Tsipras, a Political Master

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Europe and the world should be taking a moment and reflect on the political mastery of Alexis Tsipras of Greece. In less than a year, Mr. Tsipras won two general elections, won a referendum and implemented contradictory policies, all this by changing his political standing and under terrible domestic and economic conditions. Aside from political ideology, Alexis Tsipras is undeniably one of the most talented European politicians. However has his mastery of politics translated into sound governing skills?

Early 2015, most Europeans, including a some Greek citizens, had never heard of Alexis Tsipras. The 41 year old tieless politician finds his political ideology in extreme left affiliated at first to the Communist Party. His political house is centered in the extreme left side of the political spectrum. After years of internal evolution in the Greek lefts, he then became the leader of the exteme-left wing party, Syriza (which means Coalition of the Radical Left) and was elected at the helm of Greece in February 2015. This was the beginning of his true political exposition.

Chapter 1: His election in February 2015 marked the end of the decade long transfer of power between the two leading parties. Tsipras was elected based on a program of anti-austerity policies, fight for Greek interests before the Troika (ECB, IMF, and Commission), increase of minimum wages, restauration of state employees and increase of pensions. If European media were deeply skeptical about his rise and thought that he would not last a year, they have appeared to be wrong. Ensuing his election, Tspiras disappeared from European minds until the looming of the deadlines for debt repayments of the IMF and ECB.

Chapter 2: The second chapter of his reign started several weeks prior the eventual default 478861728of Greece for the repayment of a  €1.5 billion to the IMF on June 30th, and a second one to the ECB mid-2015. These negotiations at EU finance ministers level and EU leaders level were extremely tense as neither Tsipras nor his finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, wanted to accept the deal put on the table by the Troika and Germany. At the last minute, PM Tsipras called for a referendum on July 5th asking Greeks to decide on their fate: voting yes to the deal implied more austerity measures; a no vote was a rejection of the deal and could lead to a Greek default and leaving the Eurozone, known as a Grexit. Not only did Tsipras organized the referendum without noticing his European partners, but he campaigned for the no vote.

Chapter 3: The no camp, or Oxi, won the referendum with 61.3% and Europe was expecting a progressive departure of Greece from the Eurozone. Even President Juncker of the European Commission asked for a report on how to accompany Greece outside the Euro area. Instead of using his domestic mandate, Tsipras fired his finance minister (officially he resigned desipte winning) and went back to the negotiation table

ATHENS, GREECE - 2015/06/29: The word 'OXI' (NO) written on a banner in front of the Greek parliament. Greeks demonstrate in Syntagma square in support to a 'NO' vote in the referendum that will take place on the 5th of July, whether to accept the new agreement between Greece and it creditors. (Photo by George Panagakis/Pacific Press/LightRocket via Getty Images)
ATHENS, GREECE – 2015/06/29: The word ‘OXI’ (NO) written on a banner in front of the Greek parliament. Greeks demonstrate in Syntagma square in support to a ‘NO’ vote in the referendum that will take place on the 5th of July, whether to accept the new agreement between Greece and it creditors. (Photo by George Panagakis/Pacific Press/LightRocket via Getty Images)

requesting the initial deal. Germany refused and France played an important role of holding together the parties and the negotiations alive. Ultimately, Greece agreed on a worst deal than previously offered and Tsipras implemented additional austerity measures and required reforms. The deal entailed the following aspects: raising the age for retirement; a VAT hike at 23% across sectors; privatization of key sectors of Greek economy; and removal of tax breaks for some Greek islands. These reforms would permit to unlock a third loan package of €86 billion until 2018.

Chapter 4: Tsipras agreed on the second deal, agreed at EU level on July 13th, which was worst than the initial offer, and brought it back home for a vote. The Greek Parliament voted and agreed on July 15th, on the bailout deal, which was approved with a 229-64 majority. However, Tsipras’ party, Syriza, seems to have lost some unity with 32 Syriza MPs defying their leader’s pleas and rejected the deal. Throughout July and August, Tsipras was facing serious political criticism and opposition by the members of his own party. Syriza was divided between a radical branch, led by Mr. Lafazanis, and a more centrist one counting Tsipras. The radical branch of Syriza had not accepted the political move by Tsipras to go against the popular vote of the referendum. “Mr Lafazanis’s supporters speak of an ‘ideological betrayal’ and ‘treachery’ by Mr Tsipras’s faction.”

