Europe retaliates and the transatlantic split widens

US President Donald J. Trump meeting EU leaders
Source image via EPA

The European Union (EU) retaliatory tariffs on a series of American goods, including peanut butter, motorcycles, bourbon, orange juice, sweetcorn and others, kicked in on June 22. The imposed duties on American products are worth $3.3bn in a tit-for-tat response by Brussels to the Trump administration’s unilateral imposition of tariffs on aluminum (10%) and steel (25%) back on March 23.

The EU Trade Commissioner, Cecilia Malmstrom, said that “the rules of international trade, which we have developed over the years hand in hand with our American partners, cannot be violated without a reaction from our side.” She argued that the EU was “left with no other choice” to impose tariffs on US products. Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, said that the decision by the US to impose tariffs “goes against all logic and history.” In addition to the immediate tariffs, the EU seized the World Trade Organization (WTO) to challenge the US measures.

The US under President Trump is not at its first spike of tariffs on targeted foreign goods based on national security ground. Aside from the steel and aluminum tariffs, the US imposed a 20-30% tariff on washing machines and solar panels last year. It is as well discussed to impose a 25% tariff on over 800 Chinese goods. Trump seems to believe that the world is taking advantage of the US and that free trade is not being fair to the US. His sole argument is based on the reading of the US trade balance. If there is a trade deficit, the US is losing; if there is a surplus, the US is winning. Trade policies are more complex than what it is being portrayed in a tweet. The world, in particular US allies, has already responded to US ensuing the tariffs on steel and aluminum as listed in the table below.

Screen Shot 2018-06-23 at 4.51.57 PM
Source: Amy Cheng, Humza Jilani, Keith Johnson, Amy Mackinnon. 2018. “State of the Trade Wars Tracking U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs — and the retaliatory measures other countries are taking.” Foreign Policy. June 21. (here)

Tariffs on auto imports?

In a very trumpian fashion, the American president went on on Friday by threatening to impose a 20% tariff on all U.S. imports of European Union-assembled cars. His message, via twitter, read “If these Tariffs and Barriers are not soon broken down and removed, we will be placing a 20% Tariff on all of their cars coming into the U.S. Build them here!” The threat of imposing tariffs on cars is not new as a month ago he instructed the Department of Commerce, led by Wilbur Ross, to launch a probe into whether auto imports pose a national security threat.

Trump and his associates have used overtime the Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 in order to increase tariffs on ground of national security. The same rationale will potentially be used for tariffs on auto imports. The justification and connection between national security and tariffs was made by Wilbur Ross during a recent interview, wherein he said “National security is broadly defined to include the economy, to include the impact on employment, to include a very big variety of things.” He continued claiming that “Economic security is military security. And without economic security, you can’t have military security.” However, most of the tariffs are affecting traditional US allies, which happen to be NATO members and closely working on defense and security cooperation. Mr. Ross’s justification does hold any serious ground and is simply trying to hide basic protectionist policies being national security.

Congress could regain the control of decision-making on tariffs if the Republican establishment, holding the majority in the House and Senate, were committed to free trade and sound economic and trade policies. Earlier in June, republican and democrat lawmakers mentioned a plan to introduce a legislation that would force President Donald Trump to obtain Congress’ approval before imposing tariffs on national security grounds. Until the midterm elections, it is difficult to imagine the approval of such legislation by the Congress.

The current rates of tariffs for imports between the US and the EU are divided into two categories: for cars, 2.5% US import tax compared to 10% EU import tax; and for light trucks and SUVs: 25% US import tax compared to 10% EU import tax. The American president always focuses on the tariffs for cars and never on light trucks. He has been picking on Germany and its successful automobile industry. But he has failed to recognize the investments made by the three leading german companies in building assembly plants in South Carolina (BMW and Daimler), Alabama (Daimler), and Tennessee (Volkswagen). In 2017, 38% of 854,000 cars build in the US were sold in the US and over 500,000 were exported. With regards to employment, 116,500 jobs in US were connected to german auto-makers: 36,500 working at auto-maker plants and 80,000 as suppliers.

