtedly be spillovers to the United States that would affect our outlook as well.” The US have been very worried about the course of actions taken by the Europeans and has urged Greece and the Europeans to reach a deal in order to avoid a default.

A second reality, beside economics, is pure geopolitics and security. With a Greek default, the country would become unable to secure its borders, a real problem with the current migration crisis in the Mediterranean – wherein the EU and its Member States are failing to address – (read previous analyses here and here). Even if most of the coverage has focused on Italy, Greece is the second entry point to Europe by the sea and land. The second geopolitical reality is the rapprochement of Athens with Moscow. This rapprochement is taking place at a time

Reuters
Reuters

wherein the EU is extending its economic sanctions against Russia (so much for European unity vis-à-vis Russia). Greece and Russia are working on an deepening energy and agricultural ties. “Russia wants to build a pipeline through the Balkans, and Greece wants it, too” said Dimitris Vitsas, a ruling leftist Syriza party lawmaker, “We can develop a common enterprise not only in this, but for agricultural products and so on.” From Moscow’ standpoint, the gas deal with Athens is an important entrypoint into European politics. Moscow has been financing European radical parties and worked on transforming its image from within (read here a previous analysis on Russia in Europe).

Geopolitics highly matter in the Greek dossier and seem to have been sidelined for obvious economical and financial realities. With or without a Greek collapse, geopolitics will remain and affect the stability of Europe.

A New Meaning of Europe?

The European project is based on core principles, norms and values: solidarity, peace, democracy and respect. At several occasions, German Chancellor Angela Merkel used the phrase, “If the euro fails, Europe fails,” in order to talk about the need to save Greece. With the Greek fiasco, it seems that each normative dimension has been violated by all European parties. The concept of European solidarity is not embedded in punishing but assistance.

Greece is so indebted with a debt representing 183.2% of the GDP with an unemployment rate above 25% that its future can only be with a serious assistance by its European counterparts. Even if Greek debt is abysmal, Greece’s economy only represents 2% of the eurozone. In order to make Greece stable and functional, it will need to go through serious structural reforms and clean up the high level of corruption. Certainly some Eastern, Central and Baltic Member States, like Lithuania and Bulgaria, feel that Greece should implement the necessary reforms as the quality of life in Greece, especially the level of pensions in Greece, are much higher than in poorer EU Member States. But this could be adjusted once Greece is under European protection. Can these take place under additional austerity measures?

Last but not least, the European political narratives have evolved these last five years. Back in 2009, the concept of Grexit was not an option, just a concept describing an unthinkable future (read an interview on the topic here). Today, a Grexit appears as an option and eventually a reality. On the verge of a default, it seems that the EU project may be endangered because of lack of flexibility and lack of understanding of its heritage. Letting Greece default would be a failure of leadership and failure of strategic thinking.

(Copyright 2015 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

 

The End of European Illusions or The Return of Geopolitics

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Five years ago, the European project, known as the European Union (EU), was perceived and seen as a boring endeavor between a group of rich and developed nations. The EU was described as the future of the nation-state, some type of postmodern-entity striving within a complex anarchical system. Robert Kagan even portrayed the EU as a 21st century entity facing a 19th century power, Russia. Instead of asking complex questions about EU strategies in dealing with complex geopolitical dynamics, most international relations scholars and experts were looking at technical issues about power relations between small sub-agents within European institutions to explain decision-making and norms-formations. For over a decade, big questions were set aside for technicalities such as: Is the EU able to defend its interests on the European continent? Has the EU developed clear redlines on how to handle threat on the European continent and its neighborhoods? How would EU Member States behave and act under direct threat?

To some degree, these high politics questions were avoided the same way problematic questions about the limited degree of fiscal integration could jeopardize the whole European experiment in case of a crisis affecting the Euro. For over 20 years, EU Member States have lived with the illusion of a region free of geopolitics, a region free of forces possibly leading to another continental war. Ukraine is demonstrating that such geopolitical-less region was an illusion that Member States were happy to buy into. Ukraine in some ways marks the end of the European illusion, which was not the case in 2008 with Georgia.