Chapter 5: On August 20th, PM Tsipras announced his resignation and his candidacy for the next general election that would take place mid-September. His rationale was to get reelected without the radical branch of Syriza. His political gamble worked as he was reelected with 35.5% of the vote and was able to drop the hard-liners from his party. Syriza won 145 seats out of the 300 seats of the parliament, only four fewer than after the January elections. In order to assure a majority, Tsipras agreed on a coalition with right-wing party Independent Greeks (ANEL) with its leader Panos Kammenos. ANEL is an ultra-nationalist anti-immigrant party, often compared to UKIP in the United Kingdom. With this alliance, the Syriza-ANEL coalition offer the majority with 155 seats in the Parliament to Tsipras. Even President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, expressed his concerns directly to PM Tsipras about this political alliance.

Political Talent over Governing Skills?

In less than a year, PM Tsipras has demonstrated his political talent in remaining alive and electable despite party, domestic and European pressures all this under dire economic conditions and an unemployment level around 25%. If Tsipras proved to the world that he cannot lose an election, he needs to now tackle the true problems of Greece: crony capitalism, clientelism, systemic corruption, and implementing structural reforms of the economy and state. The country has been on life line for over 5 years, its intellectuals are fleeing away, higher education is barely financed and Greece cannot even protect its borders. Winning elections is one thing, implementing reforms and governing are another.

(Copyright 2015 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).
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Re-Humanizing the Migration Crisis through Images

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Five months ago most European citizens were unaware of the number of refugees seeking to reach the richest EU Member States like Germany, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The first wake up call for Europe was after the Lampedusa tragedy costing the lives of more than 300 refugees on October 3rd, 2013. Europeans were shocked, as the world was, to wake up with hearing such tragedy taking place at their doorstep. From 2013 to 2015, the issue of mass-migration from Syria, Eritrea, Somalia and other countries in the region left the front pages and the minds of Europeans, but had remained extremely present in the world of experts and the International Organization for Migration was calling for actions. The second wake-up call, which marked the beginning of the seriousness of the crisis, was the shipwreck killing an estimated 900 migrants on April 19th, 2015 off the coast of Italy.

The migration crisis, aside from geopolitics and economics, is quite interesting for several reasons. Movements in policy-recommendations and policy-making by European leaders seem to have occurred in relation with direct materialization of the crisis through very powerful (in the negative sense of the term) images. Below are the most marking pictures that were featured on front pages of global newspapers. For the last four months, images of misery, death, pain, innocence have illustrated the failures of European leaders on the international stage, brought back humanity (which has been missing for too long), and the moral responsibility of all Europeans – leaders and citizens included – (read here a superb piece by Judy Dempsey).

Death at Sea – From the Lampedusa tragedy (2013) to today

Credit: Reuters
Credit: Reuters

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Credit: Reuters
Credit: Reuters

Crossing Eastern Europe

Photo: AP
Photo: AP
Sources: The New York Times and Associated Press
Sources: The New York Times and Associated Press
Credit: AP
Credit: AP

 

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Getting to Germany

Source: AP
Source: AP
Source: AP
Source: AFP/Getty Images

The Picture that Re-Humanized the Migration Crisis

Credit: Reuters
Credit: Reuters

The last picture showing the lifeless body of Aylan Kurdi, a 3 year old Syrian boy, lying on a turkish beach has moved world citizens and European leaders (the New York Times published a powerful story about this image). Since the EU meeting in June, the EU (even though President Juncker and HR Mogherini have been active on the issue, but hardly visible) and its Member States have failed to agree on receiving asylum seekers and implementing real policies.