What would the impacts be for the US if the US president were to impose such tariffs? The Peterson Institute recently released a report on the potential impacts of a 25% proposed tariffs in auto imports. The report argues that the production in the industry could drop by 1.5% and that it could cause 195,000 US workers to lose their jobs over a 1-to-3 year period. In case of retaliation in-kind with tariffs by foreign countries on the same products, production would fall 4%, 624,000 US jobs would be lost, and 5% of the workforce in the auto and parts industries would be displaced. The ripple effects of such tariffs could have disastrous consequences for states hosting assembly plants in the long-term. The latest risk assessment by Airbus addressed to the UK government regarding the uncertain future around Brexit should be carefully read by US lawmakers and Trump associates when deciding on imposing tariffs or not. Multinational corporations hold quite a strong leverage in the decision-making process of trade policies.

Rocky transatlantic relations

Again, as argued in previous analyses, the future of transatlantic relations appears unstable and rocky. Several points shall be addressed reflecting on US treatment of historical allies and the future of the liberal order. First, The Trump administration has demonstrated over and over its decision to split with and humiliate America’s traditional allies. The message addressed by the American president and members of his cabinet, in particular Peter Navarro, towards the Canadian prime minister post-G7 meeting as well as the continuous undermining of the German chancellor illustrate Trump’s modus operandi. Per Wess Mitchell, US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian affairs, the Trump administration is implementing a “strategic renovation” with traditional allies. President Trump has made a point to undermine his German counterpart, Angela Merkel. She was one of the closest partners of President Obama, is leading the most stable and largest European economy, and has not shied away to defend the liberal order. The appointment of Mr. Grenell as US Ambassador to Germany, who has broken protocol on two occasions, confirms it. Mr. Grenell in an interview with Breitbart said “I absolutely want to empower other conservatives throughout Europe, other leaders. I think there is a groundswell of conservative policies that are taking hold because of the failed policies of the left.” The Trump administration is seeking to undermine and destabilize the German chancellor.

http_com.ft.imagepublish.upp-prod-us.s3.amazonawsBy looking at the trends and rhetorics (which can shift very quickly as demonstrated by the change of position by Trump towards the North Korean dictator), a trade war is quite an eventuality. For the EU, trade has been the core dimension of its external policy and international presence. The EU sees multilateralism and free trade as one of its most successful policies. Furthermore, the EU is at a crossroad with the continuous rise of populist forces gaining traction in core EU countries, such as recently Italy. The EU ought to defend its interests and cannot cave in to foreign pressures, otherwise it would play in the hands of the Orban, Salvini and Le Pen of Europe. And last, the European market is one of the richest, largest, developed and influential in the world. By the weight of its market, the EU shall not shy away from direct confrontation with the US. As per Charlemagne of The Economist, the EU has three strategies in hand to chose from: capitulation, resilience, and containment. Resilience is the most likely strategy at this period of time.

Lastly, the main issue with regards to trade is China, and it has remains unaddressed. Both the US and the EU agree with the fact that China, since joining the WTO in 2002, has not played by the rules. The US could have worked with the EU and utilized the common procedures and processes, the international trading system. However, Trump said it on the campaign trail, and is now doing it while in office, the rules-based global trading system is being portrayed as the cause of American demise. Trump wants a trade approach based on bilateral deal-making, transactional relations and only fair for the US. Donald Tusk, the president of the European Council said in Canada, “the rules-based international order is being challenged, quite surprisingly… by its main architect and guarantor, the US.” For instance, Trump refused to sign the G-7 communiqué. For the EU, the liberal order and rules-based trading system are critical for its functioning. Cecilia Malmstrom said this clearly, “The E.U. has a responsibility to stand up for open global trade.”

The American president seems more at ease surrounded by dictators and authoritarian leaders than with traditional American allies. The affronts to the liberal order and America’s allies are beginning to add up considering his policy choice to leave the TPP, Paris deal, the Iran deal, relocate the US embassy in Jerusalem, and unilateral imposition of tariffs. Europe knows that Trump is temporary, but his continuous attacks on the liberal order will not only undermine the US position in the world but lead to a highly unstable multipolar order. “Trump’s preference for a divide-and-rule strategy produces a game” writes Javier Solana “that will create only losers.” Europe knows it, the US may have a serious headache post-Trump.

(COPYRIGHT 2018 BY POLITIPOND. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. THIS MATERIAL MAY NOT BE PUBLISHED, BROADCAST, REWRITTEN OR REDISTRIBUTED WITHOUT PERMISSION).

 

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The stamp of America First on US foreign policy

Donald Trump
Credit: AP

What if the implementation of the tenets of America First onto US foreign policy was for real? What if Donald Trump had been consistent on telling Americans and the world, that he was serious on taking the US out of the liberal order? and, ultimately on bringing the US status down from being the centerpiece of the liberal order to a simple superpower?