European illusion of perpetual peace, growth and stability ended abruptly with the global financial crisis. The global crisis spiraled into a Eurozone crisis affected most Eurozone

Credit: © picture-alliance/dpa
Credit: © picture-alliance/dpa

and non-Eurozone members. Despite the crisis, the Euro has remained a strong currency after the Dollar, but has been perceived domestically as the cause of all European traumas. The Eurozone crisis has exposed a two-speed Europe. The Northern Members, led by Germany, have until recently survived the crisis – even though German economy is showing signs of weaknesses -, while Southern Members have simply sought to survive and save the last elements of the post-World War two welfare state. These financial and economic turmoils have shifted into unsustainable political and societal situations in most weakened EU Member States such as France, Italy, Spain among others. The rise of the extremes has been a reality that Europeans have to live and deal with. The crisis has directly threatened the core of European welfare state.

Regionally, the European continent is far from being this safe-heaven free from territorial conquest and traditional war. Russia under Putin has sought to reaffirm its sphere of influence over ‘lost’ territories and strengthen its regional and global relevance. Putin’s Russia can only exist through foreign attention/recognition, especially from NATO countries. Putin’s interpretation of history, at least Russian history, is key in order to

Credit: AP Photo/RIA-Novosti, Mikhail Klimentyev, Presidential Press Service
Credit: AP Photo/RIA-Novosti, Mikhail Klimentyev, Presidential Press Service

understand his actions since in power in 2000. Putin looks back at the lost decade of the 90s as a dark moment in Russian history initiated by Western powers. The then NATO and EU enlargements of Eastern and Central European states were perceived as an attack on Russian national interests. Putin has developed a foreign policy embedded into realpolitik. The use of energy as a weapon against Ukraine almost every winter has been a calculated move by Putin to send a clear signal to Western Europe. But the turning point was the 2008 war against Georgia. At this point, Russia clearly underscored the gap in Western narratives – read NATO and the EU – between commitments to protection of non-NATO members and actions to protect/defend them from Russia. The Ukrainian crisis is the latest illustration of Western risk aversion and unease in confronting Russia. Additionally, Euro-Atlantic members are well aware that the Ukrainian crisis started over a trade agreement between Ukraine and the EU. Almost a year later, Ukraine has lost a part of its territory to Russia, Crimea, and is seeing a civil war in its Eastern territories. If a bilateral trade agreement triggered such tensions in Europe, one can only imagine Putin’s reactions and actions following talks on either EU or NATO enlargement with Ukraine.

The latest chapter in NATO summits in Wales incorporated two dimensions: first, coalition building against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS); second, the strategy in addressing Russia. Concerning the first aspect, coalition building against ISIS, President Obama has succeeded in getting his message heard and approved. Following the NATO summit, six EU Member States, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom, plus Australia, Canada, Turkey, have agreed on joining a US-led coalition against ISIS. However, when it comes to Ukraine, NATO failed to come with a plan, let alone a strategy. If Obama feels confident on degrading and destroying ISIS, the only thing that the West can do against Russia is containing it. The rounds of sanctions against Russia have deepened the tensions between both sides, but have yet to seriously affect Russian economy and influence Putin’s actions.

The decades of European growth from the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) to the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) have seen remarkable deepening and widening processes. In terms of deepening, EU Member States were committed to increasing the integration process of the Union; while the widening process, materialized into four waves of enlargement, led to the inclusion of 16 new Member States. Aside from the regional tensions in the Balkans, the EU was believed to offer its Member States a zone-free of geopolitics, a fortress limiting the dark forces of globalization – immigration, state violence, territorial conquest -. Not only it has never been true considering the violence and wars in the Balkans, but it has certainly been an illusion bought by Member States and incorporated in academic research. The series of crisis starting with the 2007 financial crisis, the Arab Spring, continuous and deepening of violence in the Middle East, and the Ukrainian crisis underscore not only the uneasiness of EU Member States to address them, but also the inabilities of the EU to shape its world. The integration process was so successful that the EU Member States have lost their ways in dealing with geopolitics.

(Copyright 2014 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).