The migration crisis lost all of its humanity because of the national rhetorics. But the picture of Aylan appears to have been the shock necessary for European citizens and leaders. Even David Cameron, British Prime Minister, whom had used very derogatory words in regards of migrants seeking to reach the United Kingdom (read a piece on the issue here), responded by claiming that the UK will try to do more in the short and long term as it has a “moral responsibility.” During an address to the House of the Commons, David Cameron has announced that the UK will be re-settling 20,000 Syrians over the four and half years. “We will continue to show the world that this country is a country of extraordinary compassion,” said Cameron “always standing up for our values and helping those in need.”  France and Germany have announced as well that they will be taking an additional 55,000 refugees over the next two years (24,000 for France and 31,000 refugees for Germany). François Hollande of France said that it was a “fundamental principle” of France to accept asylum seekers. But the British and French numbers are well below Germany’s.

In some way, the power of this picture has mobilized world public opinion and put pressure on European leaders to deliver at the up-coming EU interior and justice ministers meeting on September 14th. But an EU leaders meeting will be necessary afterwards to solidify the decisions. As the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis highlights the lack of integration between a European asylum policy with 28 national migration policies. Until the European and national levels will either be merged or fully disintegrated, the migration and eurozone crises will not be fully solved.

If the world was not watching in May during the meeting setting the Agenda on Migration, it will be paying close attention in September. The EU and its Member States have to deliver by respect to European complex history and heritage, to European values, norms and principles, and by simple humanity.

Interview

Gabriela Esquivada of the Infobae contacted several experts, including myself, to reflect on the migration crisis, on its origins, its consequences and on European actions. Here is the link to the article (in Spanish): http://www.infobae.com/2015/09/06/1753338-por-que-medio-oriente-seguira-expulsando-refugiados

(Copyright 2015 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

A European Army – Re-Visiting an Old Federalist Dream?

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The call for a European Army is back on the European table. In an interview with German newspaper Die Welt over the weekend, Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, discussed on a wide array of topics from the Eurocrisis, to Grexit, to the Monetary Union, and called for the creation of a European army. The discussions around the topic of a European army have been cyclical inside European political circles for decades. With the European Council Summit on Defense of June approaching, President Juncker may want to prepare the ground before hand for a productive meeting.

Juncker’s Proposal for a European Army

The lingering crisis in Ukraine is reminding the Europeans how dependent they are on NATO and the US for the enforcement of regional security and how irrelevant/inefficient are the EU and its Member States in shaping desired outcomes in high politics. Despite the attempts by Berlin and Paris to solve the Ukrainian crisis diplomatically, Moscow has not budged and is continuing its territorial expansion in Eastern Ukraine. In some ways, Ukraine is another Kosovo for the Europeans, as in both cases the EU cannot respond independently with force and end the crisis. Such statement is certainly confirmed by Juncker’s comments when arguing that “With its own Army, Europe could react credibly to a threat

Photo: European People's Party/Flickr
Photo: European People’s Party/Flickr

to peace in a Member State or in a neighboring country of the European Union.”

Die Welt continued its interview by asking Mr. Juncker if he thinks that Russia would have thought twice before annexing Crimea if the EU had had a European army. Juncker responded by arguing that military response should not be the initial strategy and only complement diplomacy and politics. However, Juncker went on claiming that “a joint army of Europeans would give the clear impression [to Russia] that we are serious about defending the European values.” Juncker denied the fact that a European army would compete with NATO. As per Juncker, the European army would permit to demonstrate the seriousness of the EU in foreign policy; and contribute to the deepening process of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

On Monday, March 9th, the Commission tried to narrow and justify some of the comments made by President Juncker. Chief Commission Spokesman, Margaritas Schinas, underlined that the pooling and sharing (P&S) in defense capabilities make financial sense for the EU-28 (watch his response here). Mr. Schinas called for going beyond the interview and work on the substance of the question of a European army.

Such comment is not surprising coming from Mr. Juncker, as even before becoming President of the Commission, Mr. Juncker was in favor of the creation of a European army. As a Prime-Minister of Luxembourg, a small EU Member State in terms of military power, Mr. Juncker has long been in favor of a common EU force. During his candidacy to the presidency of the Commission, Mr. Juncker reiterated the call for a European army.

The Cyclical Desire for a European Army

The question of European defense is directly intertwined with the story of European integration. As developed in his latest analysis on the Juncker’s proposal, Jan Techau of the Carnegie Endowment wrote that:

The oldest item on the European list of utopian integration topics is a federal superstate. The second oldest is the creation of an EU army. Despite the obvious hopelessness of getting such a thing started and of making it work, this latter idea has been remarkably resilient.