Since 2017, it seems that Trump and his advisors/implementers have been working on cutting all the strings attached around the US in terms of commitments, engagements, responsibilities and duties to transform the US from the ‘indispensable’ power into a simple sovereign power. After years of trying to grasp the logic of Trump’s foreign policy, it appears to be the most likely hypothesis at this point of time.

For two years, foreign policy experts and American allies have been trying to understand the logic of Trump’s approach to foreign policy. And based on the structures, heritage, norms and values of the post-World War two order, Trump’s decisions are incomprehensible. For instance, the departure of the US from the Paris climate deal, the different rounds of tariffs and quotas (washing machines, solar panels, aluminum and steel, and potentially car tariffs), the withdrawal from the Iran deal, the visceral despite for the European Union and deep support for Brexit, the departure from the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, the lingering NAFTA talks, and lately the relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem are all a direct affront to the trust of allies. These radical shifts are not increasing American security, not advancing American interests and undermining global security.

What does that tell us? Donald Trump wants nothing to do with the liberal order and believes that the US can be better off alone dealing on bilateral basis and imposing its weight and will onto others. Trump and his administration may appear to see a success in this approach considering the limited response by the Europeans (still at awe by the permanent affront of the liberal order), and a mild reaction by China (so far).

Donald Trump believes, as a large segment of the American electorate, that the US has no business in playing the role of the world policeman. The international institutions, designed post-1945s, making the liberal order are in fact limiting the American sovereignty and national interests. The multilateral system orchestrated via the United Nations system, the World Trade Organization, and the multitude of regimes undermines the way the US can act. In December, Susan Rice, Obama’s national security advisor, wrote “these omissions [of the liberal elements in Trump’s NSS] undercut global perceptions of American leadership; worse, they hinder our ability to rally the world to our cause when blithely dismiss the aspirations of others.” Barry Posen summarizes it into the argument that Trump’s grand strategy is “primacy without a purpose.”

This approach and shaping of American foreign policy are extremely dangerous for the US and the world at large. Donald Trump inherited a strong economy and a relatively stable global order. The US is not involved in any major crises, at the exception of Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. Donald Trump did not have to save the American and world economy the way his predecessor needed to respond. These domestic and geopolitical realities have in fact created an illusion for this administration that has not proven itself in addressing any critical crises. The Trump administration feels almighty when it has in simple terms only been in cruise-control mode. Most of the crises faced by the Trump administration are in fact self-inflicted, as proven by the sudden cancellation by Donald Trump of the upcoming Singapore summit between the US and North Korea.

If Donald Trump continues on this trend and truly takes the US out of the order designed by the Americans and Europeans post-1945, he will not only launch the US into a motion of de-credibility of the US, weaken the liberal order, and simply downgrade the US into a regular superpower. Here are the dangers of such trend: first, history has taught us that multipolarity is greatly instable. The probability of war at a regional and global scale would increase. Second, the challenges ahead are becoming more global and complex to solve than ever before. The case of climate change, nuclear and chemical proliferation, free-trade, pandemics, mass migration, and stability of the financial system all require a imagesnetwork of institutions and regimes as a platform of discussion and interaction among states. These multilateral platforms permit to align interests, deepen cooperation and coordination and design mechanisms to implement and enforce agreements and policies. One country, as economically and militarily powerful as the US today, cannot solve any of these issues alone. Third, in his quest to greatness (almost like Don Quixote) Donald Trump will simply undermine the status, influence and power of the US and downgrade it to a superpower. Ironically, a long-term decline in influence and power will require the US to increase its alliances to balance its progressive global decline. That is the story of past hegemons. Fourth, this abrasive style may alienate once and for all American allies. The comments by President Donald Tusk at the recent EU summit in Bulgaria speak volume about the state of transatlantic relations. He said “We are witnessing today a new phenomenon: the capricious assertiveness of the American administration. Looking at the latest decisions of President Trump, some could even think, ‘With friends like that, who needs enemies?’”