The fight between the Gaullist vision – independent EU army – and the Altanticist – Europe9781472409959.PPC_PPC Template under the US nuclear umbrella – has remained ever since. But one should distinguish six important periods in explaining the tentatives of development/integration in high politics at the EU level (for an in-depth look at the question of the European Defense, refer to the following book Debating European Security and Defense Policy. Understanding the Complexity):

  • 1954 – European Defense Cooperation (EDC) was initiated by the French and killed by the French. The EDC was supposed to create a standing European army.
  • Cold War – Europe under the NATO umbrella. For over 30 years the baseline of European security and defense was enforced by the transatlantic alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The US provided the bulk of the military protection with its military bases around Europe. NATO offered a security blanket to the European Communities, allowing its Member States to focus on economic integration.
  • 1992 – The Treaty of Maastricht and the CFSP. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany, powerful EC Member States, France and the UK, felt that deepening the integration process with a new treaty would permit to absorb a reunified Germany. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht created the European Union and its pillar system. The new institutional design based on a three-pillar structure established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) permitting the creation of a common EU foreign policy.
  • 1998 – The Declaration of Saint Malo. Over a two-day bilateral meeting in the French town of Saint Malo, French President Chirac and British Prime Minister Blair agreed on bilateral basis to create a common European defense system permitting the EU to respond to regional crisis threatening the security of the Union and the continent. The Saint Malo Declaration was a response to European inabilities in acting and responding to the war in the Balkans and the 1998 war in Kosovo. Both regional crises highlighted the lack of hard power and unity from the Europeans and their dependence on NATO.
  • 1999-2007 – From summits to deployments. From 1999 to 2007, under the leadership of the first High Representative Javier Solana, the EU institutionalized the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) permitting the Union to deploy national forces under the EU flag for civilian and military missions. Many ESDP missions were deployed in Africa, Europe, and Asia (see the map below).
Source: EU ISS. 2014. "#CSDPbasics leaflet." September 26: 5.
Source: EU ISS. 2014. “#CSDPbasics leaflet.” September 26: 5.
  • 2007 to today – Financial crisis and CSDP. Since the 2007 collapse of the financial markets, the global balance of power has been shifting. The US and European economies were on the brink of collapse, and in the specialized literature, the declinist argument, looking at the end of the liberal world order, has illustrated the decline of American hegemony and the rise of new powers. In parallel, a series of crises surrounding Europe initiated by the Arab Spring have caused grave concerns in European capitals and Washington. Europe has been circled by a ‘ring of fire’ from all sides, Ukraine, Syria, Libya, MENA and Central Africa. Inside this ‘ring of fire’ many threats have directly challenged Europeans such as terrorism, mass-migration, war, trafficking, and failed-states. In this environment, the EU has tried to increase its defense harmonization through the Pooling & Sharing (P&S) in order to avoid duplication at the European level as well as responding to the declining of share of national GDP committed to military expenditures. Because of lack of national commitment, the P&S and CSDP have not received the attention required. In such environment, the argument of a European Defense Union (EDU), as raised by Solana and Blockmans, should permit greater strategic, institutional, capabilities, and resources cooperation between the EU-28.

A Hopeless Call?

The call for an EU army is only part of the revival of an old federalist dream. The gap between Juncker’s proposal and the European realities is extremely wide. For instance, the United Kingdom under Prime Minister Cameron has fought all European initiatives towards the furthering of European integration. During the selection and appointment process of Mr. Juncker, the UK opposed his nomination fearing that he would continuously call for deeper integration as he had done in the past. With Juncker at the helm of the Commission for a little less than a year, he has certainly launched a series of initiatives inCAMERON-UK-EU order to re-boost the EU. From the Juncker Plan to launch the European economies (read two previous analyses here and here), to the EU Energy Union to now the call for a EU army, Juncker’ strategy is to demonstrate that ‘more Europe’ is necessary in order to solving Europe’s problems.