The US foreign policy under this Trumpian paradigm is due to a lack of understanding of the past 70 years and world history, the arrogance of inheritance of such power, and ideology. Furthermore, the Republican establishment in power and control of the Congress (House and Senate) seems to agree with the current direction of US foreign policy considering the lack of opposition (at the exception of Senator McCain). The decline of the US has been projected for quite sometime and it certainly won’t occur overnight. However, the trends these last years of this administration confirm to American allies and the world that analyzing Trump’s foreign policy decisions based on past paradigms will lead to more confusion than understanding. Trump’s America first is for real and could have lasting negative impacts on the US, world affairs and global security.

(COPYRIGHT 2018 BY POLITIPOND. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. THIS MATERIAL MAY NOT BE PUBLISHED, BROADCAST, REWRITTEN OR REDISTRIBUTED WITHOUT PERMISSION).

European crises – The forgotten malaises

Daniel Stolle

Has populism disappeared from Europe? Is the European Union finally perceived as a constructive actor in Europe? Where are the reflections on regional crises affecting the unity of the EU and the security of the member states (MS)? All these questions seem to have disappeared from the national and European agendas since the election of Emmanuel Macron at the helm of France. Unfortunately, the malaise within each MS of the Union remains unchanged and ought to be analyzed.

On the question of the European Union, the debate about the role of the Commission will re-emerge with the next appointment of the President in 2019 and the next rounds of trade agreement with Japan. One core lesson that is often forgotten is the centrality of the MS in the decision-making process of the EU. The integration of the Union, either deepening or widening, cannot occur without the agreement and consent of the MS. If European technocrats and experts on the EU are aware of this fact, a wide majority of Europeans still tends to be unaware or even doubt this reality. Many cases in recent years, beginning with the Greek debt crisis leading to a referendum opposing the terms of the bailouts, which was then rejected by Prime Minister Tsipras, followed by the Austrian elections in May/November 2016, then the Brexit vote in June 2016, and the radicalization of new MS like Poland and Hungary, illustrate this popular opposition against the integration process and the EU at large.

The commonalities among all these cases are: regain of national sovereignty, protection of national identity, and quest to increase national power over European forces. The argument has usually been MS versus the EU. However, opening up the black-box of each MS, one can identify a much more nuance and complex picture. Within each MS, a division between cosmopolitanism (usually cities) versus nationalism (usually rural and post-industrial regions) is dividing countries politically and culturally speaking. The domestic split existed before 2016, but the financial crisis leading to an anemic economic growth across the Union exacerbated the split.

Pew Research Center

However, since the ‘positive’ outcomes of the Dutch and French elections, one could be fooled believing that the cultural-identity split dividing MS and the Union has disappeared. For many the election of Emmanuel Macron at the helm of French presidency stopped the populist wave. Such statement is certainly false considering the current domestic tensions in Poland with the push for constitutional reforms undermining the independence of the judiciary and in Hungary with the continuous anti-democratic efforts. The response of the Commission to potentially trigger Article 7 to sanction Poland is the proper approach enforcing the Copenhagen Criteria. However, the lack of clear support by Paris and Berlin to sanction Warsaw sends a mix message of unity and support of the rule of law in the EU.

The current Brexit negotiations are as well an important matter for the future of the EU and the relationship with the UK. Even though the departure of the UK from the Union is a disappointing event, it is an important historical lesson for Europeans. At this point, it would be a mistake for the EU to appear weak in the negotiations by not reaching a complete departure of the UK from the Union; Brexit ought to occur. In the UK, there are already surges of unhappiness towards the ruling class with the recent domestic talks of a potential remaining of the UK in the Union. It would play against the EU to keep the UK at this point of time. Despite a close majority of pro-Brexit votes winning the non-binding referendum, the EU needs to move along and finalize the exit of the UK. In addition, the EU needs to remain strong in enforcing rule of law and global norms. If the rumors of ongoing US-UK negotiations, as advanced by the American president, regarding a comprehensive trade agreement between the UK-US to kick in as soon the exit is completed, were to be true, the EU needs to escalate the matter. It is in the interest of the EU to enforce its global standing as the trade negotiator for the 28 Member States. The credibility of the EU as global actor is at play and should not be undermined by neither the UK nor the US. The 27 remaining MS need to support such action in case ongoing trade talks between London and Washington were to be accurate.

The domestic political tensions have distracted from the broader question of furthering the integration of the EU. The Eurozone crisis has highlighted the limitation of an integration à la carte and incomplete integration process in fiscal and economic matters. President Macron was in recent time the most pro-European candidate centering his agenda around the need to foster EU integration. Now in power, President Macron may back down from its EU centric agenda. But the EU needs to maintain the momentum in pushing for deepening the integration process in fiscal and economic issues as well as in defense policies.

(COPYRIGHT 2017 BY POLITIPOND. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. THIS MATERIAL MAY NOT BE PUBLISHED, BROADCAST, REWRITTEN OR REDISTRIBUTED WITHOUT PERMISSION).

Mr. Tusk Goes to Washington

(AP Photo/Susan Walsh)
(AP Photo/Susan Walsh)

In his first visit to Washington in his capacity as President of the European Council, Donald Tusk met with President Obama and Vice-President Biden today, March 9th, 2015. Over his two-day visit to the American capital, Donald Tusk seeks to solidify the EU’s relationship with the US. In addition, President Tusk will visit the Holocaust museum tomorrow, March 10th, in order to send a message of reconciliation to Europe’s Jewish community after the recent rise of anti-Jewish sentiments.

The agenda discussed between the two transatlantic leaders covered the following issues: Russia and the crisis in Ukraine; the situation around the Mediterranean with Syria, Libya and the consolidation of the Islamic State (IS); and naturally the negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). This comprehensive agenda underscores an interesting paradigm: each crisis is regional for the EU with serious international repercussions.

On the case of Ukraine and the role of Russia, the Europeans and Americans share the visions of the problem as it is a direct threat to the old concept of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, the Europeans, as expressed by President Tusk prior meeting with President Obama, are not willing to deepen the sanctions against Russia. There is a lack of unity among the EU-28 for domestic political reasons – like in Italy and Greece – and strong lobby groups in France, Britain and Germany – weapons, energy and finance – fearing a deepening in the tensions between the EU and Russia. From a personal standpoint, President Tusk, a former Prime Minister of Poland, has much more hawkish view of the problem and tends to emphasize the role of NATO.

The Mediterranean region is becoming one of the hottest part of the world. Geopolitics are moving fast and looking dire from Europe. The war in Syria seems unattainable, and the consolidation of IS in Syria, Iraq and now Libya is of great concerns for the EU. With a number of failed-states causing a regional vacuum, IS has found its territory to implement its strategy and vision. IS is attracting young Europeans, leading Europeans to conduct terrorist attacks against other Europeans, as well as widening its territorial control in the Middle East. President Tusk told reporters on March 9th, that “We [Europeans] must help because we cannot have a failed state run by warlords and anarchy — sitting in anarchy just 100 miles off the southern coast of Europe.” The power vacuum left after the fall of Gaddafi in 2011 had not been filled until the arrival of IS. Now IS is at the doorstep of Europe.

In the case of the TTIP, the negotiations initiated in 2013, are moving into their their year. It was supposed to be a mega-free trade deal, quickly signed, allowing further harmonization and lowering tariffs, allowing to bail-out the European economies, and ultimately boosting up the transatlantic economy. The TTIP is a way for the US and the EU to compete with the rise of new powers like China, India and Brazil. But instead a quick agreement, the negotiations have become more complex and Europeans have increased a certain numbers of concerns about the consequences of such FTA on their lives. Several issues are of concerns for Europeans: first, the lack of transparency in the negotiation process; second, lowering standards on health and food regulations (on Genetically Modified Food or even chlorine washed chicken); third, investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms (ISDS); and last, a certain opposition to globalization and American capitalism. If Americans and Europeans want to have the TTIP agreed, it will need to take place in 2015 otherwise it could look like the endless WTO’s Doha Round.

The transatlantic relationship is one of the world’ strongest and this high-level visit by President Tusk demonstrates that the EU and the US see eye-to-eye on foreign and economic policies. The degree of interdependence and interconnection between the two sides of the pond is such that the US cannot ignore what is happening at the doorsteps of Europe, and the Europeans have to realize the importance of the alliance with the US in order to assure its security.

(Copyright 2015 by Politipond. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission).

 

 

Power Transition from Ashton to Mogherini

mogherini

On November 1st, 2014, the transfer of power from Catherine Ashton to Frederica Mogherini was finally official. Federica Mogherini is the third High Representative (HR), as well referred as EU foreign minister, in EU history. The first HR, Javier Solana of Spain, was appointed in 1999 and remained at the helm for two mandates (1999-2009), followed by Catherine Ashton of the UK for one mandate (2009-2014), to now Federica Mogherini of Italy (2014-).