Even though the United Kingdom was a pioneer with France in December 1998 when agreeing to the creation of the ESDP, the UK has since changed its position on greater defense integration. Ensuing the Juncker interview, London’s reaction was “Our position is crystal clear that defense is a national, not an EU responsibility and that there is no prospect of that position changing and no prospect of a European army.” The reactions by British politicians have been along the same line, a clear opposition to the Juncker’s proposal of a European army. That does not mean that the UK is opposed to a more integrated CSDP, but the country is in election-mode and being pro-European seems to be a no-go in this election.

If the UK finds Juncker’s call outraging, Germany welcomed it. For instance, German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen told German radio that “Our [German] future as Europeans will at some point be with a European army.” France has not been very vocal on Juncker’s comments. So far, France has been very active in his perceived sphere of influence and has been deploying his national troops in Libya, Mali, CAR and throughout the Sahel region at the expense of the CSDP.

The question of a EU army is always of actuality and will remain in the federalist arsenal. President Juncker is correct in his analysis of the state of the world in 2015 and the challenges/threats facing the Union and its 28 Member States. In this ever-changing world and increasing degree of

Photo: Vadim Braydov/Associated Press
Photo: Vadim Braydov/Associated Press

complexity of the challenges, the EU-28 ought to understand that increasing the Pooling & Sharing falls under an improvement of their national security and interest. The regional instabilities equally threaten all EU Member States from Sofia to London, Rome to Copenhagen, Warsaw to Paris. An EU army may not be the appropriate option, but a common strategic thinking and common foreign policy and military vision ought to be addressed and adopted.

(Copyright 2015 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

A Book Presentation – Debating the CSDP

Tobias Schwarz/Reuters
Tobias Schwarz/Reuters

A paradox is taking place in Europe. On the one hand, armed conflicts, traditional state invasions, revolutions, terrorist activities among others are taking place at the European Union’s doorstep. On the other hand, the EU is going through a process of risk-aversion and lack of strategic vision combined with progressive demilitarization as most EU Member States are barely investing in their national armies, in R&D, and even in their commitments to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). With the current types of threats and the global shift of power, one would expect the EU and its 28 Member States to maintain and/or at least increase their spending and investments in defense and security policies. The book, Debating European Security and Defense Policy. Understanding the Complexity, asks a simple question: “Why has the integration process of the EU security and defense policies been so unpredictable?” (p.4)

9781472409959.PPC_PPC Template

This overarching research question has allowed the author to demonstrate throughout 12 chapters the multitude of dimensions and variables affecting the integration and/or demise of the CSDP from the 1950s to today. Debating European Security and Defense Policy is a journey into the European construction and broader narratives of a commitment among the initial six Member States to the current EU-28 to develop a common approach, policy and thinking to security and defense. Such project is directly intertwined to the story of European integration as the first attempt goes back to 1954 with the European Defense Cooperation (EDC) promoted and killed by the French, and supported by the US under President

Credit: Chancel ‘Get this idea well and truly into your head!’ This cartoon depicts the threat that would hang over France if it were to ratify the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC).
Credit: Chancel
‘Get this idea well and truly into your head!’ This cartoon depicts the threat that would hang over France if it were to ratify the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC).

Eisenhower. The evolution of European defense is closely linked to the integration process of the Union and saw several phases of integration. The problem of harmonization and integration in defense is similar to the one on fiscal policy. Both policies are causing headaches for Member States as they are at the crossroad between traditional state sovereignty and EU integration. Defense and fiscal policies are some of the most controversial to harmonized as they are forcing Member States to identify up to what point integration is necessary without affecting too much the sanctity of national sovereignty.

Purpose, Debate and Skepticism about the CSDP

The idea of this book fermented throughout my research for my Ph.D. dissertation seeking to look at the different degree of integration in EU defense and security. During a very insightful interview with a top expert in a highly renowned and respected Washington think tank, the interviewee told me: “your dissertation ought to start with the ESDP [this was before the 2009 Lisbon Treaty] and terminate with the ESDP.” For some reason, such comment/advise has stayed with me all these years and could be the words than fostered my desire to dig deeper into the topic of the CSDP.

The goal of this book was to decorticate the CSDP into manageable pieces centered on relevant debates. This work shall be seen and understood more as a reflection with diverging narratives and be read as such rather than a linear storyline. The manuscript is organized around three main parts: part one, the theoretical debates (positivist approaches) around the CSDP; part two, the historical and strategic evolutions of European Security and Defense Policy; and, part three, the Actors of the CSDP such as the Member States, the different institutions (Parliament, Commission, Council, EEAS) and agencies (European Defense Agency), the High Representative, and the CSDP (read here the table of contents).