Before drawing some expectations on what the EU under HR Mogherini may look like, one should reflect on the transition of power from one High Representative to another: Solana to Ashton to Mogherini. Out of the three High Representatives, Mogherini seats comfortably behind Solana in terms of promising situations, meaning EU Member States’ willingness to commit to EU foreign affairs, economic position of the EU, and global forces. Catherine Ashton received the worst situation possible once appointed as HR in 2009. Considering the domestic, regional and international situations, it would have been very difficult for any appointee to make it into a successful tenure.

The Position and Role of the High Representative

The position of High Representative was established at the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 Solana-fermeture-014and the first High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy was appointed in 1999 after the European Council meeting of Cologne (for more in depth analysis on the position of the HR refer to these books, here and here). The article J.8.3 of the Amsterdam Treaty mentions the position of HR and states that the Presidency will be assisted by the HR. The description of the job requirements was very broad, as the HR ought to contribute with assistance of the Council to the “formulation, preparation, and implementation of policy decisions” on foreign and security policy matters (Official Journal of the European Union 2007: Article J.16). The HR was supposed to increase the cooperation between the various actors in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), bring coherence in the rotating processes of the six-month presidencies, and to make the EU a more visible international actor.

Until the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), the position of the HR did not evolve institutionally speaking. Javier Solana made his marks all over the position during his tenure. With Lisbon, the new position became the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission. The Lisbon Treaty made the position of HR more complex and as well cross-institutional, as the HR sits now at the Commission and at the Council, whereas before the Treaty of Lisbon, the HR was only sitting at the Secretariat of the Council. The position of the HR is now the bridge between a supranational institution, the Commission, the Member States, the Council, and the institution at the HR’s disposition, the European External Action Service (EEAS). The most important change in the position of the HR is its double-role, supranational and intergovernmental all at the same time. As opposed to her predecessor, HR Mogherini has announced her moving from the EEAS building to the Commission’s building, wherein she will be residing. The Treaty of Lisbon made the position of the HR one of the most powerful and visible figure in the Union.

From Ashton to Mogherini

A vast literature, mostly from media and think tanks, have demonstrated, since her appointment, how Catherine Ashton has been a weak HR and certainly not very savvy in dealing with foreign affairs. Cathy Ashton even describes herself as the “accidental diplomat” (O’Connor 2010). HR Ashton certainly scored some late successes with the agreement in Kosovo (despite the recent scandal over the EU mission in Kosovo) and Iran. For the rest, HR Ashton has been invisible and quiet.  As compared to Federica Mogherini, Catherine Ashton took the helm of European foreign policy at a very difficult time. One should recognize that Ashton faced three fundamental difficulties when appointed HR/VP in 2009.

First, the world markets were at their lowest after the collapse of the global financial markets in 2007. The Eurozone was already feeling the tension and several EU Member States were already showing serious signs of weakness such asPortugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain, formerly known as the PIIGS. The future of the Union looked very bleak at that point and many thought that neither the EU nor the Euro would survive the crisis. The financial crisis, and its consequences on the eurozone, was the first real challenge ever faced by the EU. Many realized the degree of incoherence, unpreparedness in the design of the Union and its monetary union. Ultimately, the CSDP was not the priority for neither the EU nor the Member States. The Union turned into crisis-mode and let the CSDP on the side. The CSDP was after ten years of existence considered a luxury good that Member States could easily dispense themselves from, especially the European powerhouses with effective diplomatic and defense instruments. During the Solana era, Member States were committed to the CSDP experiment and were willing to spend money and contribute in terms of capabilities and humans. This was not the same under Ashton, whom had to deal with less money, less political will, and an messy world order.

Second, Ashton was being appointed right after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009. The Treaty of Lisbon changed a lot the EU in terms of foreign and security policy. First, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – or foreign policy – and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) – or European defense – were merged into the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Second, the Treaty of Lisbon established the European External Action Service (EEAS). Cathy Ashton had one year to design a new institution and make it operational. Third, the position of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy was transformed into a double-hatted position, the High Representative of European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). Prior to Ashton, the HR was simply part of the Secretary of the Council of the EU, now the HR is not only leading a new body, the EEAS, and chairing at the Commission. The double-hatted position merges two contradictory institutional forces, inter-governmentalism and supranationalism.

Las but not least, Cathy Ashton took over European foreign policy after its first and very successful HR Javier Solana. Javier Solana, a savvy Spanish politician, was prior hisCatherine_Ashton_and_solana appointment at the helm of European foreign affairs in 1999, Secretary General of NATO from 1995 to 1999. During his leadership at the head of the Alliance, he oversaw the massive air campaign over Kosovo in 1998 and demonstrated on the international stage his savviness in working with Europe and the US. During his time at the head of European foreign policy, he was the person that pushed the ESDP from its paper-status into a civilian-military instruments seeing its first action in 2003. He has as well axiomatic during the nuclear negotiation with Iran in 2002-03, known as the EU3+1. The +1 being HR Solana, which rose the question of knowing if Solana was speaking in the name of Europe, or simply being an intermediary between the EU3 and the rest of the Union. Last, Solana finally was important in answering Kissinger’s question, “what is the phone number of Europe?”

Yes, Cathy Ashton was not the best HR/VP that European experts were dreaming about. But she embodied what the powerful EU Member States wanted, a leaderless HR/VP shifting the EU from a risk-taking EU into a risk-averse EU. EU Member States, especially France, Germany and the UK, wanted in 2009 to avoid another Solana and settled on the appointment of Ashton. For her defense, as demonstrated above, her set of cards could not really allow her to do anything positive. During her mandate, she illustrated herself more as an administrator than a strategic leader. Her clear achievement, though, is the EEAS, that she was able to create and implement in one year.

A Welcome’s Note

hq_hp_mogherini_enAs opposed to Ashton, Mogherini’ situation is much more promising and could allow her to be an effective HR/VP. She embodies a new generation of European leaders and is from Italy, a founding Member State, that wants to redeem itself after the years of crisis. Mogherini’s experience in foreign affairs is certainly greater than Ashton’s, but lesser than Solana. It will be interesting to see what Mogherini decides to focus on: foreign policy and/or defense. Will she help in strengthening the CSDP – civilian-military instrument -? Or, would she facilitate the transition to a more NATO integrated instrument? In terms of foreign policy issues, she has several important ones in her hands (see the excellent memo by Daniel Keohane, Stefan Lehne, Ulrich Speck, Jan Techau about the challenges facing HR Mogherini):

  • short-term, ebola, the direct threat of the Islamic State (IS), and Eastern violences in Ukraine. They all represent direct threats to the security of the Union.
  • mid-term, stabilizing the neighborhoods (Eastern and Southern) through economic and development assistances. Countries in Northern-Africa and Central Africa are facing serious domestic challenges that could completely destabilize the region. For the Union, it means rise of ethnic violence in Africa, illegal trafficking, rise of mass-migrations, and eventually rise of radical islamism, all these directly threatening the stability of the Union. The CSDP was created for exactly this purpose to stabilize the neighborhoods. Would it become the primary instrument for stabilization, peace-keeping, and institutional solidification?
  • long-term (well beyond her tenure), the survival of European influence in global affairs and the maintenance of its strategic role side by side with new powers like China and Brazil. Ashton did not have a long-term vision, will Mogherini have one? The EU still holds a favorable position in the current global order. Its Member States are key actors in international organizations, with France and Britain at the UN Security Council, with NATO, the WTO, the IMF – Christine Lagarde of France is leading it -, the World Bank and so forth. Multilateralism has always been a core component of European global strategy, now EU Member States have to solidify and empower these international organizations in order to keep them relevant in a more multipolar system. The EU has a role to play in the 21st century, but if it does not secure a seat in this new multipolar global order, it will simply become a second/third rank power.

In any case, Politipond wishes the best of luck to Federica Mogherini. She published on the EEAS website a simple message marking her commencement and calling for a new beginning:

Today we start a new story. The next five years will be challenging, we are all well aware of the difficulties that lie ahead of us. Our part of the world is facing one of the most complex periods of our recent history, still I believe we have all the tools and the capacity to overcome these times of tensions and crisis, and build peace, stability and prosperity all around Europe.
 
It’s up to us and we have great opportunities too. Vision, political will and teamwork can make us shape a much better future. Not only for Europe, but for the rest of the world. Today I start my mandate knowing that I can build on the good lessons we can learn from the past and counting on an excellent team: in the EEAS, in the Commission, in the Council and with all Member States. We know the next five years will be a turning point: we feel the responsibility to make the European dream come true.
 
Generations of Europeans expect from us a new beginning. So, ready to start!
 
Federica Mogherini
 
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