This work distinguishes itself from the existing body of literature by the structure of the argument and chapters (access here to the introduction). Each chapter, answering an overarching research question, is divided into two sub-level research questions underscoring two-sides for each theme. Instead of evolving in the gray area as the entire literature on the topic, the book purposely answers each question through a yes and no answer. The reason behind such model is to demonstrate to the reader how successful or not the EU and the Member States have been in promoting and developing the CSDP. Such approach has demonstrated to be very effective in order to foster discussion and a debate.

Additionally, the book features a foreword written by Dr. Jolyon Howorth, undeniably one of the most accomplished researchers on the topic (read here his latest analysis on the 2011 Libyan military operation). His argument fits perfectly with the purpose of this book to underscore the existing debate on the CSDP. As he writes “Prior to 2009, the overall mood was upbeat, optimistic and constructive. Most scholars writing in the late 1990s and early 2000s were confident that the creation of a European defense capacity was an important new development, both for European integration and for European security. […] All this began to change around the time of the ratification of the Lisbon Treat. The mood among scholars switched to one of uncertainty, pessimism, skepticism” (p. xi).

One of the most interesting chapters to write and research on was about the impacts of the 2008 financial crisis on the CSDP (Chapter 7). Theoretically (as informed by neoliberalism), the financial crisis should have been a vector contributing to the fostering of integration in security and defense policies; but the EU has seen another evolving trend: mini-clusters or sub-EU defense integration. Member States have instead increased spending on sub-regional defense cooperation initiatives with their closest neighboring states sharing similar national security problems like the Visegrad Group (as well known as the V4 composed of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), Weimar Triangle (Poland, Germany and France), Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO composed of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) among others. A debate among EU experts exist as some claim that these sub-regional initiatives will ultimately spill-over at the regional level – meaning the CSDP –, while others (myself included) see a trend lowering the deepening process of defense and security integration at the EU. This could lead to a multi-speed Europe in the realm of defense and security.

The CSDP, A Priority in the Future of the EU?

Once again, the CSDP does not appear to be on the list of priorities of the EU-28 for the coming year or even decade. Almost a year ago, the 27 heads of states and governments (Croatia was not part of the EU yet) met at the December defense summit (read analyses on the summit here, here and there), wherein they all committed to deepening European defense, and famously agreed that “defense matters.” One major way to empower the CSDP since the 2008 financial crisis has been through an increase in the pooling and sharing (P&S) of military capabilities among the Member States in order to decrease the levels of duplication at national levels.

From “defense matters” to “what defense?” the EU-28 has not expressed a great interest in empowering the CSDP. The usual argument of Pooling & Sharing (P&S) has been a way for Member States to avoid to develop and commit behind a clear strategic vision requiring credible European forces and strategic thinking. Additionally, the pillars of the CSDP, the Big 3, have been shifting away their interests from the CSDP to more national policies. Historically, European defense has evolved thanks to Franco-British initiatives. With the current distance between Paris and London for political and ideological divergences, the CSDP is slowing declining. Additionally, France has increasingly gone alone since the Libya mission in order to advance its interests and influence in Africa; Britain is fighting against the EU and trying to identify its future outside of the Union; and Germany is struggling in maintaining a standing national army and values its influence over other EU

Source: Getty
Source: Getty

policies (nevertheless, Falk Tettweiler argues that the CSDP fits in German mindset for its contribution to crisis management and prevention, civilian missions, and its multilateral nature).

Debating European Security and Defense Policy comes at the time where the CSDP is not a priority for European capitals and remains a mystery to most European citizens. This manuscript seeks to identify the important problems facing the EU and many themes of debate challenging European experts. The new EU leadership, President Tusk, President Juncker and HR Mogherini, seems to have brought a new wind into their respective positions (even though President Van Rompuy has done an excellent job). It may be that this new group of EU leaders could reinvigorate the CSDP and EU foreign policy, at least at the European level.

The book is available for purchase here on Ashgate’s website and here on Amazon.

(Copyright 2014 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).